(1) The Department has a decentralized system for responding to FOIA requests, with each component designating a FOIA office to process records from that component. All components have the capability to receive requests electronically either through email or a web portal. To make a request for records of the Department, a requester should write directly to the FOIA office of the component that maintains the records being sought. A request will receive the quickest possible response if it is addressed to the FOIA office of the component that maintains the records sought. The Department's FOIA Reference Guide, which may be accessed as described in § 16.1(a), contains descriptions of the functions of each component and provides other information that is helpful in determining where to make a request. Each component's FOIA office and any additional requirements for submitting a request to a given component are listed in Appendix I to this part. Part 0 of this chapter also summarizes the functions of each component. These references can all be used by requesters to determine where to send their requests within the Department.

(2) A requester may also send requests to the FOIA/PA Mail Referral Unit, Justice Management Division, Department of Justice, 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20530-0001, or via email to MRUFOIA.Requests@usdoj.gov, or via fax to (202) 616-6695. The Mail Referral Unit will forward the request to the component(s) that it determines to be most likely to maintain the records that are sought.

(3) A requester who is making a request for records about himself or herself must comply with the verification of identity provision set forth in subpart D of this part.

(4) Where a request for records pertains to a third party, a requester may receive greater access by submitting either a notarized authorization signed by that individual or a declaration made in compliance with the requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. 1746 by that individual authorizing disclosure of the records to the requester, or by submitting proof that the individual is deceased (e.g., a copy of a death certificate or an obituary). As an exercise of administrative discretion, each component can require a requester to supply additional information if necessary in order to verify that a particular individual has consented to disclosure.

(1) Consultation. When records originated with the component processing the request, but contain within them information of interest to another component, agency, or other Federal Government office, the component processing the request should typically consult with that other component or agency prior to making a release determination.

(2) Referral.

(3) Coordination. The standard referral procedure is not appropriate where disclosure of the identity of the component or agency to which the referral would be made could harm an interest protected by an applicable exemption, such as the exemptions that protect personal privacy or national security interests. For example, if a non-law enforcement component responding to a request for records on a living third party locates within its files records originating with a law enforcement agency, and if the existence of that law enforcement interest in the third party was not publicly known, then to disclose that law enforcement interest could cause an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of the third party. Similarly, if a component locates within its files material originating with an Intelligence Community agency, and the involvement of that agency in the matter is classified and not publicly acknowledged, then to disclose or give attribution to the involvement of that Intelligence Community agency could cause national security harms. In such instances, in order to avoid harm to an interest protected by an applicable exemption, the component that received the request should coordinate with the originating component or agency to seek its views on the disclosability of the record. The release determination for the record that is the subject of the coordination should then be conveyed to the requester by the component that originally received the request.

(1) Requests and appeals shall be processed on an expedited basis whenever it is determined that they involve:

(2) A request for expedited processing may be made at any time. Requests based on paragraphs (e)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii) of this section must be submitted to the component that maintains the records requested. When making a request for expedited processing of an administrative appeal, the request should be submitted to OIP. Requests for expedited processing that are based on paragraph (e)(1)(iv) of this section must be submitted to the Director of Public Affairs at the Office of Public Affairs, Department of Justice, 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20530-0001. A component that receives a misdirected request for expedited processing under the standard set forth in paragraph (e)(1)(iv) of this section shall forward it immediately to the Office of Public Affairs for its determination. The time period for making the determination on the request for expedited processing under paragraph (e)(1)(iv) of this section shall commence on the date that the Office of Public Affairs receives the request, provided that it is routed within 10 working days.

(3) A requester who seeks expedited processing must submit a statement, certified to be true and correct, explaining in detail the basis for making the request for expedited processing. For example, under paragraph (e)(1)(ii) of this section, a requester who is not a full-time member of the news media must establish that the requester is a person whose primary professional activity or occupation is information dissemination, though it need not be the requester's sole occupation. Such a requester also must establish a particular urgency to inform the public about the government activity involved in the request—one that extends beyond the public's right to know about government activity generally. The existence of numerous articles published on a given subject can be helpful in establishing the requirement that there be an “urgency to inform” the public on the topic. As a matter of administrative discretion, a component may waive the formal certification requirement.

(4) A component shall notify the requester within 10 calendar days of the receipt of a request for expedited processing of its decision whether to grant or deny expedited processing. If expedited processing is granted, the request shall be given priority, placed in the processing track for expedited requests, and shall be processed as soon as practicable. If a request for expedited processing is denied, any appeal of that decision shall be acted on expeditiously.

(1) The name and title or position of the person responsible for the denial;

(2) A brief statement of the reasons for the denial, including any FOIA exemption applied by the component in denying the request;

(3) An estimate of the volume of any records or information withheld, such as the number of pages or some other reasonable form of estimation, although such an estimate is not required if the volume is otherwise indicated by deletions marked on records that are disclosed in part or if providing an estimate would harm an interest protected by an applicable exemption; and

(4) A statement that the denial may be appealed under § 16.8(a), and a description of the requirements set forth therein.

(5) A statement notifying the requester of the assistance available from the component's FOIA Public Liaison and the dispute resolution services offered by the Office of Government Information Services.

(1) In the event that a component identifies records that may be subject to exclusion from the requirements of the FOIA pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(c), the component must confer with OIP to obtain approval to apply the exclusion.

(2) Any component invoking an exclusion shall maintain an administrative record of the process of invocation and approval of the exclusion by OIP.

(1) Confidential commercial information means commercial or financial information obtained by the Department from a submitter that may be protected from disclosure under Exemption 4 of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4).

(2) Submitter means any person or entity, including a corporation, State, or foreign government, but not including another Federal Government entity, that provides information, either directly or indirectly to the Federal Government.

(1) A component shall promptly provide written notice to a submitter of confidential commercial information whenever records containing such information are requested under the FOIA if, after reviewing the request, the responsive records, and any appeal by the requester, the component determines that it may be required to disclose the records, provided:

(2) The notice shall either describe the commercial information requested or include a copy of the requested records or portions of records containing the information. In cases involving a voluminous number of submitters, notice may be made by posting or publishing the notice in a place or manner reasonably likely to accomplish it.

(1) The component determines that the information is exempt under the FOIA;

(2) The information has been lawfully published or has been officially made available to the public;

(3) Disclosure of the information is required by a statute other than the FOIA or by a regulation issued in accordance with the requirements of Executive Order 12600 of June 23, 1987; or

(4) The designation made by the submitter under paragraph (b) of this section appears obviously frivolous, except that, in such a case, the component shall give the submitter written notice of any final decision to disclose the information and must provide that notice within a reasonable number of days prior to a specified disclosure date.

(1) A component shall specify a reasonable time period within which the submitter must respond to the notice referenced above. If a submitter has any objections to disclosure, it should provide the component a detailed written statement that specifies all grounds for withholding the particular information under any exemption of the FOIA. In order to rely on Exemption 4 as basis for nondisclosure, the submitter must explain why the information constitutes a trade secret or commercial or financial information that is privileged or confidential.

(2) A submitter who fails to respond within the time period specified in the notice shall be considered to have no objection to disclosure of the information. Information received by the component after the date of any disclosure decision shall not be considered by the component. Any information provided by a submitter under this subpart may itself be subject to disclosure under the FOIA.

(1) A statement of the reasons why each of the submitter's disclosure objections was not sustained;

(2) A description of the information to be disclosed; and

(3) A specified disclosure date, which shall be a reasonable time subsequent to the notice.

(1) The Director of OIP or designee will act on behalf of the Attorney General on all appeals under this section.

(2) An appeal ordinarily will not be adjudicated if the request becomes a matter of FOIA litigation.

(3) On receipt of any appeal involving classified information, OIP shall take appropriate action to ensure compliance with part 17 of this title.

(1) Commercial use request is a request that asks for information for a use or a purpose that furthers a commercial, trade, or profit interest, which can include furthering those interests through litigation. A component's decision to place a requester in the commercial use category will be made on a case-by-case basis based on the requester's intended use of the information.

(2) Direct costs are those expenses that an agency incurs in searching for and duplicating (and, in the case of commercial use requests, reviewing) records in order to respond to a FOIA request. For example, direct costs include the salary of the employee performing the work (i.e., the basic rate of pay for the employee, plus 16 percent of that rate to cover benefits) and the cost of operating computers and other electronic equipment, such as photocopiers and scanners. Direct costs do not include overhead expenses such as the costs of space, and of heating or lighting a facility.

(3) Duplication is reproducing a copy of a record, or of the information contained in it, necessary to respond to a FOIA request. Copies can take the form of paper, audiovisual materials, or electronic records, among others.

(4) Educational institution is any school that operates a program of scholarly research. A requester in this fee category must show that the request is made in connection with the requester's role at the educational institution. Components may seek assurance from the requester that the request is in furtherance of scholarly research and will advise requesters of their placement in this category.

(5) Noncommercial scientific institution is an institution that is not operated on a “commercial” basis, as defined in paragraph (b)(1) of this section and that is operated solely for the purpose of conducting scientific research the results of which are not intended to promote any particular product or industry. A requester in this category must show that the request is authorized by and is made under the auspices of a qualifying institution and that the records are sought to further scientific research and are not for a commercial use.

(6) Representative of the news media is any person or entity that actively gathers information of potential interest to a segment of the public, uses its editorial skills to turn the raw materials into a distinct work, and distributes that work to an audience. The term “news” means information that is about current events or that would be of current interest to the public. Examples of news media entities include television or radio stations that broadcast “news” to the public at large and publishers of periodicals that disseminate “news” and make their products available through a variety of means to the general public, including news organizations that disseminate solely on the Internet. A request for records supporting the news-dissemination function of the requester shall not be considered to be for a commercial use. “Freelance” journalists who demonstrate a solid basis for expecting publication through a news media entity shall be considered as a representative of the news media. A publishing contract would provide the clearest evidence that publication is expected; however, components shall also consider a requester's past publication record in making this determination.

(7) Review is the examination of a record located in response to a request in order to determine whether any portion of it is exempt from disclosure. Review time includes processing any record for disclosure, such as doing all that is necessary to prepare the record for disclosure, including the process of redacting the record and marking the appropriate exemptions. Review costs are properly charged even if a record ultimately is not disclosed. Review time also includes time spent both obtaining and considering any formal objection to disclosure made by a confidential commercial information submitter under § 16.7, but it does not include time spent resolving general legal or policy issues regarding the application of exemptions.

(8) Search is the process of looking for and retrieving records or information responsive to a request. Search time includes page-by-page or line-by-line identification of information within records and the reasonable efforts expended to locate and retrieve information from electronic records.

(1) Search.

(2) Duplication. Duplication fees shall be charged to all requesters, subject to the restrictions of paragraph (d) of this section. A component shall honor a requester's preference for receiving a record in a particular form or format where it is readily reproducible by the component in the form or format requested. Where photocopies are supplied, the component shall provide one copy per request at a cost of five cents per page. For copies of records produced on tapes, disks, or other media, components shall charge the direct costs of producing the copy, including operator time. Where paper documents must be scanned in order to comply with a requester's preference to receive the records in an electronic format, the requester shall pay the direct costs associated with scanning those materials. For other forms of duplication, components shall charge the direct costs.

(3) Review. Review fees shall be charged to requesters who make commercial use requests. Review fees shall be assessed in connection with the initial review of the record, i.e., the review conducted by a component to determine whether an exemption applies to a particular record or portion of a record. No charge will be made for review at the administrative appeal stage of exemptions applied at the initial review stage. However, if a particular exemption is deemed to no longer apply, any costs associated with a component's re-review of the records in order to consider the use of other exemptions may be assessed as review fees. Review fees shall be charged at the same rates as those charged for a search under paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this section.

(1) No search fees will be charged for requests by educational institutions (unless the records are sought for a commercial use), noncommercial scientific institutions, or representatives of the news media.

(2) If a component fails to comply with the FOIA's time limits in which to respond to a request, it may not charge search fees, or, in the instances of requests from requesters described in paragraph (d)(1) of this section, may not charge duplication fees, except as described in paragraphs (d)(2)(i) through (iii) of this section.

(3) No search or review fees will be charged for a quarter-hour period unless more than half of that period is required for search or review.

(4) Except for requesters seeking records for a commercial use, components shall provide without charge:

(5) When, after first deducting the 100 free pages (or its cost equivalent) and the first two hours of search, a total fee calculated under paragraph (c) of this section is $25.00 or less for any request, no fee will be charged.

(1) When a component determines or estimates that the fees to be assessed in accordance with this section will exceed $25.00, the component shall notify the requester of the actual or estimated amount of the fees, including a breakdown of the fees for search, review or duplication, unless the requester has indicated a willingness to pay fees as high as those anticipated. If only a portion of the fee can be estimated readily, the component shall advise the requester accordingly. If the requester is a noncommercial use requester, the notice shall specify that the requester is entitled to the statutory entitlements of 100 pages of duplication at no charge and, if the requester is charged search fees, two hours of search time at no charge, and shall advise the requester whether those entitlements have been provided.

(2) In cases in which a requester has been notified that the actual or estimated fees are in excess of $25.00, the request shall not be considered received and further work will not be completed until the requester commits in writing to pay the actual or estimated total fee, or designates some amount of fees the requester is willing to pay, or in the case of a noncommercial use requester who has not yet been provided with the requester's statutory entitlements, designates that the requester seeks only that which can be provided by the statutory entitlements. The requester must provide the commitment or designation in writing, and must, when applicable, designate an exact dollar amount the requester is willing to pay. Components are not required to accept payments in installments.

(3) If the requester has indicated a willingness to pay some designated amount of fees, but the component estimates that the total fee will exceed that amount, the component shall toll the processing of the request when it notifies the requester of the estimated fees in excess of the amount the requester has indicated a willingness to pay. The component shall inquire whether the requester wishes to revise the amount of fees the requester is willing to pay or modify the request. Once the requester responds, the time to respond will resume from where it was at the date of the notification.

(4) Components shall make available their FOIA Public Liaison or other FOIA professional to assist any requester in reformulating a request to meet the requester's needs at a lower cost.

(1) For requests other than those described in paragraphs (i)(2) or (i)(3) of this section, a component shall not require the requester to make an advance payment before work is commenced or continued on a request. Payment owed for work already completed (i.e., payment before copies are sent to a requester) is not an advance payment.

(2) When a component determines or estimates that a total fee to be charged under this section will exceed $250.00, it may require that the requester make an advance payment up to the amount of the entire anticipated fee before beginning to process the request. A component may elect to process the request prior to collecting fees when it receives a satisfactory assurance of full payment from a requester with a history of prompt payment.

(3) Where a requester has previously failed to pay a properly charged FOIA fee to any component or agency within 30 calendar days of the billing date, a component may require that the requester pay the full amount due, plus any applicable interest on that prior request, and the component may require that the requester make an advance payment of the full amount of any anticipated fee before the component begins to process a new request or continues to process a pending request or any pending appeal. Where a component has a reasonable basis to believe that a requester has misrepresented the requester's identity in order to avoid paying outstanding fees, it may require that the requester provide proof of identity.

(4) In cases in which a component requires advance payment, the request shall not be considered received and further work will not be completed until the required payment is received. If the requester does not pay the advance payment within 30 calendar days after the date of the component's fee determination, the request will be closed.

(1) Requesters may seek a waiver of fees by submitting a written application demonstrating how disclosure of the requested information is in the public interest because it is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government and is not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester.

(2) A component must furnish records responsive to a request without charge or at a reduced rate when it determines, based on all available information, that disclosure of the requested information is in the public interest because it is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government and is not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester. In deciding whether this standard is satisfied the component must consider the factors described in paragraphs (k)(2)(i) through (iii) of this section:

(3) Where only some of the records to be released satisfy the requirements for a waiver of fees, a waiver shall be granted for those records.

(4) Requests for a waiver or reduction of fees should be made when the request is first submitted to the component and should address the criteria referenced above. A requester may submit a fee waiver request at a later time so long as the underlying record request is pending or on administrative appeal. When a requester who has committed to pay fees subsequently asks for a waiver of those fees and that waiver is denied, the requester shall be required to pay any costs incurred up to the date the fee waiver request was received.

(1) In all federal and state proceedings in which the United States is a party; and

(2) In all federal and state proceedings in which the United States is not a party, including any proceedings in which the Department is representing a government employee solely in that employee's individual capacity, when a subpoena, order, or other demand (hereinafter collectively referred to as a “demand”) of a court or other authority is issued for such material or information.

(1) There is no objection after inquiry of the originating component;

(2) The demanded disclosure, in the judgment of the responsible official, is appropriate under the factors specified in § 16.26(a) of this part; and

(3) None of the factors specified in § 16.26(b) of this part exists with respect to the demanded disclosure.

(1) In a case in which the United States is not a party, if the responsible U.S. attorney and the originating component disagree with respect to the appropriateness of demanded testimony or of a particular disclosure, or if they agree that such testimony or such a disclosure should not be made, they shall determine if the demand involves information that was collected, assembled, or prepared in connection with litigation or an investigation supervised by a division of this Department or the EOUST. If so, the U.S. attorney shall notify the Director of the EOUST or the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the division responsible for such litigation or investigation, who may:

(2) If the demand for testimony or other disclosure in such a case does not involve information that was collected, assembled, or prepared in connection with litigation or an investigation supervised by a division of this Department, the originating component shall decide whether disclosure is appropriate, except that, when especially significant issues are raised, the responsible official may refer the matter to the Deputy or Associate Attorney General, as indicated in § 16.25 of this part. If the originating component determines that disclosure would not be appropriate and the responsible official does not refer the matter for higher level review, the responsible official shall take all appropriate steps to limit the scope or obtain the withdrawal of a demand.

(1) to the Deputy Attorney General, if the matter is referred personally by or through the designee of an Assistant Attorney General who is within the general supervision of the Deputy Attorney General, or

(2) to the Associate Attorney General, in all other cases.

(1) to the Deputy Attorney General, if the originating component is within the supervision of the Deputy Attorney General or is an independent agency that, for administrative purposes, is within the Department of Justice, or

(2) to the Associate Attorney General, if the originating component is within the supervision of the Associate Attorney General.

(1) Whether such disclosure is appropriate under the rules of procedure governing the case or matter in which the demand arose, and

(2) Whether disclosure is appropriate under the relevant substantive law concerning privilege.

(1) Disclosure would violate a statute, such as the income tax laws, 26 U.S.C. 6103 and 7213, or a rule of procedure, such as the grand jury secrecy rule, F.R.Cr.P., Rule 6(e),

(2) Disclosure would violate a specific regulation;

(3) Disclosure would reveal classified information, unless appropriately declassified by the originating agency,

(4) Disclosure would reveal a confidential source or informant, unless the investigative agency and the source or informant have no objection,

(5) Disclosure would reveal investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, and would interfere with enforcement proceedings or disclose investigative techniques and procedures the effectiveness of which would thereby be impaired,

(6) Disclosure would improperly reveal trade secrets without the owner's consent.

(1) The seriousness of the violation or crime involved,

(2) The past history or criminal record of the violator or accused,

(3) The importance of the relief sought,

(4) The importance of the legal issues presented,

(5) Other matters brought to the attention of the Deputy or Associate Attorney General.

(1) Component means each separate bureau, office, board, division, commission, service, or administration of the Department of Justice.

(2) Request for access to a record means a request made under Privacy Act subsection (d)(1).

(3) Request for amendment or correction of a record means a request made under Privacy Act subsection (d)(2).

(4) Request for an accounting means a request made under Privacy Act subsection (c)(3).

(5) Requester means an individual who makes a request for access, a request for amendment or correction, or a request for an accounting under the Privacy Act.

(1) The identity of the individual who is the subject of the record, by stating the name, current address, date and place of birth, and, at your option, the social security number of the individual;

(2) Your own identity, as required in paragraph (d) of this section;

(3) That you are the parent or guardian of that individual, which you may prove by providing a copy of the individual's birth certificate showing your parentage or by providing a court order establishing your guardianship; and

(4) That you are acting on behalf of that individual in making the request.

(1) Respond to the request regarding that record, after consulting with the component or agency best able to determine whether the record is exempt from access and with any other component or agency that has a substantial interest in it; or

(2) Refer the responsibility for responding to the request regarding that record to the component best able to determine whether it is exempt from access, or to another agency that originated the record (but only if that agency is subject to the Privacy Act). Ordinarily, the component or agency that originated a record will be presumed to be best able to determine whether it is exempt from access.

(1) The name and title or position of the person responsible for the denial;

(2) A brief statement of the reason(s) for the denial, including any Privacy Act exemption(s) applied by the component in denying the request; and

(3) A statement that the denial may be appealed under § 16.45(a) and a description of the requirements of § 16.45(a).

(1) In the case of an adverse determination by the Deputy Attorney General or the Associate Attorney General, the Attorney General or the Attorney General's designee will act on the appeal;

(2) An adverse determination by the Attorney General will be the final action of the Department; and

(3) An appeal ordinarily will not be acted on if the request becomes a matter of litigation.

(1) The reason(s) for the denial; and

(2) The procedure for appeal of the denial under paragraph (c) of this section, including the name and business address of the official who will act on your appeal.

(1) Transcripts of testimony given under oath or written statements made under oath;

(2) Transcripts of grand jury proceedings, judicial proceedings, or quasi-judicial proceedings, which are the official record of those proceedings;

(3) Presentence records that originated with the courts; and

(4) Records in systems of records that have been exempted from amendment and correction under Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a(j) or (k) by notice published in the Federal Register.

(1) Disclosures for which accountings are not required to be kept—in other words, disclosures that are made to employees within the agency and disclosures that are made under the FOIA;

(2) Disclosures made to law enforcement agencies for authorized law enforcement activities in response to written requests from those law enforcement agencies specifying the law enforcement activities for which the disclosures are sought; or

(3) Disclosures made from law enforcement systems of records that have been exempted from accounting requirements.

(1) Records are protected from public view;

(2) The area in which records are kept is supervised during business hours to prevent unauthorized persons from having access to them;

(3) Records are inaccessible to unauthorized persons outside of business hours; and

(4) Records are not disclosed to unauthorized persons or under unauthorized circumstances in either oral or written form.

(1) Whether providing social security numbers is mandatory or voluntary;

(2) Any statutory or regulatory authority that authorizes the collection of social security numbers; and

(3) The uses that will be made of the numbers.

(1) The legal authority to collect the information and whether providing it is mandatory or voluntary;

(2) The principal purpose for which the Department intends to use the information;

(3) The routine uses the Department may make of the information; and

(4) The effects on the individual, if any, of not providing the information;

(1) General Files System of the Office of the Attorney General (JUSTICE/OAG-001).

These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in the system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a (j)(2), (k)(1), (k)(2), and (k)(5).

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures from records concerning him/her would reveal investigative interest on the part of the Department of Justice as well as the recipient agency. This would permit record subjects to impede the investigation, e.g., destroy evidence, intimidate potential witnesses, or flee the area to avoid inquiries or apprehension by law enforcement personnel.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d) pursuant to subsections (j) and (k) of the Privacy Act.

(3) From subsection (d) because the records contained in this system relate to official Federal investigations. Individual access to these records might compromise ongoing investigations, reveal confidential informants or constitute unwarranted invasions of the personal privacy of third parties who are involved in a certain investigation. Amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing criminal law enforcement proceedings and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring criminal investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.

(4) From subsections (e) (1) and (5) because in the course of law enforcement investigations, information may occasionally be obtained or introduced the accuracy of which is unclear or which is not strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of criminal activity. Moreover, it would impede the specific investigative process if it were necessary to assure the relevance, accuracy, timeliness and completeness of all information obtained.

(5) From subsection (e)(2) because in a law enforcement investigation the requirement that information be collected to the greatest extent possible from the subject individual would present a serious impediment to law enforcement in that the subject of the investigation would be informed of the existence of the investigation and would therefore be able to avoid detection, apprehension, or legal obligations of duties.

(6) From subsection (e)(3) because to comply with the requirements of this subsection during the course of an investigation could impede the information gathering process, thus hampering the investigation.

(7) From subsections (e)(4) (G) and (H) because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d) pursuant to subsections (j) and (k) of the Privacy Act.

(8) From subsection (g) because this system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d) pursuant to subsections (j) and (k) of the Privacy Act.

(1) Presidential Appointee Candidate Records System (JUSTICE/DAG-006).

(2) Presidential Appointee Records System (JUSTICE/DAG-007).

(3) Special Candidates for Presidential Appointments Records System (JUSTICE/DAG-008).

(4) Miscellaneous Attorney Personnel Records System (JUSTICE/DAG-011).

These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in these systems is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5).

(1) From subsection (d)(1) because many persons are contacted who, without an assurance of anonymity, refuse to provide information concerning a candidate for a Presidential appointee or Department attorney position. Access could reveal the identity of the source of the information and constitute a breach of the promise of confidentiality on the part of the Department of Justice. Such breaches ultimately would restrict the free flow of information vital to a determination of a candidate's qualifications and suitability.

(2) From subsection (e)(1) because in the collection of information for investigative and evaluative purposes, it is impossible to determine in advance what exact information may be of assistance in determining the qualifications and suitability of a candidate. Information which may appear irrelevant, when combined with other seemingly irrelevant information, can on occasion provide a composite picture of a candidate for a position which assists in determining whether that candidate should be nominated for appointment.

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures from records concerning him/her could reveal investigative interest on the part of the Department of Justice, as well as the recipient agency. This would permit record subjects to impede the investigation, e.g., destroy evidence, intimidate potential witnesses, or flee the area to avoid inquiries or apprehension by law enforcement personnel. Further, making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures could reveal the identity of a confidential source. In addition, release of an accounting of disclosures from the General Files System may reveal information that is properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 12356, and thereby cause damage to the national security.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) because these systems are exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d) pursuant to subsections (j) and (k) of the Privacy Act.

(3) From subsection (d) because the records contained in these systems relate to official Federal investigations. Individual access to these records could compromise ongoing investigations, reveal confidential informants and/or sensitive investigative techniques used in particular investigations, or constitute unwarranted invasions of the personal privacy of third parties who are involved in a certain investigation. In addition, release of records from the General Files System may reveal information that is properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 12356, and thereby cause damage to the national security. Amendment of the records in either of these systems would interfere with ongoing law enforcement proceedings and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring law enforcement investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.

(4) From subsections (e)(1) and (e)(5) because in the course of law enforcement investigations information may occasionally be obtained or introduced the accuracy of which is unclear or which is not strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of criminal activity. Moreover, it would impede any investigative process, whether civil or criminal, if it were necessary to assure the relevance, accuracy, timeliness and completeness of all information obtained.

(5) From subsection (e)(2) because in a law enforcement investigation the requirement that information be collected to the greatest extent possible from the subject individual would present a serious impediment to law enforcement in that the subject of the investigation would be informed of the existence of the investigation and may therefore be able to avoid detection, apprehension, or legal obligations or duties.

(6) From subsection (e)(3) because to comply with the requirements of this subsection during the course of an investigation could impede the information gathering process, thus hampering the investigation.

(7) From subsection (g) because these systems of records are exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d) pursuant to subsections (j) and (k) of the Privacy Act.

(1) General Files System of the Office of the Associate Attorney General (JUSTICE/AAG-001).

These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in the system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), (k)(1), (k)(2) and (k)(5).

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures from records concerning him/her could reveal investigative interest on the part of the Department of Justice, as well as the recipient agency. This would permit record subjects to impede the investigation, e.g., destroy evidence, intimidate potential witnesses, or flee the area to avoid inquiries or apprehension by law enforcement personnel. Further, making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures could reveal the identity of a confidential source. In addition, release of an accounting of disclosures may reveal information that is properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 12356, and thereby cause damage to the national security.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d) pursuant to subsections (j)(2), (k)(1), (k)(2) and (k)(5) of the Privacy Act.

(3) From subsection (d) because the records contained in this system relate to official Federal investigations. Individual access to these records could compromise ongoing investigations, reveal confidential informants and/or sensitive investigative techniques used in particular investigations, or constitute unwarranted invasions of the personal privacy of third parties who are involved in a certain investigation. In addition, release of these records may reveal information that is properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 12356, and thereby cause damage to the national security. Amendment of the records in this system would interfere with ongoing law enforcement proceedings and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring law enforcement investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.

(4) From subsections (e)(1) and (e)(5) because in the course of law enforcement investigations information may occasionally be obtained or introduced the accuracy of which is unclear or which is not strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of criminal activity. Moreover, it would impede any investigative process, whether civil or criminal, if it were necessary to assure the relevance, accuracy, timeliness and completeness of all information obtained.

(5) From subsection (e)(2) because in a law enforcement investigation the requirement that information be collected to the greatest extent possible from the subject individual would present a serious impediment to law enforcement in that the subject of the investigation would be informed of the existence of the investigation and may therefore be able to avoid detection, apprehension, or legal obligations or duties.

(6) From subsection (e)(3) because to comply with the requirements of this subsection during the course of an investigation could impede the information gathering process, thus hampering the investigation.

(7) From subsection (g) because this system of records is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d) pursuant to subsections (j)(2), (k)(1), (k)(2) and (k)(5) of the Privacy Act.

(1) Freedom of Information and Privacy Appeals Index (JUSTICE/OLP-001).

These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), (k)(2) and (k)(5).

(1) From subsections (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4) to the extent that information in this record system relates to official Federal investigations and matters of law enforcement. Individual access to these records might compromise ongoing investigations, reveal confidential informants or constitute unwarranted invasions of the personal privacy of third parties who are involved in a certain investigation. Amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing criminal law enforcement proceedings and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring criminal investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.

(2) From subsections (e)(1) and (5) because in the course of law enforcement investigations, information may occasionally be obtained or introduced the accuracy of which is unclear or which is not strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of criminal activity. Moreover, it would impede the specific investigative process if it were necessary to assure the relevance, accuracy, timeliness, and completeness of all information obtained.

(3) From subsection (e)(2) because in a law enforcement investigation the requirement that information be collected to the greatest extent possible from the subject individual would present a serious impediment to law enforcement in that the subject of the investigation would be informed of the existence of the investigation and would therefore be able to avoid detection, apprehension, or legal obligations or duties.

(4) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H) because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d) pursuant to subsections (j) and (k) of the Privacy Act.

(5) From subsection (g) because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d) pursuant to subsections (j) and (k) of the Privacy Act.

(1) U.S. Judges Records System (JUSTICE/OLP-002).

These exemptions apply to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5).

(1) From subsection (d)(1) because many persons are contracted who, without an assurance of anonymity, refuse to provide information concerning a candidate for a judgeship. Access could reveal the identity of the source of the information and constitute a breach of the promised confidentiality on the part of the Department. Such breaches ultimately would restrict the free flow of information vital to the determination of a candidate's qualifications and suitability.

(2) From subsection (e)(1) because in the collection of information for investigative and evaluative purposes, it is impossible to determine advance what exact information may be of assistance in determining the qualifications and suitability of a candidate. Information which may seem irrelevant, when combined with other seemingly irrelevant information, can on occasion provide a composite picture of a candidate which assists in determining whether that candidate should be nominated for appointment.

(1) General Files System of the Office of Legal Policy (JUSTICE/OLP-003).

These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in the system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), (k)(1), (k)(2), and (k)(5).

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures from records concerning him/her would reveal investigative interest on the part of the Department as well as the recipient agency. This would permit record subjects to impede the investigation, e.g., destroy evidence, intimidate potential witnesses, or flee the area to avoid inquiries or apprehension by law enforcement personnel.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d) pursuant to subsections (j) and (k) of the Privacy Act.

(3) From subsection (d) because the records contained in this system relate to official Federal investigations. Individual access to these records might compromise ongoing investigations, reveal confidential informants, or constitute unwarranted invasions of the personal privacy of third parties who are involved in a certain investigation. Amendment of records would interfere with ongoing criminal law enforcement proceedings and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring criminal investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.

(4) From subsections (e) (1) and (5) because in the course of law enforcement investigations, information may occasionally be obtained or introduced the accuracy of which is unclear or which is not strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to retain all information since it may aid in establishing patterns of criminal activity. Moreover, it would impede the specific investigation process if it were necessary to assure the relevance, accuracy, timeliness and completeness of all information obtained.

(5) From subsections (e)(2) because in a law enforcement investigation the requirement that information be collected to the greatest extent possible from the subject individual would present a serious impediment to law enforcement in that the subject of the investigation would be informed of the existence of the investigation and would therefore be able to avoid detection, apprehension, or legal obligations and duties.

(6) From subsection (e)(3) because to comply with the requirements of this subsection during the course of an investigation could impede the information gathering process, thus hampering the investigation.

(7) From subsections (e)(4) (G) and (H) because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d) pursuant to subsections (j) and (k) of the Privacy Act.

(8) From subsection (g) because this system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d) pursuant to subsections (j) and (k) of the Privacy Act.

(1) Declassification Review System (JUSTICE/OLP-004).

These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(j)(2), (k)(1), (k)(2), and (k)(5).

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures from records concerning him/her would reveal investigative interest on the part of the Department of Justice as well as the recipient agency. This would permit record subjects to impede the investigation e.g., destroy evidence, intimidate potential witnesses, or flee the area to avoid inquiries or apprehension by law enforcement personnel.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d) pursuant to subsections (j) and (k) of the Privacy Act.

(3) From subsection (d) to the extent that information in this record system relates to official Federal investigations and matters of law enforcement and/or is properly classified pursuant to E.O. 12356. Individual access to these records might compromise ongoing investigations, reveal confidential sources or constitute unwarranted invasions of the personal privacy of third parties who are involved in a certain investigation, or jeopardize national security or foreign policy interests. Amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing criminal law enforcement proceedings and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring criminal investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.

(4) From subsections (e) (1) and (5) because in the course of law enforcement investigations, information may occasionally be obtained or introduced the accuracy of which is unclear or which is not strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to retain all information which may aid in establishing patterns of criminal activity. Moreover, it would impede the specific investigative process if it were necessary to assure the relevance, accuracy, timeliness, and completeness of all information obtained.

(5) From subsection (e)(2) because in a law enforcement investigation the requirement that information be collected to the greatest extent possible from the subject individual would present a serious impediment to law enforcement in that the subject of the investigation would be informed of the existence of the investigation and would therefore be able to avoid detection, apprehension, or legal obligations or duties.

(6) From subsection (e)(3) because to comply with the requirements of this subsection during the course of an investigation could impede the information gathering process, thus hampering the investigation.

(7) From subsections (e)(4) (G) and (H), and (g) because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d) pursuant to subsections (j) and (k) of the Privacy Act.

(1) Subsection (c)(3). To provide the target of a surveillance or collection activity with the disclosure accounting records concerning him or her would hinder authorized United States intelligence activities by informing that individual of the existence, nature, or scope of information that is properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 12958, as amended, and thereby cause damage to the national security.

(2) Subsection (c)(4). This subsection is inapplicable to the extent that an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d).

(3) Subsection (d)(1). Disclosure of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information would interfere with collection activities, reveal the identity of confidential sources, and cause damage to the national security of the United States. To ensure unhampered and effective collection and analysis of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information, disclosure must be precluded.

(4) Subsection (d)(2). Amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing intelligence activities thereby causing damage to the national security.

(5) Subsections (d)(3) and (4). These subsections are inapplicable to the extent exemption is claimed from (d)(1) and (2).

(6) Subsection (e)(1). It is often impossible to determine in advance if intelligence records contained in this system are relevant and necessary, but, in the interests of national security, it is necessary to retain this information to aid in establishing patterns of activity and provide intelligence leads.

(7) Subsection (e)(2). Although this office does not conduct investigations, the collection efforts of agencies that supply information to this office would be thwarted if the agencies were required to collect information with the subject's knowledge.

(8) Subsection (e)(3). To inform individuals as required by this subsection could reveal the existence of collection activity and compromise national security. For example, a target could, once made aware that collection activity exists, alter his or her manner of engaging in intelligence or terrorist activities in order to avoid detection.

(9) Subsections (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I), and (f). These subsections are inapplicable to the extent that this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d).

(10) Subsection (e)(5). It is often impossible to determine in advance if intelligence records contained in this system are accurate, relevant, timely and complete, but, in the interests of national security, it is necessary to retain this information to aid in establishing patterns of activity and providing intelligence leads.

(11) Subsection (e)(8). Serving notice could give persons sufficient warning to evade intelligence collection and anti-terrorism efforts.

(12) Subsections (g) and (h). These subsections are inapplicable to the extent that this system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.

(1) Office of the Inspector General Investigative Records (JUSTICE/OIG-001).

These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a (j)(2), (k)(1) and (k)(2). Where compliance would not appear to interfere with or adversely affect the law enforcement process, and/or where it may be appropriate to permit individuals to contest the accuracy of the information collected, e.g., public source materials, the applicable exemption may be waived, either partially or totally, by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG).

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because release of disclosure accounting could alert the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of the investigation and the fact that they are subjects of the investigation, and reveal investigative interest by not only the OIG, but also by the recipient agency. Since release of such information to the subjects of an investigation would provide them with significant information concerning the nature of the investigation, release could result in the destruction of documentary evidence, improper influencing of witnesses, endangerment of the physical safety of confidential sources, witnesses, and law enforcement personnel, the fabrication of testimony, flight of the subject from the area, and other activities that could impede or compromise the investigation. In addition, accounting for each disclosure could result in the release of properly classified information which would compromise the national defense or disrupt foreign policy.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d) pursuant to subsections (j) and (k) of the Privacy Act.

(3) From the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d) because access to the records contained in this system of records could inform the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation, of the existence of that investigation; of the nature and scope of the information and evidence obtained as to his activities; of the identity of confidential sources, witnesses, and law enforcement personnel, and of information that may enable the subject to avoid detection or apprehension. These factors would present a serious impediment to effective law enforcement where they prevent the successful completion of the investigation, endanger the physical safety of confidential sources, witnesses, and law enforcement personnel, and/or lead to the improper influencing of witnesses, the destruction of evidence, or the fabrication of testimony. In addition, granting access to such information could disclose security-sensitive or confidential business information or information that would constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of third parties. Finally, access to the records could result in the release of properly classified information which would compromise the national defense or disrupt foreign policy. Amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.

(4) From subsection (e)(1) because the application of this provision could impair investigations and interfere with the law enforcement responsibilities of the OIG for the following reasons:

(5) From subsection (e)(2) because, in some instances, the application of this provision would present a serious impediment to law enforcement for the following reasons:

(6) From subsection (e)(3) because the application of this provision would provide the subject of an investigation with substantial information which could impede or compromise the investigation. Providing such notice to a subject of an investigation could interfere with an undercover investigation by revealing its existence, and could endanger the physical safety of confidential sources, witnesses, and investigators by revealing their identities.

(7) From subsection (e)(5) because the application of this provision would prevent the collection of any data not shown to be accurate, relevant, timely, and complete at the moment it is collected. In the collection of information for law enforcement purposes, it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. Material which may seem unrelated, irrelevant, or incomplete when collected may take on added meaning or significance as an investigation progresses. The restrictions of this provision could interfere with the preparation of a complete investigative report, and thereby impede effective law enforcement.

(8) From subsection (e)(8) because the application of this provision could prematurely reveal an ongoing criminal investigation to the subject of the investigation, and could reveal investigative techniques, procedures, or evidence.

(9) From subsection (g) to the extent that this system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d) pursuant to subsections (j)(2) and (k)(1) and (k)(2) of the Privacy Act.

(1) From subsection (c)(3), the requirement that an accounting be made available to the named subject of a record, because release of disclosure accounting could alert the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of an investigation and the fact that the individual is the subject of the investigation. Such a disclosure could also reveal investigative interests by not only OIG, but also by the recipient agency or component. Since release of such information to the subjects of an investigation would provide them with significant information concerning the nature of the investigation, release could result in the destruction of documentary evidence, improper influencing of witnesses, endangerment of the physical safety of confidential sources, witnesses, and law enforcement personnel, the fabrication of testimony, flight of the subject from the area, and other activities that could impede or compromise the investigation. In addition, providing the individual an accounting for each disclosure could result in the release of properly classified information which would compromise the national defense or disrupt foreign policy.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) notification requirements, for the same reasons that justify exempting this system from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d), and similarly, from the accounting of disclosures provision of subsection (c)(3). The DOJ takes seriously its obligation to maintain accurate records despite its assertion of this exemption, and to the extent it, in its sole discretion, agrees to permit amendment or correction of DOJ records, it will share that information in appropriate cases.

(3) From subsection (d), the access and amendment provisions, because access to the records contained in this system of records could inform the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation, of the existence of the investigation; of the nature and scope of the information and evidence obtained as to the subject's activities; of the identity of confidential sources, witnesses, and law enforcement personnel, and of information that may enable the subject to avoid detection or apprehension. These factors would present a serious impediment to effective law enforcement where they prevent the successful completion of the investigation, endanger the physical safety of confidential sources, witnesses, and law enforcement personnel, and/or lead to the improper influencing of witnesses, the destruction of evidence, or the fabrication of testimony. In addition, granting access to such information could disclose security-sensitive or confidential business information or information that would constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of third parties. Finally, access to the records could result in the release of properly classified information that would compromise the national defense or disrupt foreign policy. Amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.

(4) From subsection (e)(1), because the application of this provision could impair investigations and interfere with the law enforcement responsibilities of the OIG for the following reasons:

(5) From subsection (e)(2), because, in some instances, the application of this provision would present a serious impediment to law enforcement for the following reasons:

(6) From subsection (e)(3), because the application of this provision would provide the subject of an investigation with substantial information which could impede or compromise the investigation. Providing such notice to a subject of an investigation could interfere with an undercover investigation by revealing its existence, and could endanger the physical safety of confidential sources, witnesses, and investigators by revealing their identities.

(7) From subsection (e)(5), because the application of this provision would prevent the collection of any data not shown to be accurate, relevant, timely, and complete at the moment it is collected. In the collection of information for law enforcement purposes, it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. Material that may seem unrelated, irrelevant, or incomplete when collected may take on added meaning or significance as an investigation progresses. The restrictions of this provision could interfere with the preparation of a complete investigative report, and thereby impede effective law enforcement.

(8) From subsection (e)(8), because to require individual notice of disclosure of information due to compulsory legal process would pose an impossible administrative burden on OIG and may alert the subjects of law enforcement investigations, who might be otherwise unaware, to the fact of those investigations. Such notice could also reveal investigative techniques, procedures, or evidence.

(9) From subsection (g), to the extent that this system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d), pursuant to subsections (j)(2), (k)(1), and (k)(2) of the Privacy Act.

(1) Controlled Substances Act Nonpublic Records (JUSTICE/JMD-002).

This exemption applies only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2).

(1) Access to and use of the nonpublic records maintained in this system are restricted by law. Section 3607(b) of Title 18 U.S.C. (enacted as part of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, Chapter II) provides that the sole purpose of these records shall be for use by the courts in determining whether a person found guilty of violating section 404 of the Controlled Substances Act qualifies:

(2) Information in this system consists of arrest records, including those of co-defendants. The records include reports of informants and investigations. Therefore, access could disclose investigative techniques, reveal the identity of confidential sources, and invade the privacy of third parties.

(1) Subsection (c)(3). To provide the subject with an accounting of disclosures of records in this system could inform that individual of the existence, nature, or scope of an actual or potential law enforcement or counterintelligence investigation, and thereby seriously impede law enforcement or counterintelligence efforts by permitting the record subject and other persons to whom he might disclose the records to avoid criminal penalties, civil remedies, or counterintelligence measures.

(2) Subsection (c)(4). This subsection is inapplicable to the extent that an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d).

(3) Subsection (d)(1). Information within this record system could relate to official federal investigations and matters of law enforcement. Individual access to these records could compromise ongoing investigations, reveal confidential informants and/or sensitive investigative techniques used in particular investigations, or constitute unwarranted invasions of the personal privacy of third parties who are involved in a certain investigation. Disclosure may also reveal information relating to actual or potential law enforcement investigations. Disclosure of classified national security information would cause damage to the national security of the United States.

(4) Subsection (d)(2). Amendment of these records could interfere with ongoing criminal or civil law enforcement proceedings and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.

(5) Subsections (d)(3) and (4). These subsections are inapplicable to the extent exemption is claimed from (d)(1) and (2).

(6) Subsection (e)(1). It is often impossible to determine in advance if investigatory information contained in this system is accurate, relevant, timely and complete, but, in the interests of effective law enforcement and counterintelligence, it is necessary to retain this information to aid in establishing patterns of activity and provide investigative leads.

(7) Subsection (e)(2). To collect information from the subject individual could serve to notify the subject individual that he or she is the subject of a criminal investigation and thereby present a serious impediment to such investigations.

(8) Subsection (e)(3). To inform individuals as required by this subsection could reveal the existence of a criminal investigation and compromise investigative efforts.

(9) Subsection (e)(5). It is often impossible to determine in advance if investigatory information contained in this system is accurate, relevant, timely and complete, but, in the interests of effective law enforcement and counterintelligence, it is necessary to retain this information to aid in establishing patterns of activity and provide investigative leads.

(10) Subsection (e)(8). To serve notice could give persons sufficient warning to evade investigative efforts.

(11) Subsection (g). This subsection is inapplicable to the extent that the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.

(1) U.S. Trustee Program Case Referral System, JUSTICE/UST-004.

These exemptions apply to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) and (k)(2).

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because the release of the disclosure accounting would permit the subject of an investigation to obtain valuable information concerning the nature of that investigation. This would permit record subjects to impede the investigation, e.g., destroy evidence, intimidate potential witnesses, or flee the area to avoid inquiries or apprehension by law enforcement personnel.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) since an exemption being claimed for subsection (d) makes this subsection inapplicable.

(3) From subsection (d) because access to the records contained in this system might compromise ongoing investigations, reveal confidential informants, or constitute unwarranted invasions of the personal privacy of third parties who are involved in a certain investigation. Amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing criminal law enforcement proceedings and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring criminal investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.

(4) From subsections (e)(1) and (e)(5) because in the course of law enforcement investigations, information may occasionally be obtained or introduced the accuracy of which is unclear or which is not strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In the interest of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of criminal activity. Moreover, it would impede the specific investigative process if it were necessary to assure the relevance, accuracy, timeliness, and completeness of all information obtained.

(5) From subsection (e)(2) because in a criminal investigation the requirement that information be collected to the greatest extent possible from the subject individual would present a serious impediment to law enforcement because the subject of the investigation would be placed on notice as to the existence of the investigation and would therefore be able to avoid detection or apprehension, to influence witnesses improperly, to destroy evidence, or to fabricate testimony.

(6) From subsection (e)(3) because the requirement that individuals supplying information be provided with a form stating the requirements of subsection (e)(3) would constitute a serious impediment to law enforcement in that it would compromise the existence of a confidential investigation or reveal the identity of witnesses or confidential informants.

(7) From subsections (e)(4) (G) and (H) because this system of records is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d) pursuant to subsections (j) and (k).

(8) From subsection (e)(8) because the individual notice requirement of this subsection could present a serious impediment to law enforcement in that this could interfere with the U.S. Attorney's ability to issue subpoenas.

(9) From subsections (f) and (g) because this system has been exempted from the access provisions of subsection (d).

(1) Central Index File and Associated Records, JUSTICE/OSC-001.

These exemptions apply to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2).

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because the release of the disclosure accounting would permit the subject of an investigation to obtain valuable information concerning the nature of that investigation. This would permit record subjects to impede the investigation, e.g., destroy evidence, intimidate potential witnesses, or flee the area to avoid inquiries.

(2) From subsection (d) because access to the records might compromise ongoing investigations, reveal confidential informants, or constitute unwarranted invasions of the personal privacy of third parties who are involved in a certain investigation.

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because:

(2) From subsection (c)(4) because the exemption from subsections (d)(1), (d)(2), (d)(3), and (d)(4) will make notification of disputes inapplicable.

(3) From subsections (d)(1), (d)(2), (d)(3), and (d)(4) is justified for the reasons stated in paragraph (b)(1) of this section.

(4) From subsection (e)(5) is justified for the reasons stated in paragraph (b)(1) of this section.

(1) Office of Professional Responsibility Record Index (JUSTICE/OPR-001).

These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in the system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), (k)(1), (k)(2), and (k)(5).

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because release of the disclosure accounting would enable the subject of an investigation to gain information concerning the existence, nature and scope of the investigation and seriously hamper law enforcement efforts.

(2) From subsections (c)(4), (d), (e)(4)(G) and (H), (f) and (g) because these provisions concern individual access to records and such access might compromise ongoing investigations, reveal confidential informants and constitute unwarranted invasions of the personal privacy of third persons who provide information in connection with a particular investigation.

(3) From subsections (e)(1) and (5) because the collection of information during an investigation necessarily involves material pertaining to other persons or events which is appropriate in a thorough investigation, even though portions thereof are not ultimately connected to the person or event subject to the final action or recommendation of the Office of Professional Responsibility.

(4) From subsection (e)(2) because collecting the information from the subject would thwart the investigation by placing the subject on notice of the investigation.

(5) From subsections (e)(3) and (e)(8) because disclosure and notice would provide the subject with substantial information which could impede or compromise the investigation. For example, an investigatory subject occupying a supervisory position could, once made aware that a misconduct investigation was ongoing, put undue pressure on subordinates so as to preclude their cooperation with investigators.

(1) Freedom of Information/Privacy Act (FOI/PA) Records (JUSTICE/OPR-002).

This exemption applies only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), (k)(1), and (k)(2). To the extent that information in a record pertaining to an individual does not relate to national defense or foreign policy, official Federal investigations and/or law enforcement matters, the exemption does not apply. In addition, where compliance would not appear to interfere with or adversely affect the overall law enforcement process, the applicable exemption may be waived by OPR.

(1) From the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d) because access to the records contained in this system of records could inform the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation of the existence of that investigation; of the nature and scope of the information and evidence obtained as to his activities; of the identity of confidential sources, witnesses, and law enforcement personnel; and of information that may enable the subject to avoid detection or apprehension. These factors would present a serious impediment to effective law enforcement where they prevent the successful completion of the investigation, endanger the physical safety of confidential sources, witnesses, and law enforcement personnel, and/or lead to the improper influencing of witnesses, the destruction of evidence, or the fabrication of testimony. In addition, granting access to such information could disclose security-sensitive or confidential business information or information that would constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of third parties. Finally, access to the records could result in the release of properly classified information which would compromise the national defense or disrupt foreign policy. Amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and impose an enormous administrative burden by requiring investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.

(1) Citizen Complaint Files (JUSTICE/USA-003).

(2) Civil Case Files (JUSTICE/USA-005).

(3) Consumer Complaints (JUSTICE/USA-006).

(4) Criminal Case Files (JUSTICE/USA-007).

(5) Kline-District of Columbia and Maryland-Stock and Land Fraud Interrelationship Filing System (JUSTICE/USA-009).

(6) Major Crimes Division Investigative Files (JUSTICE/USA-010).

(7) Prosecutor's Management Information System (PROMIS) (JUSTICE/USA-011).

(8) United States Attorney, District of Columbia Superior Court Division, Criminal Files (JUSTICE/USA-013).

(9) Pre-trial Diversion Program Files (JUSTICE/USA-014).

These exemptions apply to the extent that information in these systems is subject to exemption pursuant to U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), (k)(1) and (k)(2).

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because the release of the disclosure accounting, for disclosures pursuant to the routine uses published for these systems, would permit the subject of a criminal investigation and/or civil case or matter under investigation, litigation, regulatory or administrative review or action, to obtain valuable information concerning the nature of that investigation, case or matter and present a serious impediment to law enforcement or civil legal activities.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) since an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d), this subsection will not be applicable.

(3) From subsection (d) because access to the records contained in these systems would inform the subject of criminal investigation and/or civil investigation, matter or case of the existence of that investigation, provide the subject of the investigation with information that might enable him to avoid detection, apprehension or legal obligations, and present a serious impediment to law enforcement and other civil remedies.

(4) From subsection (e)(1) because in the course of criminal investigations and/or civil investigations, cases or matters, the U.S. Attorneys often obtain information concerning the violation of laws or civil obligations other than those relating to an active case or matter. In the interests of effective law enforcement and civil litigation, it is necessary that the U.S. Attorneys retain this information since it can aid in establishing patterns of activity and provide valuable leads for other agencies and future cases that may be brought within the U.S. Attorneys' offices.

(5) From subsection (e)(2) because in a criminal investigation the requirement that information be collected to the greatest extent possible from the subject individual would present a serious impediment to law enforcement in that the subject of the investigation would be placed on notice of the existence of the investigation and would therefore be able to avoid detection, apprehension or legal obligations and duties.

(6) From subsection (e)(3) because the requirement that individuals supplying information be provided with a form stating the requirements of subsection (e)(3) would constitute a serious impediment to law enforcement in that it could compromise the existence of a confidential investigation, reveal the identity of confidential sources of information and endanger the life and physical safety of confidential informants.

(7) From subsections (e)(4) (G) and (H) because these systems of records are exempt from individual access pursuant to subsections (j) and (k) of the Privacy Act of 1974.

(8) From subsection (e)(5) because in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to light and the accuracy of such information can only be determined in a court of law. The restrictions of subsection (e)(5) would restrict the ability of trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment in reporting on investigations and impede the development of intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement.

(9) From subsection (e)(8) because the individual notice requirements of subsection (e)(8) could present a serious impediment to law enforcement as this could interfere with the United States Attorneys' ability to issue subpoenas and could reveal investigative techniques and procedures.

(10) From subsection (f) because these systems of records have been exempted from the access provisions of subsection (d).

(11) From subsection (g) because these systems of records are compiled for law enforcement purposes and have been exempted from the access provisions of subsections (d) and (f).

(1) Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act Files (JUSTICE/USA-008)

These exemptions apply to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), (k)(1) and (k)(2).

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because the release of the disclosure accounting would permit the subject of a criminal investigation and/or civil case or matter under investigation, in litigation, or under regulatory or administrative review or action to obtain valuable information concerning the nature of that investigation, case or matter, and present a serious impediment to law enforcement or civil legal activities.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) because an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d) of the Act (Access to Records), rendering this subsection inapplicable to the extent that this system of records is exempted from subsection (d).

(3) From subsection (d) because access to the records contained in these systems would inform the subject of a criminal or civil investigation, matter or case of the existence of such, and provide the subject with information that might enable him to avoid detection, apprehension or legal obligations, and present a serious impediment to law enforcement and other civil remedies. Amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing criminal law enforcement proceedings and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring criminal investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.

(4) From subsection (e)(1) because in the course of criminal investigations and/or civil investigations, cases or matters, the U.S. Attorneys often obtain information concerning the violation of laws or civil obligations other than those relating to an active case or matter. In the interests of effective law enforcement and civil litigation, it is necessary that the U.S. Attorneys retain this information since it can aid in establishing patterns of activity and provide valuable leads for other agencies and future cases that may be brought within the U.S. Attorneys' offices.

(5) From subsection (e)(2) because to collect information to the greatest extent possible from the subject individual of a criminal investigation or prosecution would present a serious impediment to law enforcement in that the subject of the investigation would be placed on notice of the existence of the investigation and would therefore be able to avoid detection, apprehension, or legal obligations and duties.

(6) From subsection (e)(3) because to provide individuals supplying information with a form stating the requirements of subsection (e)(3) would constitute a serious impediment to law enforcement in that it could compromise the existence of a confidential investigation, reveal the identity of confidential sources of information, and endanger the life and physical safety of confidential informants.

(7) From subsections (e)(4) (G) and (H) because this system of records is exempt from the individual access provisions of subsection (d) and the rules provisions of subsection (f).

(8) From subsection (e)(5) because in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to light and the accuracy of such information can only be determined in a court of law. The restrictions of subsection (e)(5) would inhibit the ability of trained investigator and intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment in reporting on investigations and impede the development of intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement.

(9) From subsection (e)(8) because the individual notice requirements of subsection (e)(8) could present a serious impediment to law enforcement as this could interfere with the U.S. Attorneys' ability to issue subpoenas and could reveal investigative techniques and procedures.

(10) From subsection (f) because this system has been exempted from the individual access provisions of subsection (d).

(11) From subsection (g) because the records in this system are generally compiled for law enforcement purposes and are exempt from the access provisions of subsections (d) and (f), rendering subsection (g) inapplicable.

(1) Assistant U.S. Attorneys Applicant Records System (JUSTICE/USA-016).

(2) Appointed Assistant U.S. Attorneys Personnel System (JUSTICE/USA-017).

These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in these systems is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5).

(1) From subsection (d)(1) because many persons are contacted who, without an assurance of anonymity, refuse to provide information concerning a candidate for an Assistant U.S. Attorney position. Access could reveal the identity of the source of the information and constitute a breach of the promise of confidentiality on the part of the Department of Justice. Such breaches ultimately would restrict the free flow of information vital to a determination of a candidate's qualifications and suitability.

(2) From subsection (e)(1) because in the collection of information for investigative and evaluative purposes, it is impossible to determine in advance what exact information may be of assistance in determining the qualifications and suitability of a candidate. Information which may appear irrelevant, when combined with other seemingly irrelevant information, can on occasion provide a composite picture of a candidate for a position which assists in determining whether that candidate should be nominated for appointment.

(1) National Drug Intelligence Center Data Base (JUSTICE/NDIC-001).

(2) [Reserved]

(1) From subsection (c)(3) for the same reasons that the system is exempted from the provisions of subsection (d).

(2) From subsection (c)(4) because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d) pursuant to subsection (j)(2) of the Privacy Act.

(3) From subsection (d) because disclosure to the subject could alert the subject of an investigation pertaining to narcotic trafficking or related activity of the fact and nature of the investigation, and/or of the investigative interest of NDIC and other intelligence or law enforcement agencies (including those responsible for civil proceedings related to laws against drug trafficking); lead to the destruction of evidence, improper influencing of witnesses, fabrication of testimony, and/or flight of the subject; reveal the details of a sensitive investigative or intelligence technique, or the identity of a confidential source; or otherwise impede, compromise, or interfere with investigative efforts and other related law enforcement and/or intelligence activities. In addition, disclosure could invade the privacy of third parties and/or endanger the life and safety of law enforcement personnel, confidential informants, witnesses, and potential crime victims. Finally, access to records could result in the release of properly classified information that could compromise the national defense or foreign policy. Amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations, analyses, and reports to be continuously reinvestigated and revised.

(4) From subsection (e)(1) because, in the course of its acquisition, collation, and analysis of information, NDIC will need to retain information not immediately shown to be relevant to counterdrug law enforcement to establish patterns of activity and to assist other agencies charged with the enforcement of laws and regulations regarding drug trafficking and charged with the acquisition of intelligence related to international aspects of drug trafficking. This consideration applies equally to information acquired from, or collated or analyzed for, both law enforcement agencies and agencies of the U.S. foreign intelligence community.

(5) From subsection (e)(2) because application of this provision could present a serious impediment to law enforcement in that it would put the subject of an investigation, study or analysis on notice of the fact of such investigation, study, or analysis, thereby permitting the subject to engage in conduct intended to frustrate the activity; because, in some circumstances, the subject of an investigation may not be required to provide to investigators certain information; and because thorough analysis and investigation may require seeking information from a number of different sources.

(6) From subsection (e)(3) (to the extent applicable) because the requirement that individuals supplying information be provided a form stating the requirements of subsection (e)(3) would constitute a serious impediment to law enforcement in that it could compromise the existence of a confidential investigation and reveal the identity of confidential informants and endanger their lives and safety.

(7) From subsection (e)(4)(I), to the extent that this subsection is interpreted to require more detail regarding the record sources in this system than have been published in the Federal Register. Should the subsection be so interpreted, exemption from this provision is necessary to protect the confidentiality of the sources of criminal and other law enforcement information and to protect the privacy and physical safety of witnesses and informants. Furthermore, greater specificity concerning the sources of properly classified records could compromise national defense or foreign policy.

(8) From subsection (e)(5) because the acquisition, collation, and analysis of information for law enforcement purposes does not permit advance determination whether such information is accurate or relevant, nor can such information be limited to that which is complete or apparently timely. Information of this type often requires further analysis and investigation to develop into a comprehensive whole that which is otherwise incomplete or even fragmentary. Moreover, its accuracy is continually subject to analysis and review, and, upon careful examination, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire added significance as additional information brings new details to light. The restrictions imposed by subsection (e)(5) would restrict the ability of trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment in collating and analyzing information and would impede the development of criminal intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement.

(9) From subsection (e)(8) because the individual notice requirements of subsection (e)(8) could present a serious impediment to law enforcement by revealing investigative techniques, procedures, or evidence.

(10) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt from subsection (d).

(1) The Executive Office for Immigration Review's Records and Management Information System (JUSTICE/EOIR-001).

This exemption applies only to the extent that information in the system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k) (1) and (2).

(1) From subsection (d) because access to information which has been properly classified pursuant to an Executive Order could have an adverse effect on the national security. In addition, from subsection (d) because unauthorized access to certain investigatory material could compromise ongoing or potential investigations; reveal the identity of confidential informants; or constitute unwarranted invasions of the personal privacy of third parties.

(2) From subsection (d) (2), (3), and (4) because the record of proceeding constitutes an official record which includes transcripts of quasi-judicial administrative proceedings, investigatory materials, evidentiary materials such as exhibits, decisional memoranda, and other case-related papers. Administrative due process could not be achieved by the ex parte “correction” of such materials by the individual who is the subject thereof.

(1) Practitioner Compliant/Disciplinary Files (JUSTICE/EOIR 003). This exemption applies only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), (k)(1), and (k)(2). To the extent that information in a record pertaining to an individual does not relate to national defense or foreign policy, official Federal investigations and/or law enforcement matters, the exemption does not apply. In addition, where compliance would not appear to interfere with or adversely affect the overall law or regulatory enforcement process, the applicable exemption may be waived by the Executive Office for Immigration Review.

(1) From the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d) because access to the records contained in this system of records could inform the subject of the investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation or the existence of that investigation; of the nature and scope of the information and evidence obtained as to the subject's activities; of the identity of confidential sources, witnesses, and law enforcement personnel; and of information that may enable the subject to avoid detection or apprehension. These factors would present a serious impediment to effective law and regulatory enforcement where they prevent the successful completion of the investigation, endanger the physical safety of confidential sources, witnesses, and law enforcement personnel, and/or lead to the improper influencing of witnesses, the destruction of evidence, or the fabrication of testimony. In addition, granting access to such information could disclose security-sensitive or confidential business information or information that would constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of third parties. Finally, access to the records could result in the release of properly classified information which would compromise the national defense or disrupt foreign policy. Amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and impose an enormous administrative burden by requiring investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.

(1) In limited circumstances, from subsection (d) when access to the records contained in the system of records in paragraph (e) of this section could inform the subject of an ongoing investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation or the existence of that investigation; of the nature and scope of the information and evidence obtained as to the subject's activities; of the identity of confidential sources, witnesses, and law enforcement personnel; and of information that may enable the subject to avoid detection or apprehension. These factors would present a serious impediment to effective law and regulatory enforcement where they prevent the successful completion of the investigation, endanger the physical safety of confidential sources, witnesses, and law enforcement personnel; and/or lead to the improper influencing of witnesses, the destruction of evidence, or the fabrication of testimony. In addition, granting access to such information could disclose security-sensitive or confidential business information or information that would constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of third parties.

(2) From subsections (d)(2), (3), and (4) because the administrative case files constitute an official record which includes transcripts of administrative proceedings, investigatory materials, evidentiary materials such as exhibits, decisional memoranda, and other case-related papers. Administrative due process could not be achieved by the ex parte “correction” of such materials by the individual who is the subject thereof.

(1) Decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals (JUSTICE/BIA-001).

This exemption applies only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k).

(1) From subsections (d) (2), (3) and (4) because the decisions reflected constitute official records of opinions rendered in quasi-judicial proceedings. Administrative due process could not be achieved by the ex parte “correction” of such opinions by the subject of the opinion.

(1) Docket Scheduling and Control System (JUSTICE/PRC-001).

(2) Inmate and Supervision Files System (JUSTICE/PRC-003).

(3) Labor and Pension Case, Legal File, and General Correspondence System (JUSTICE/PRC-004).

(4) Statistical, Educational and Developmental System (JUSTICE/PRC-006).

(5) Workload Record, Decision Result, and Annual Report System (JUSTICE/PRC-007).

These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in these systems is subject to exemptions pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2).

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because revealing disclosure of accountings to inmates and persons on supervision could compromise legitimate law enforcement activities and U.S. Parole Commission responsibilities.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) because the exemption from subsection (d) will make notification of disputes inapplicable.

(3) From subsection (d) because this is essential to protect internal processes by which Commission personnel are able to formulate decisions and policies with regard to federal prisoners and persons under supervision, to prevent disclosures of information to federal inmates or persons on supervision that would jeopardize legitimate correctional interests of security, custody, supervision, or rehabilitation, to permit receipt of relevant information from other federal agencies, state and local law enforcement agencies, and federal and state probation and judicial offices, to allow private citizens to express freely their opinions for or against parole, to allow relevant criminal history type information of co-defendants to be kept in files, to allow medical, psychiatric and sociological material to be available to professional staff, and to allow a candid process of fact selection, opinion formulation, evaluation and recommendation to be continued by professional staff. The legal files contain case development material and, in addition to other reasons, should be exempt under the attorney-client privilege. Each labor or pension applicant has had served upon him the material in his file which he did not prepare and may see his own file at any time.

(4) From subsection (e)(2) because primary collection of information directly from federal inmates or persons on supervision about criminal sentence, criminal records, institutional performance, readiness for release from custody, or need to be returned to custody is highly impractical and inappropriate.

(5) From subsection (e)(3) because application of this provision to the operations and collection of information by the Commission which is primarily from sources other than the individual, is inappropriate.

(6) From subsections (e)(4) (G) and (H) because exemption from the access provisions of (d) makes publication of agency procedures under (d) inapplicable.

(7) From subsection (e)(8) because the nature of the Commission's activities renders notice of compliance with compulsory legal process impractical.

(8) From subsection (f) because exemption from the provisions of subsection (d) will render compliance with provisions of this subsection inapplicable.

(9) From subsection (g) because exemption from the provisions of subsection (d) will render the provisions on suits to enforce (d) inapplicable.

(1) Antitrust Caseload Evaluation System (ACES)—Monthly Report (JUSTICE/ATR-006).

These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a (k)(2).

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because information in this system is maintained in aid of ongoing antitrust enforcement investigations and proceedings. The release of the accounting of disclosures made under subsection (b) of the Act would permit the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal or civil violation to determine whether he is the subject of an investigation. Disclosure of the accounting would therefore present a serious impediment to antitrust law enforcement efforts.

(2) From subsection (d) because access to the information retrievable from this system and compiled for law enforcement purposes could result in the premature disclosure of the identity of the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal or civil violation and information concerning the nature of that investigation. This information could enable the subject to avoid detection or apprehension. This would present a serious impediment to effective law enforcement since the subject could hinder or prevent the successful completion of the investigation. Further, confidential business and financial information, the identities of confidential sources of information, third party privacy information, and statutorily confidential information such as grand jury information must be protected from disclosure.

(3) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H), and (f) because this system is exempt from the individual access provisions of subsection (d).

(1) Freedom of Information/Privacy—Requester/Subject Index File (JUSTICE/ATR-008).

These exemptions apply to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a (k)(2).

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because the release of the accounting of disclosures made under subsection (b) of the Act would permit the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal or civil violation to determine whether he is the subject of an investigation. Disclosure of accounting would therefore present a serious impediment to antitrust law enforcement efforts.

(2) From subsection (d) because access to information in this system could result in the premature disclosure of the identity of the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal or civil violation and information concerning the nature of the investigation. This information could enable the subject to avoid detection or apprehension. This would present a serious impendiment to effective law enforcement since the subject could hinder or prevent the successful completion of the investigation. Further, confidential business and financial information, the identities of confidential sources of information, third party privacy information, and statutorily confidential information such as grand jury information must be protected from disclosure.

(3) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H), and (f) because this system is exempt from the individual access provisions of subsection (d).

(1) Civil Division Case File System, JUSTICE/CIV-001.

(2) Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts File System, JUSTICE/CIV-005.

These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in these systems is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a (j)(2), (k)(1) and (k)(2).

(1) Subsection (c)(3). To provide the subject of a criminal or civil matter or case under investigation with an accounting of disclosures of records concerning him or her would inform that individual (and others to whom the subject might disclose the records) of the existence, nature, or scope of that investigation and thereby seriously impede law enforcement efforts by permitting the record subject and others to avoid criminal penalties and civil remedies.

(2) Subsections (c)(4), (e)(4) (G) and (H), and (g). These provisions are inapplicable to the extent that these systems of records are exempted from subsection (d).

(3) Subsection (d). To the extent that information contained in these systems has been properly classified, relates to the investigation and/or prosecution of grand jury, civil fraud, and other law enforcement matters, disclosure could compromise matters which should be kept secret in the interest of national security or foreign policy; compromise confidential investigations or proceedings; hamper sensitive civil or criminal investigations; impede affirmative enforcement actions based upon alleged violations of regulations or of civil or criminal laws; reveal the identity of confidential sources; and result in unwarranted invasions of the privacy of others. Amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing criminal law enforcement proceedings and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring criminal investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.

(4) Subsection (e)(1). In the course of criminal or civil investigations, cases, or matters, the Civil Division may obtain information concerning the actual or potential violation of laws which are not strictly within its statutory authority. In the interest of effective law enforcement, it is necessary to retain such information since it may establish patterns of criminal activity or avoidance of other civil obligations and provide leads for Federal and other law enforcement agencies.

(5) Subsection (e)(2). To collect information from the subject of a criminal investigation or prosecution would present a serious impediment to law enforcement in that the subject (and others to whom the subject might be in contact) would be informed of the existence of the investigation and would therefore be able to avoid detection or apprehension, to influence witnesses improperly, to destroy evidence, or to fabricate testimony.

(6) Subsection (e)(3). To comply with this requirement during the course of a criminal investigation or prosecution could jeopardize the investigation by disclosing the existence of a confidential investigation, revealing the identity of witnesses or confidential informants, or impeding the information gathering process.

(7) Subsection (e)(5). In compiling information for criminal law enforcement purposes, the accuracy, completeness, timeliness and relevancy of the information obtained cannot always be immediately determined. As new details of an investigation come to light, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance and the accuracy of such information can often only be determined in a court of law. Compliance with this requirement would therefore restrict the ability of government attorneys in exercising their judgment in developing information necessary for effective law enforcement.

(8) Subsection (e)(8). To serve notice would give persons sufficient warning to evade law enforcement efforts.

(1) Subsections (c)(3). This system occasionally contains investigatory material based on complaints of actual or alleged criminal or civil violations. To provide the subject of a criminal or civil matter or case under investigation with an accounting of disclosures of records concerning him/her would inform that individual of the existence, nature, or scope of that investigation, and thereby seriously impede law enforcement efforts by permitting the record subject and other persons to whom he might disclose the records to avoid criminal penalties and civil remedies.

(2) Subsections (c)(4). This subsection is inapplicable to the extent that an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d).

(3) Subsection (d). Disclosure of information relating to the investigation of complaints of alleged violation of criminal or civil law could interfere with the investigation, reveal the identity of confidential sources, and result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of others. Amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing criminal law enforcement proceedings and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring criminal investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.

(4) Subsection (e)(1). In the course of criminal or civil investigations, cases, or matters, the Civil Division may obtain information concerning the actual or potential violation of laws which are not strictly within its statutory authority. In the interest of effective law enforcement, it is necessary to retain such information since it may establish patterns of criminal activity or avoidance of other civil obligations and provide leads for Federal and other law enforcement agencies.

(5) Subsection (e)(5). In compiling information for criminal law enforcement purposes, the accuracy, completeness, timeliness and relevancy of the information obtained cannot always be immediately determined. As new details of an investigation come to light, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance and the accuracy of such information can often only be determined in a court of law. Compliance with this requirement would therefore restrict the ability of government attorneys in exercising their judgment in developing information necessary for effective law enforcement.

(1) Subsection (d). Disclosure of investigatory information would jeopardize the integrity of the investigative process, disclose the identity of individuals who furnished information to the government under an express or implied promise that their identities would be held in confidence, and result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of others. Amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing criminal law enforcement proceedings and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring criminal investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.

(1) Subsection (c)(3). To provide the subject of a criminal, civil, or administrative matter or case under investigation with an accounting of disclosures of records concerning him or her could inform that individual of the existence, nature, or scope of an actual or potential criminal or civil violation to gain valuable information concerning the nature and scope of the investigation, to determine whether he or she is the subject of the investigation, and seriously impede law enforcement efforts by permitting the record subject and other persons to whom he or she might disclose the records to avoid criminal penalties, civil remedies, or administrative measures.

(2) Subsection (c)(4). This subsection is inapplicable to the extent that an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d).

(3) Subsection (d)(1). Disclosure of investigatory information could interfere with the investigation, reveal the identity of confidential sources, and result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of others. Disclosure of classified national security information would cause damage to the national security of the United States. In addition, these records may be subject to protective orders entered by federal courts to protect their confidentiality. Further, many of the records contained in this system are copies of documents which are the property of state agencies and were obtained under express or implied promises to strictly protect their confidentiality.

(4) Subsection (d)(2). Amendment of the records could interfere with ongoing criminal or civil law enforcement proceedings and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.

(5) Subsection (d)(3) and (4). These subsections are inapplicable to the extent exemption is claimed from (d)(1) and (2).

(6) Subsection (e)(1). It is often impossible to determine in advance if investigatory records contained in this system are accurate, relevant, timely and complete, but, in the interests of effective law enforcement, it is necessary to retain this information to aid in establishing patterns of activity and provide investigative leads.

(7) Subsection (e)(2). To collect information from the subject individual could serve notice that he or she is the subject of a criminal investigation and thereby present a serious impediment to such investigation.

(8) Subsection (e)(3). To inform individuals as required by this subsection could reveal the existence of a criminal or civil investigation and compromise investigative efforts.

(9) Subsection (e)(5). It is often impossible to determine in advance if investigatory records contained in this system are accurate, relevant, timely and complete, but, in the interests of effective law enforcement, it is necessary to retain this information to aid in establishing patterns of activity and provide investigative leads.

(10) Subsection (e)(8). To serve notice could give persons sufficient warning to evade investigative efforts.

(11) Subsection (g). This subsection is inapplicable to the extent that the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.

(1) Subsection (d)(1). Disclosure of investigatory information could interfere with the investigation, reveal the identity of confidential sources, and result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of others. In addition, these records may be subject to protective orders entered by federal courts to protect their confidentiality. Further, many of the records contained in this system are copies of documents which are the property of state agencies and were obtained under express or implied promises to strictly protect their confidentiality.

(2) Subsection (d)(2). Amendment of the records could interfere with ongoing criminal or civil law enforcement proceedings and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.

(3) Subsection (d)(1), (2), (3) and (4). This system contains investigatory material compiled by the Equal Opportunity Commission pursuant to its authority under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-8. Titles 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-8(e), and 44 U.S.C. 3508 make it unlawful to make public in any manner whatsoever any information obtained by the Commission pursuant to the authority.

(4) Subsection (d)(3) and (4). These subsections are inapplicable to the extent exemption is claimed from (d)(1) and (2).

(1) Central Criminal Division, Index File and Associated Records System of Records (JUSTICE/CRM-001)—Limited Access. This system of records and associated exemptions is adopted by and applies with equal force and effect to the National Security Division, until modified, superseded, or revoked in accordance with law.

(2) General Crimes Section, Criminal Division, Central Index File and Associated Records System of Records (JUSTICE/CRM-004)—Limited Access.

These exemptions apply to the extent that information in those systems are subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a (j)(2), (k)(1) and (k)(2).

(1) . (c)(3). The release of the disclosure accounting for disclosures made pursuant to subsection (b) of the Act, including those permitted under the routine uses published for these systems of records, would permit the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to determine whether he is the subject of investigation, or to obtain valuable information concerning the nature of that investigation, and the information obtained, or the identity of witnesses and informants and would therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement. In addition, disclosure of the accounting would amount to notice to the individual of the existence of a record; such notice requirement under subsection (f)(1) is specifically exempted for these systems of records.

(2) . (c)(4). Since an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d) of the Act (Access to Records) this subsection is inapplicable to the extent that these systems of records are exempted from subsection (d).

(3) . (d). Access to the records contained in these systems would inform the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation of the existence of that investigation, or the nature and scope of the information and evidence obtained as to his activities, of the identity of witnesses and informants, or would provide information that could enable the subject to avoid detection or apprehension. These factors would present a serious impediment to effective law enforcement because they could prevent the successful completion of the investigation, endanger the physical safety of witnesses or informants, and lead to the improper influencing of witnesses, the destruction of evidence, or the fabrication of testimony.

(4) . (e)(1). The notices of these systems of records published in the Federal Register set forth the basic statutory or related authority for maintenance of this system. However, in the course of criminal or other law enforcement investigations, cases, and matters, the Criminal Division or its components will occasionally obtain information concerning actual or potential violations of law that are not strictly within its statutory or other authority or may compile information in the course of an investigation which may not be relevant to a specific prosecution. In the interests of effective law enforcement, it is necessary to retain such information in these systems of records since it can aid in establishing patterns of criminal activity and can provide valuable leads for federal and other law enforcement agencies.

(5) . (e)(2). In a criminal investigation or prosecution, the requirement that information be collected to the greatest extent practicable from the subject individual would present a serious impediment to law enforcement because the subject of the investigation or prosecution would be placed on notice as to the existence of the investigation and would therefore be able to avoid detection or apprehension, to influence witnesses improperly, to destroy evidence, or to fabricate testimony.

(6) . (e)(3). The requirement that individuals supplying information be provided with a form stating the requirements of subsection (e)(3) would constitute a serious impediment to law enforcement in that it could compromise the existence of a confidential investigation or reveal the identity of witnesses or confidential informants.

(7) . (e)(4) (G) and (H). Since an exemption is being claimed for subsections (f) (Agency Rules) and (d) (Access to Records) of the Act these subsections are inapplicable to the extent that these systems of records are exempted from subsections (f) and (d).

(8) . (e)(4)(I). The categories of sources of the records in these systems have been published in the Federal Register in broad generic terms in the belief that this is all that subsection (e)(4)(I) of the Act requires. In the event, however, that this subsection should be interpreted to require more detail as to the identity of sources of the records in these systems, exemption from this provision is necessary in order to protect the confidentiality of the sources of criminal and other law enforcement information. Such exemption is further necessary to protect the privacy and physical safety of witnesses and informants.

(9) . (e)(5). In the collection of information for criminal law enforcement purposes it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to light and the accuracy of such information can often only be determined in a court of law. The restrictions of subsection (e)(5) would restrict the ability of trained investigators, intelligence analysts, and government attorneys in exercising their judgment in reporting on information and investigations and impede the development of criminal or other intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement.

(10) . (e)(8). The individual notice requirements of subsection (e)(8) could present a serious impediment to law enforcement as this could interfere with the ability to issue warrants or subpoenas and could reveal investigative techniques, procedures, or evidence.

(11) . (f). Procedures for notice to an individual pursuant to subsection (f)(1) as to the existence of records pertaining to him dealing with an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory investigation or prosecution must be exempted because such notice to an individual would be detrimental to the successful conduct and/or completion of an investigation or prosecution pending or future. In addition, mere notice of the fact of an investigation could inform the subject or others that their activities are under or may become the subject of an investigation and could enable the subjects to avoid detection or apprehension, to influence witnesses improperly, to destroy evidence, or to fabricate testimony.

Since an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d) of the Act (Access to Records) the rules require pursuant to subsection (f) (2) through (5) are inapplicable to these systems of records to the extent that these systems of records are exempted from subsection (d).

(12) . (g). Since an exemption is being claimed for subsections (d) (Access to Records) and (f) (Agency Rules) this section is inapplicable, and is exempted for the reasons set forth for those subsections, to the extent that these systems of records are exempted from subsections (d) and (f).

(13) . In addition, exemption is claimed for these systems of records from compliance with the following provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a) pursuant to the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1): Subsections (c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4) (G), (H) and (I) and (f) to the extent that the records contained in these systems are specifically authorized to be kept secret in the interests of national defense and foreign policy.

(1) . (c)(3) The release of the disclosure accounting for disclosures made pursuant to subsection (b) of the Act, including those permitted under the routine uses published for these systems of records, would permit the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal violation, which may include those protected under the Witness Security Program, to determine whether he is the subject of a criminal investigation, to obtain valuable information concerning the nature of that investigation and the information obtained, or the identity of witnesses and informants and the nature of their reports, and would therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement. In addition, disclosure of the accounting would amount to notice to the individual of the existence of a record; such notice requirement under subsection (f)(1) is specifically exempted for these systems of records. Moreover, disclosure of the disclosure accounting to an individual protected under the Witness Security Program could jeopardize the effectiveness and security of the Program by revealing the methods and techniques utilized in relocating witnesses and could therefore jeopardize the ability to obtain, and to protect the confidentiality of, information compiled for purposes of a criminal investigation.

(2) . (c)(4) Since an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d) of the Act (Access to Records) this section is inapplicable.

(3) . (d) Access to the records contained in these systems would inform the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal violation, which may include those protected under the Witness Security Program, of the existence of that investigation, of the nature and scope of the information and evidence obtained as to his activities, of the identity of witnesses and informants, or would provide information that could enable the subject to avoid detection or apprehension. These factors would present a serious impediment to effective law enforcement because they could prevent the successful completion of the investigation, endanger the physical safety of witnesses or informants, and lead to the improper influencing of witnesses, the destruction of evidence, or the fabrication of testimony. In addition, access to the records in these systems to an individual protected under the Witness Security Program could jeopardize the effectiveness and security of the Program by revealing the methods and techniques utilized in relocating witnesses and could therefore jeopardize the ability to obtain, and to protect the confidentiality of, information compiled for purposes of a criminal investigation.

(4) . Exemption is claimed from subsection (e)(1) for the reasons stated in subsection (b)(4) of this section.

(5) . (e)(2) In the course of preparing a Witness Security Program for an individual, much of the information is collected from the subject. However, the requirement that the information be collected to the greatest extent practicable from the subject individual would present a serious impediment to criminal law enforcement because the individual himself may be the subject of a criminal investigation or have been a participant in, or observer of, criminal activity. As a result, it is necessary to seek information from other sources. In addition, the failure to verify the information provided from the individual when necessary and to seek other information could jeopardize the confidentiality of the Witness Security Program and lead to the obtaining and maintenance of incorrect and uninvestigated information on criminal matters.

(6) . (e)(3) The requirement that individuals supplying information be provided with a form stating the requirements of subsection (e)(3) would constitute a serious impediment to law enforcement in that it could compromise or reveal the identity of witnesses and informants protected under the Witness Security Program.

(7) . (e)(4) (G) and (H). Since an exemption is being claimed for subsections (f) (Agency Rules) and (d) (Access to Records) of the Act these subsections are inapplicable.

(8) . (e)(4)(I). The categories of sources of the records in these systems have been published in the Federal Register in broad generic terms in the belief that this is all that subsection (e)(4)(I) of the Act requires. In the event, however, that this subsection should be interpreted to require more detail as to the identity of sources of the records in the system, exemption from this provision is necessary in order to protect the confidentiality of the sources of criminal law, enforcement information and of witnesses and informants protected under the Witness Security Program.

(9) . Exemption is claimed from subsections (e)(5) and (e)(8) for the reasons stated in subsection (b)(9) and (b)(10) of this section.

(10) . Procedures for notice to an individual pursuant to subsection (f)(1) as to the existence of records contained in these systems pertaining to him would inform the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal violation, which may include those protected under the Witness Security Program, of the existence of that investigation, of the nature and scope of the information and evidence obtained as to his activities, of the identity of witnesses and informants, or would provide information that could enable the subject to avoid detection or apprehension. These factors would present a serious impediment to effective law enforcement because they could prevent the successful conduct and/or completion of an investigation pending or future, endanger the physical safety of witnesses or informants, and lead to the improper influencing of witnesses, the destruction of evidence, or the fabrication of testimony. In addition, notices as to the existence of records contained in these systems to an individual protected under the Witness Security Program could jeopardize the effectiveness and security of the Program by revealing the methods and techniques utilized in relocating witnesses and could therefore jeopardize the ability to obtain, and to protect the confidentiality of, information compiled for purposes of a criminal investigation.

Since an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d) of the Act (Access to Records) the rules required pursuant to subsection (f) (2) through (5) are inapplicable.

(11) . (g) Since an exemption is being claimed for subsections (d) (Access to Records) and (f) (Agency Rules) this section is inapplicable and is exempted for the reasons set forth for those subsections.

(1) . (c)(3). The release of the disclosure accounting for disclosures made pursuant to subsection (b) of the Act, including those permitted under the routine uses published for these systems of records, would permit the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal violation to determine whether he is the subject of a criminal investigation and would therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement. The records in these systems contain the names of the subjects of the files in question and the system is accessible by name of the person checking out the file and by name of the subject of the file. In addition, disclosure of the accounting would amount to notice to the individual of the existence of a record; such notice requirement under subsection (f)(1) is specifically exempted for these systems of records.

(2) . (c)(4). Since an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d) of the Act (Access to Records) this section is inapplicable.

(3) . (d). Access to the records contained in these systems would inform the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal violation of the existence of that investigation. This would present a serious impediment to effective law enforcement because it could prevent the successful completion of the investigation, endanger the physical safety of witnesses or informants, and lead to the improper influencing of witnesses, the destruction of evidence, or the fabrication of testimony.

(4) . Exemption is claimed from subsections (e)(4) (G), (H) and (I) for the reasons stated in subsections (b)(7) and (b)(8) of this section.

(5) . (f). These systems may be accessed by the name of the person who is the subject of the file and who may also be the subject of a criminal investigation. Procedures for notice to an individual pursuant to subsection (f)(1) as to the existence of records pertaining to him, which may deal with an actual or potential criminal investigation or prosecution, must be exempted because such notice to an individual would be detrimental to the successful conduct and/or completion of the investigation or prosecution pending or future. In addition mere notice of the fact of an investigation could inform the subject or others that their activities are under or may become the subject of an investigation and could enable the subjects to avoid detection or apprehension, to influence witnesses improperly, to destroy evidence, or to fabricate testimony.

Since an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d) of the Act (Access to Records) the rules required pursuant to subsection (f) (2) through (5) are inapplicable.

(6) . (g). Since an exemption is being claimed for subsections (d) (Access to Records) and (f) (Agency Rules) of the Act this section is inapplicable and is exempted for the reasons set forth for those subsections.

(1) . (c)(4). Since an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d) of the Act (Access to Records) this section is inapplicable to the extent that this system of records is exempted from subsection (d).

(2) . (d). The records contained in this system of records generally consist of information filed with the court in response to the request and made available to the requestor. To the extent that these records have been so filed, no exemption is sought from the provisions of this subsection. Occasionally, the records contain pertinent logs of intercepted communications and other investigative reports not filed with the court. These records must be exempted because access to such records could inform the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal violation of the existence of that investigation and of the nature of the information and evidence obtained by the government. This would present a serious impediment to effective law enforcement because it could prevent the successful completion of the investigation, endanger the physical safety of witnesses or informants, and lead to the improper influencing of witnesses, the destruction of evidence, or the fabrication of testimony.

(3) . Exemption is claimed from subsections (e)(4) (G), (H) and (I) for the reasons stated in subsections (b)(7) and (b)(8) of this section.

(4) . (f). The records contained in this system of records generally consist of information filed with the court and made available to the requestor. To the extent that these records have been so filed, no exemption is sought from the provisions of this subsection. Occasionally, the records contain pertinent logs of intercepted communications and other investigative reports not filed with the court. These records must be exempted from a requirement of notification as to their existence because such notice to an individual would be detrimental to the successful conduct and/or completion of a criminal investigation or prosecution pending or future. In addition, mere notice of the existence of such logs or investigative reports could inform the subject or others that their activities are under or may become the subject of an investigation and could enable the subjects to avoid detection or apprehension, to influence witnesses improperly, to destroy evidence, or to fabricate testimony.

Since an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d) of the Act (Access to Records) the rules required pursuant to subsection (f) (2) through (5) are inapplicable to the extent that this system of records is exempted for subsection (d).

(6) . (g). Since an exemption is being claimed for subsections (d) (Access to Records) and (f) (Agency Rules) this section is inapplicable, and is exempted for the reasons set forth for those subsections, to the extent that this system of records is exempted from subsections (d) and (f).

(1) Information File on Individuals and Commercial Entities Known or Suspected of Being Involved in Fraudulent Activities System of Records (JUSTICE/CRM-006).

(2) The Stocks and Bonds Intelligence Control Card File System of Records (JUSTICE/CRM-021).

(3) Tax Disclosure Index File and Associated Records (JUSTICE/CRM-025).

These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in these systems is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2).

(1) (c)(3) The release of the disclosure accounting for disclosures made pursuant to subsection (b) of the act, including those permitted under the routine uses published for these systems of records, would permit the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal violation to determine whether he is the subject of a criminal investigation, to obtain valuable information concerning the nature of that investigation, and the information obtained, or the identity of witnesses and informants, and would therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement. In addition, disclosure of the accounting would amount to notice to the individual of the existence of a record; such notice requirement under subsection (f)(1) is specifically exempted for this system of records.

(2) (c)(4) Since an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d) of the act (access to records), this section is inapplicable to the extent that these systems of records are exempted from subsection (d).

(3) (d) Access to the records contained in these systems would inform the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal violation of the existence of that investigation, of the nature and scope of the information and evidence obtained as to his activities, of the identity of witnesses and informants, or would provide information that could enable the subject to avoid detection or apprehension. These factors would present a serious impediment to effective law enforcement because they could prevent the successful completion of the investigation, endanger the physical safety of witnesses or informants, and lead to the improper influencing of witnesses, the destruction of evidence, or the fabrication of testimony.

(4) Exemption is claimed from subsections (e) (1), (2), and (3), (e)(4) (G), (H), and (I), (e)(5) and (e)(8) for the reasons stated in subsections (b)(4), (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7), (b)(8), (b)(9), and (b)(10) of this section.

(5) (f) Procedures for notice to an individual pursuant to subsection (f)(1) as to the existence of records pertaining to him dealing with an actual or potential criminal investigation or prosecution must be exempted because such notice to an individual would be detrimental to the successful conduct and/or completion of an investigation or prosecution pending or future. In addition, mere notice of the fact of an investigation could inform the subject or others that their activities are under or may become the subject of an investigation and could enable the subjects to avoid detection or apprehension, to influence witnesses improperly, to destroy evidence, or to fabricate testimony. Since an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d) of the act (access to records), the rules required pursuant to subsection (f) (2) through (5) are inapplicable to these systems of records.

(6) (g) Since an exemption is being claimed for subsections (d) (access to records) and (f) (Agency rules), this section is inapplicable and is exempted for the reasons set forth for those subsections.

(1) . Exemption is claimed from subsections (c) (3) and (4) and (d) for the reasons stated in subsections (j)(1), (j)(2) and (j)(3) of this section.

(2) . (e)(1). The notice for this system of records published in the Federal Register sets forth the basic statutory or related authority for maintenance of this system. However, in the course of criminal investigations, cases, and matters, the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section will occasionally obtain information concerning actual or potential violations of law that are not strictly within its statutory or other authority, or may compile information in the course of an investigation which may not be relevant to a specific prosecution. In the interests of effective law enforcement, it is necessary to retain such information in this system of records since it can aid in establishing patterns of criminal activity and can provide valuable leads for federal and other law enforcement agencies.

(3) . Exemption is claimed from subsections (e) (2) and (3), (e)(4) (G), (H) and (I), (e) (5) and (8), (f) and (g) for the reasons stated in subsections (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7), (b)(8), (b)(9), (b)(10), (b)(11) and (b)(12) of this section.

(4) . In addition, exemption is claimed for this system of records from compliance with the following provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a) pursuant to the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1): Subsections (c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4) (G), (H) and (I) and (f) to the extent that the records contained in this system are specifically authorized to be kept secret in the interests of national defense and foreign policy.

(1) . (c)(3). The release of the disclosure accounting for disclosures made pursuant to subsection (b) of the Act, including those permitted under the routine uses published for these systems of records, would permit the subject of an electronic interception to obtain valuable information concerning the interception, including information as to whether he is the subject of a criminal investigation, by means other than those provided for by statute. Such information could interfere with the successful conduct and/or completion of a criminal investigation, and would therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement. In addition, disclosure of the accounting would amount to notice to the individual of the existence of a record; such notice requirement under subsection (f)(1) is specifically exempted for these systems of records.

(2) . (c)(4). Since an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d) of the Act (Access to Records) this section is inapplicable.

(3) . (d). Access to the records contained in these systems would inform the subject of an electronic interception of the existence of such surveillance including information as to whether he is the subject of a criminal investigation by means other than those provided for by statute. This could interfere with the successful conduct and/or completion of a criminal investigation and therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement.

(4) . (e)(2). In the context of an electronic interception, the requirement that information be collected to the greatest extent practicable from the subject individual would present a serious impediment to law enforcement because the subject of the investigation or prosecution would be placed on notice as to the existence of the investigation and this would therefore destroy the efficacy of the interception.

(5) . (e)(3). The requirement that individuals supplying information be provided with a form stating the requirements of subsection (e)(3) would constitute a serious impediment to law enforcement in that it could compromise the existence of a confidential electronic interception or reveal the identity of witnesses or confidential informants.

(6) . (e)(4) (G) and (H). Since an exemption is being claimed for subsections (f) (Agency Rules) and (d) (Access to Records) of the Act these subsections are inapplicable.

(7) . Exemption is claimed from subsections (e)(4)(I) and (e)(8) for the reasons stated in subsections (b)(8) and (b)(10) of this section.

(8) . (f). Procedures for notice to an individual pursuant to subsection (f)(1) as to the existence of records pertaining to him dealing with an electronic interception other than pursuant to statute must be exempted because such notice to an individual would be detrimental to the successful conduct and/or completion of an investigation pending or future. In addition, mere notice of the fact of an electronic interception could inform the subject or others that their activities are under or may become the subject of an investigation and could enable the subjects to avoid detection or apprehension, to influence witnesses improperly, to destroy evidence, or to fabricate testimony.

Since an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d) of the Act (Access to Records) the rules required pursuant to subsection (f)(2) through (5) are inapplicable to these systems of records to the extent that these systems of records are exempted from subsection (d).

(9) . (g). Since an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d) (Access to Records) and (f) (Agency Rules) this section is inapplicable, and is exempted for the reasons set forth for those subsections, to the extent that these systems of records are exempted from subsection (d) and (f).

(1) . (c)(3). Release of the accounting of disclosures made pursuant to subsection (b) of the Act, including those permitted under the routine uses published for this system of records, (a) as to a witness for whom immunity has been proposed, would inform the individual of the existence of the proposed immunity prematurely, thus creating a serious impediment to effective law enforcement in that the witness could flee, destroy evidence, or fabricate testimony; and (b) as to a witness to whom immunity has been granted, or for whom it has been denied, would reveal the nature and scope of the activities, if any, of the witness known to the government, which would also create a serious impediment to effective law enforcement.

(2) . (c)(4). Since an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d) of the Act (Access to Records) this section is inapplicable to the extent that this system of records is exempted from subsection (d).

(3) . (d). Access to the records contained in this system (a) as to a witness for whom immunity has been proposed, would inform the individual of the existence of the proposed immunity prematurely, thus presenting a serious impediment to effective law enforcement in that the witness could flee, destroy evidence, or fabricate testimony; and (b) as to a witness to whom immunity has been granted, or for whom it has been denied, would reveal the nature and scope of the activities, if any, of the witness known to the government, which would also create a serious impediment to effective law enforcement.

(4) . (e)(2). In a witness immunity request matter, the requirement that information be collected to the greatest extent practicable from the subject individual would present a serious impediment to law enforcement because the subject of the immunity request and often the subject of the underlying investigation or prosecution would be placed on notice as to the existence of the investigation and would therefore be able to avoid detection or apprehension, to influence witnesses improperly, to destroy evidence, or to fabricate testimony.

(5) . Exemption is claimed from subsections (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I), and (e)(8) for the reasons stated in subsections (b)(6), (b)(7), (b)(8) and (b)(10) of this section.

(6) . (f). Procedures for notice to an individual pursuant to subsection (f)(1) as to the existence of records pertaining to him (a) as to a witness for whom immunity has been proposed, would inform the individual of the existence of the proposed immunity prematurely, thus presenting a serious impediment to effective law enforcement in that the witness could flee, destroy evidence, or fabricate testimony; and (b) as to a witness to whom immunity has been granted, or for whom it has been denied, would reveal the nature and scope of the activity, if any, of the witness known to the government, which would also create a serious impediment to effective law enforcement.

Since an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d) of the Act (Access to Records) the rules required pursuant to subsection (f)(2) through (5) are inapplicable to this system of records to the extent that this system of records is exempted from subsection (d).

(7) . (g). Since an exemption is being claimed for subsections (d) (Access to Records) and (f) (Agency Rules) this section is inapplicable, and is exempted for the reasons set forth for those subsections, to the extent that this system of records is exempted for subsections (d) and (f).

(8) . In addition, exemption is claimed for this system of records from compliance with the following provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a) pursuant to the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1): subsections (c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4) (G), (H) and (I) and (f) to the extent that the records contained in this system are specifically authorized to be kept secret in the interests of national defense and foreign policy.

(1) Freedom of Information/Privacy Act Records (JUSTICE/CRM-024)

These exemptions apply to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), (k)(1) and (k)(2).

(1) (c)(3). The release of the disclosure accounting would present a serious impediment to law enforcement by permitting the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to determine whether he is the subject of investigation, or to obtain valuable information concerning the nature of that investigation and the information obtained, or to identify witnesses and informants.

(2) (c)(4). Since an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d) of the Act (Access to Records), this subsection is inapplicable to the extent that this system of records is exempted from subsection (d).

(3) (d). Access to records contained in this system would enable the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal or civil case or regulatory violation to determine whether he or she is the subject of investigation, to obtain valuable information concerning the nature and scope of the investigation, and information or evidence obtained as to his/her activities, to identify witnesses and informants, or to avoid detection or apprehension. Such results could prevent the successful completion of the investigation, endanger the physical safety of witnesses or informants, lead to the improper influencing of witnesses, the destruction of evidence, or the fabrication of testimony, and thereby present a serious impediment to effective law enforcement. Amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing criminal law enforcement proceedings and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring criminal investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.

(4) (e)(1). In the course of criminal or other law enforcement investigations, cases, and matters, the Criminal Division will occasionally obtain information concerning actual or potential violations of law that are not strictly within its statutory or other authority, or it may compile information in the course of an investigation which may not be relevant to a specific prosecution. In the interests of effective law enforcement, it is necessary to retain such information since it can aid in establishing patterns of criminal activity and can provide valuable leads for Federal and other law enforcement agencies.

(5) (e)(2). To collect information to the greatest extent practicable from the subject individual of a criminal investigation or prosecution would present a serious impediment to law enforcement. The nature of criminal and other investigative activities is such that vital information about an individual can only be obtained from other persons who are familiar with such individual and his/her activities. In such investigations it is not feasible to rely upon information furnished by the individual concerning his own activities.

(6) (e)(3). To provide individuals supplying information with a form stating the requirements of subsection (e)(3) would constitute a serious impediment to law enforcement in that it could compromise the existence of a confidential investigation or reveal the identity of witnesses or confidential informants.

(7) (e)(4) (G) and (H). These subsections are inapplicable to the extent that this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d) and the rules provisions of subsection (f).

(8) (e)(4)(I). The categories of sources of the records in this system have been published in the Federal Register in broad generic terms in the belief that this is all that subsection (e)(4)(I) of the Act requires. In the event, however, that this subsection should be interpreted to require more detail as to the identity of sources of the records in this system, exemption from this provision is necessary to protect the confidentiality of the sources of criminal and other law enforcement information. Such exemption is further necessary to protect the privacy and physical safety of witnesses and informants.

(9) (e)(5). In the collection of information for criminal law enforcement purposes it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to light and the accuracy of such information can often only be determined in a court of law. The restrictions of subsection (e)(5) would inhibit the ability of trained investigators, intelligence analysts, and government attorneys in exercising their judgment in reporting on information and investigations and impede the development of criminal or other intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement.

(10) (e)(8). The individual notice requirements of subsection (e)(8) could present a serious impediment to law enforcement as this could interfere with the ability to issue warrants or subpoenas and could reveal investigative techniques, procedures, or evidence.

(11) (f). This subsection is inapplicable to the extent that this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d).

(12) (g). Because some of the records in this system contain information which was compiled for law enforcement purposes and have been exempted from the access provisions of subsection (d), subsection (g) is inapplicable.

(1) Access to records contained in this system could inform the subject of the identity of witnesses or informants. The release of such information could present a serious impediment to effective law enforcement by endangering the physical safety of witnesses or informants; by leading to the improper influencing of witnesses, the destruction of evidence, or the fabrication of testimony; or by otherwise preventing the successful completion of an investigation.

(1) The following system of records is exempted pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) from subsections (c)(3) and (4), (d), (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(5), (e)(8), (f) and (g); in addition, the following systems of records are exempted pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1) and (k)(2) from subsections (c)(3), (d), and (e)(1):

(2) These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system relates to the investigation, prosecution or defense of actual or potential criminal or civil litigation, or which has been properly classified in the interest of national defense and foreign policy, and therefore is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), (k)(1) and (k)(2). To the extent that information in a record pertaining to an individual does not relate to national defense or foreign policy, official Federal investigations, and/or law enforcement matters, the exemption does not apply. In addition, where compliance would not appear to interfere with or adversely affect the overall law or regulatory enforcement process, the applicable exemption may be waived by the Environment and Natural Resources Division.

(1) Subsection (c)(3). Subsection (c)(3) requires an agency to provide an accounting of disclosures of records concerning an individual. To provide the subject of a criminal or civil matter or case under investigation with an accounting of disclosures of records would inform that individual (and others to whom the subject might disclose the records) of the existence, nature, or scope of that investigation and thereby seriously impede law enforcement efforts by permitting the record subject and others to avoid criminal penalties and civil remedies.

(2) Subsections (c)(4) (requiring an agency to inform individuals about any corrections made to a record that has been disclosed) and (g) (providing for civil remedies when an agency fails to comply with these provisions). These provisions are inapplicable to the extent that this system of records is exempted from subsection (d).

(3) Subsection (d). Subsection (d) requires an agency to allow individuals to gain access to a record about him or herself; to dispute the accuracy, relevance, timeliness or completeness of such records; and to have an opportunity to amend his or her record or seek judicial review. To the extent that information contained in this system has been properly classified, relates to the investigation and/or prosecution of grand jury, civil fraud, and other law enforcement matters, disclosure could compromise matters which should be kept secret in the interest of national security or foreign policy; compromise confidential investigations or proceedings; impede affirmative enforcement actions based upon alleged violations of regulations or of civil or criminal laws; reveal the identity of confidential sources; and result in unwarranted invasions of the privacy of others. Amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing criminal law enforcement proceedings and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring criminal investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.

(4) Subsection (e)(1). Subsection (e)(1) requires an agency to maintain in its records only such information about an individual that is relevant and necessary to accomplish the agency's purpose. In the course of criminal or civil investigations, cases, or other matters, the Environment and Natural Resources Division may obtain information concerning the actual or potential violation of laws which are not strictly within its statutory authority. In the interest of effective law enforcement, it is necessary to retain such information since it may establish patterns of criminal activity or avoidance of other civil obligations and provide leads for Federal and other law enforcement agencies.

(5) Subsection (e)(2). Subsection (e)(2) requires an agency to collect information to the greatest extent practicable from the subject individual when the information may result in adverse determinations about an individual's rights, benefits and privileges under Federal programs. To collect information from the subject of a criminal investigation or prosecution would present a serious impediment to law enforcement in that the subject (and others with whom the subject might be in contact) would be informed of the existence of the investigation and would therefore be able to avoid detection or apprehension, to influence witnesses improperly, to destroy evidence, or to fabricate testimony.

(6) Subsection (e)(3). Subsection (e)(3) requires an agency to inform each individual whom it asks to supply information, on a form that can be retained by the individual, the authority which authorizes the solicitation, the principal purpose for the information, the routine uses of the information, and the effects on the individual of not providing the requested information. To comply with this requirement during the course of a criminal investigation or prosecution could jeopardize the investigation by disclosing the existence of a confidential investigation, revealing the identity of witnesses or confidential informants, or impeding the information gathering process.

(7) Subsection (e)(5). Subsection (e)(5) requires an agency to maintain records with such accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness as is reasonably necessary to assure fairness to the individual. In compiling information for criminal law enforcement purposes, the accuracy, completeness, timeliness and relevancy of the information obtained cannot always be immediately determined. As new details of an investigation come to light, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance and the accuracy of such information can often only be determined in a court of law. Compliance with this requirement would therefore restrict the ability of government attorneys in exercising their judgment in developing information necessary for effective law enforcement.

(8) Subsection (e)(8). Subsection (e)(8) requires agencies to make reasonable efforts to serve notice on an individual when any record on the individual is made available to any person under compulsory legal process. To serve notice would give persons sufficient warning to evade law enforcement efforts.

(9) Subsections (f) and (g). Subsection (f) requires an agency to establish procedures to allow an individual to have access to information about him or herself and to contest information kept by an agency about him or herself. Subsection (g) provides for civil remedies against agencies who fail to comply with the Privacy Act requirements. These provisions are inapplicable to the extent that this system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).

(1) Freedom of Information/Privacy Act Records System. (Justice/LDN-005).

These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2).

(1) From subsection (c) (3) because that portion of the Freedom of Information/Privacy Act Records System that consists of investigatory materials compiled for law enforcement purposes is being exempted from access and contest; the provision for disclosure of accounting is not applicable.

(2) From subsection (d) because of the need to safeguard the identity of confidential informants and avoid interference with ongoing investigations or law enforcement activities by preventing premature disclosure of information relating to those efforts.

(1) Tax Division Central Classification Cards, Index Docket Cards, and Associated Records—Criminal Tax Cases (JUSTICE/TAX-001)—Limited Access.

(2) These exemptions apply to the extent that information in these systems is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2).

(1) (c)(3). The release of the disclosure accounting, for disclosures made pursuant to subsection (b) of the Act, including those permitted under the routine uses published for those systems of records, would enable the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal tax case to determine whether he or she is the subject of investigation, to obtain valuable information concerning the nature of that investigation and the information obtained, and to determine the identity of witnesses or informants. Such access to investigative information would, accordingly, present a serious impediment to law enforcement. In addition, disclosure of the accounting would constitute notice to the individual of the existence of a record even though such notice requirement under subsection (f)(1) is specifically exempted for these systems of records.

(2) (c)(4). Since an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d) of the Act (Access to Records) this subsection is inapplicable to the extent that these systems of records are exempted from subsection (d).

(3) (d)(1); (d)(2); (d)(3); (d)(4). Access to the records contained in these systems would inform the subject of an actual or potential criminal tax investigation of the existence of that investigation, of the nature and scope of the information and evidence obtained as to his or her activities, and of the identity of witnesses or informants. Such access would, accordingly, provide information that could enable the subject to avoid detection, apprehension and prosecution. This result, therefore, would constitute a serious impediment to effective law enforcement not only because it would prevent the successful completion of the investigation but also because it could endanger the physical safety of witnesses or informants, lead to the improper influencing of witnesses, the destruction of evidence, or the fabrication of testimony.

(4) (e)(1). The notices for these systems of records published in the Federal Register, set forth the basic statutory or related authority for maintenance of these systems. However, in the course of criminal tax and related law enforcement investigations, cases, and matters, the Tax Division will occasionally obtain information concerning actual or potential violations of law that may not be technically within its statutory or other authority or may compile information in the course of an investigation which may not be relevant to a specific prosecution. In the interests of effective law enforcement, it is necessary to retain some or all of such information in these systems of records since it can aid in establishing patterns of criminal activity and can provide valuable leads for Federal and other law enforcement agencies.

(5) (e)(2). In a criminal tax investigation or prosecution, the requirement that information be collected to the greatest extent practicable from the subject individual would present a serious impediment to law enforcement because the subject of the investigation or prosecution would be placed on notice as to the existence of the investigation and would therefore be able to avoid detection or apprehension, influence witnesses improperly, destroy evidence, or fabricate testimony.

(6) (e)(3). The requirement that individuals supplying information be provided with a form stating the requirements of subsection (e)(3) would constitute a serious impediment to law enforcement in that it could compromise the existence of a confidential investigation or reveal the identity of witnesses or confidential informants.

(7) (e)(4) (G) and (H). Since an exemption is being claimed for subsections (f) (Agency Rules) and (d) (Access to Records) of the Act these subsections are inapplicable to the extent that these systems of records are exempted from subsection (f) and (d).

(8) (e)(4)(I). The categories of sources of the records in the systems have been published in the Federal Register in broad generic terms in the belief that this is all that subsection (e)(4)(I) of the Act requires. In the event, however, that this subsection should be interpreted to require more detail as to the identity of sources of the records in these systems, exemption from this provision is necessary in order to protect the confidentiality of the sources of criminal tax and related law enforcement information. Such exemption is further necessary to protect the privacy and physical safety of witnesses and informants.

(9) (e)(5). In the collection of information for criminal tax enforcement purposes it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to light. Furthermore, the accuracy of such information can often only be determined in a court of law. The restrictions of subsection (e)(5) would restrict the ability of government attorneys in exercising their judgment in reporting on information and investigations and impede the development of criminal tax information and related data necessary for effective law enforcement.

(10) (e)(8). The individual notice requirements of subsection (e)(8) could present a serious impediment to law enforcement as this could interfere with the ability to issue warrants or subpoenas and could reveal investigative techniques, procedures, or evidence.

(11) (f). Procedures for notice to an individual pursuant to subsection (f)(1) as to the existence of records pertaining to him dealing with an actual or potential criminal tax, civil tax, or regulatory investigation or prosecution must be exempted because such notice to an individual would be detrimental to the successful conduct and/or completion or an investigation or prosecution pending or future. In addition, mere notice of the fact of an investigation could inform the subject or others that their activities are under or may become the subject of an investigation and could enable the subjects to avoid detection or apprehension, to influence witnesses improperly, to destroy evidence, or to fabricate testimony.

Since an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d) of the Act (Access to Records) the rules required pursuant to subsection (f) (2) through (5) are inapplicable to these systems of records to the extent that these systems of records are exempted from subsection (d).

(12) (g). Since an exemption is being claimed for subsections (d) (Access to Records) and (f) (Agency Rules) this section is inapplicable, and is exempted for the reasons set forth for those subsections, to the extent that these systems of records are exempted from subsections (d) and (f).

(1) Tax Division Central Classification Cards, Index Docket Cards, and Associated Records—Civil Tax Cases (JUSTICE/TAX-002)—Limited Access.

These exemptions apply to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2).

(1) (c)(3). The release of the disclosure accounting, for disclosures made pursuant to subsection (b) of the Act, including those permitted under the routine uses published for this system of records, would enable the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential civil tax case to determine whether he or she is the subject of investigation, to obtain valuable information concerning the nature of that investigation and the information obtained, and to determine the identity of witnesses or informants. Such access to investigative information would, accordingly, present a serious impediment to law enforcement. In addition, disclosure of the accounting would constitute notice to the individual of the existence of a record even though such notice requirement under subsection (f)(1) is specifically exempted for this system of records.

(2) (d)(1); (d)(2); (d)(3); (d)(4). Access to the records contained in this system would inform the subject of an actual or potential civil tax investigation of the existence of that investigation, of the nature and scope of the information and evidence obtained as to his or her activities and of the identity of witnesses or informants. Such access would, accordingly, provide information that could enable the subject to avoid detection. This result, therefore, would constitute a serious impediment to effective law enforcement not only because it would prevent the successful completion of the investigation but also because it could endanger the physical safety of witnesses or informants, lead to the improper influencing of witnesses, the destruction of evidence, or the fabrication of testimony.

(3) (e)(1). The notices for this system of records published in the Federal Register set forth the basic statutory or related authority for maintenance of this system. However, in the course of civil tax and related law enforcement investigations, cases and matters, the Tax Division will occasionally obtain information concerning actual or potential violations of law that are not strictly or technically within its statutory or other authority or may compile information in the course of an investigation which may not be relevant to a specific case. In the interests of effective law enforcement, it is necessary to retain some or all of such information in this system of records since it can aid in establishing patterns of tax compliance and can provide valuable leads for Federal and other law enforcement agencies.

(4) (e)(4) (G) and (H). Since an exemption is being claimed for subsections (f) (Agency Rules) and (d) (Access to Records) of the Act these subsections are inapplicable to the extent that this system of records is exempted from subsection (f) and (d).

(5) (e)(4)(I). The categories of sources of the records in this system have been published in the Federal Register in broad generic terms in the belief that this is all that subsection (e)(4)(I) of the Act requires. In the event, however, that this subsection should be interpreted to require more detail as to the identity of sources of the records in this system, exemption from this provision is necessary in order to protect the confidentiality of the sources of civil tax and related law enforcement information. Such exemption is further necessary to protect the privacy and physical safety of witnesses and informants.

(6) (f). Procedures for notice to an individual pursuant to subsection (f)(1) as to existence of records pertaining to the individual dealing with an actual or potential criminal tax, civil tax, or regulatory investigation or prosecution must be exempted because such notice to an individual would be detrimental to the successful conduct and/or completion of an investigation or case, pending or future. In addition, mere notice of the fact of an investigation could inform the subject or others that their activities are under or may become the subject of an investigation and could enable the subjects to avoid detection, to influence witnesses improperly, to destroy evidence, or to fabricate testimony.

Since an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d) of the Act (Access to Records) the rules required pursuant to subsection (f) (2) through (5) are inapplicable to this system of records to the extent that this system of records is exempted from subsection (d).

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because an accounting could reveal the identity of confidential sources and result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of others. Many persons are contacted who, without an assurance of anonymity, refuse to provide information concerning an applicant for a position with the Tax Division. Disclosure of an accounting could reveal the identity of a source of information and constitutes a breach of the promise of confidentiality by the Tax Division. This would result in the reduction in the free flow of information vital to a determination of an applicant's qualifications and suitability for federal employment.

(2) From subsection (d)(1) because disclosure of records in the system could reveal the identity of confidential sources and result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of others. Many persons are contacted who, without an assurance of anonymity, refuse to provide information concerning an applicant for a Tax Division position. Access could reveal the identity of the source of the information and constitute a breach of the promise of confidentiality on the part of the Tax Division. Such breaches ultimately would restrict the free flow of information vital to a determination of an applicant's qualifications and suitability.

(1) Central Records System (CRS) (JUSTICE/FBI-002).

These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(j) and (k). Where compliance would not appear to interfere with or adversely affect the overall law enforcement process, the applicable exemption may be waived by the FBI.

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures from records concerning him/her would reveal investigative interest by not only the FBI, but also by the recipient agency. This would permit the record subject to take appropriate measures to impede the investigation, e.g., destroy evidence, intimidate potential witnesses or flee the area to avoid the thrust of the investigation.

(2)

(3) From subsection (e)(1) because:

(4) From subsection (e)(2) because the nature of criminal and other investigative activities is such that vital information about an individual can only be obtained from other persons who are familiar with such individual and his/her activities. In such investigations it is not feasible to rely upon information furnished by the individual concerning his own activities.

(5) From subsection (e)(3) because disclosure would provide the subject with substantial information which could impede or compromise the investigation. The individual could seriously interfere with undercover investigative activities and could take appropriate steps to evade the investigation or flee a specific area.

(6) From subsection (e)(5) because in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to light. The restrictions imposed by subsection (e)(5) would limit the ability of trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment in reporting on investigations and impede the development of criminal intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement. In addition, because many of these records come from other federal, state, local, joint, foreign, tribal, and international agencies, it is administratively impossible to ensure compliance with this provision.

(7) From subsection (e)(8) because the notice requirements of this provision could seriously interfere with a law enforcement activity by alerting the subject of a criminal or other investigation of existing investigative interest.

(1) Electronic Surveillance (Elsur) Indices (JUSTICE/FBI-006).

These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in the system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j).

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because the release of accounting disclosures would place the subject of an investigation on notice that he is under investigation and provide him with significant information concerning the nature of the investigation, resulting in a serious impediment to law enforcement.

(2) From subsections (c)(4), (d), (e)(4) (G) and (H), and (g) because these provisions concern an individual's access to records which concern him and such access to records in this system would compromise ongoing investigations, reveal investigatory techniques and confidential informants, and invade the privacy of private citizens who provide information in connection with a particular investigation.

(3) From subsection (e)(1) because these indices must be maintained in order to provide the information as described in the “routine uses” of this particular system.

(4) From subsections (e) (2) and (3) because compliance is not feasible given the subject matter of the indices.

(5) From subsection (e)(5) because this provision is not applicable to the indices in view of the “routine uses” of the indices. For example, it is impossible to predict when it will be necessary to utilize information in the system and, accordingly it is not possible to determine when the records are timely.

(6) From subsection (e)(8) because the notice requirement could present a serious impediment to law enforcement by revealing investigative techniques, procedures and the existence of confidential investigations.

(7) From subsection (m) for the reasons stated in subsection (b)(7) of this section.

(1) The Next Generation Identification (NGI) System (JUSTICE/FBI-009).

(2) These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j) or (k). Where compliance would not appear to interfere with or adversely affect the purpose of this system to detect, deter, and prosecute crimes and to protect the national security, the applicable exemption may be waived by the FBI in its sole discretion.

(1) From subsection (c)(3), the requirement that an accounting be made available to the named subject of a record, because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d). Also, because making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures from records concerning the subject would specifically reveal investigative interest by the FBI or agencies that are recipients of the disclosures. Revealing this information could compromise ongoing, authorized law enforcement and national security efforts and may provide the record subject with the opportunity to evade or impede the investigation.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) notification requirements because this system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d) as well as the accounting of disclosures provision of subsection (c)(3). The FBI takes seriously its obligation to maintain accurate records despite its assertion of this exemption, and to the extent it, in its sole discretion, agrees to permit amendment or correction of FBI records, it will share that information in appropriate cases.

(3) From subsection (d) (1), (2), (3) and (4), (e)(4)(G) and (H), (e)(8), (f) and (g) because these provisions concern individual access to and amendment of law enforcement records and compliance and could alert the subject of an authorized law enforcement activity about that particular activity and the interest of the FBI and/or other law enforcement agencies. Providing access could compromise sensitive law enforcement information, disclose information that would constitute an unwarranted invasion of another's personal privacy, reveal a sensitive investigative technique, provide information that would allow a subject to avoid detection or apprehension, or constitute a potential danger to the health or safety of law enforcement personnel, confidential sources, or witnesses. Also, an alternate system of access has been provided in 28 CFR 16.30 through 16.34, and 28 CFR 20.34, for record subjects to obtain a copy of their criminal history records. However, the vast majority of criminal history records concern local arrests for which it would be inappropriate for the FBI to undertake correction or amendment.

(4) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not always possible to know in advance what information is relevant and necessary for law enforcement purposes. The relevance and utility of certain information may not always be evident until and unless it is vetted and matched with other sources of information that are necessarily and lawfully maintained by the FBI. Most records in this system are acquired from state and local law enforcement agencies and it is not possible for the FBI to review that information as relevant and necessary.

(5) From subsection (e)(2) and (3) because application of this provision could present a serious impediment to the FBI's responsibilities to detect, deter, and prosecute crimes and to protect the national security. Application of these provisions would put the subject of an investigation on notice of that fact and allow the subject an opportunity to engage in conduct intended to impede that activity or avoid apprehension. Also, the majority of criminal history records and associated biometrics in this system are collected by state and local agencies at the time of arrest; therefore it is not feasible for the FBI to collect directly from the individual or to provide notice. Those persons who voluntarily submit fingerprints into this system pursuant to state and federal statutes for licensing, employment, and similar civil purposes receive an (e)(3) notice.

(6) From subsection (e)(4)(I), to the extent that this subsection is interpreted to require more detail regarding the record sources in this system than has been published in the Federal Register. Should the subsection be so interpreted, exemption from this provision is necessary to protect the sources of law enforcement information and to protect the privacy and safety of witnesses and informants and others who provide information to the FBI.

(7) From subsection (e)(5) because in the collection of information for authorized law enforcement purposes it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely and complete. With time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance when new details are brought to light. Additionally, the information may aid in establishing patterns of activity and providing criminal leads. Most records in this system are acquired from state and local law enforcement agencies and it would be impossible for the FBI to vouch for the compliance of these agencies with this provision. The FBI does communicate to these agencies the need for accurate and timely criminal history records, including criminal dispositions.

(1) National Crime Information Center (NCIC) (JUSTICE/FBI-001).

(2) These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in the system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552aG) and (k). Where the FBI determines compliance with an exempted provision would not appear to interfere with or adversely affect interests of the United States or other system stakeholders, the FBI in its sole discretion may waive an exemption, in whole or in part; exercise of this discretionary waiver prerogative in a particular matter shall not create any entitlement to or expectation of waiver in that matter or any other matter. As a condition of discretionary waiver, the FBI in its sole discretion may impose any restrictions deemed advisable by the FBI (including, but not limited to, restrictions on the location, manner, or scope of notice, access or amendment).

(1) From subsection (c)(3) the requirement that an accounting be made available to the named subject of a record, because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d). Also, because making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures from records concerning him/her would specifically reveal law enforcement or national security investigative interest in the individual by the FBI or agencies that are recipients of the disclosures. Revealing this information could compromise ongoing, authorized law enforcement and intelligence efforts, particularly efforts to identify and defuse any potential acts of terrorism or other potential violations of criminal law. Revealing this information could also permit the record subject to obtain valuable insight concerning the information obtained during any investigation and to take measures to circumvent the investigation (e.g., destroy evidence or flee the area to avoid investigation).

(2) From subsection (c)(4) notification requirements because this system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d) as well as the accounting disclosures provision of subsection (c)(3). The FBI takes seriously its obligation to maintain accurate records despite its assertion of this exemption, and to the extent it, in its sole discretion, agrees to permit amendment or correction of FBI records, it will share that information in appropriate cases.

(3) From subsection (d), (e)(4)(G) and (H), (e)(8), (f), and (g) because these provisions concern individual access to and amendment of law enforcement and intelligence records and compliance could alert the subject of an authorized law enforcement or intelligence activity about that particular activity and the investigative interest of the FBI and/or other law enforcement or intelligence agencies. Providing access could compromise sensitive law enforcement information; disclose information that could constitute an unwarranted invasion of another's personal privacy; reveal a sensitive investigative or intelligence technique; provide information that would allow a subject to avoid detection or apprehension; or constitute a potential danger to the health or safety of law enforcement personnel, confidential sources, and witnesses. The FBI takes seriously its obligation to maintain accurate records despite its assertion of this exemption, and to the extent it, in its sole discretion, agrees to permit amendment or correction of FBI records, it will share that information in appropriate cases with subjects of the information.

(4) From subsection (e)(l) because it is not always possible to know in advance what information is relevant and necessary for law enforcement and intelligence purposes. Relevance and necessity are questions of judgment and timing. For example, what appears rekvant and necessary when collected ultimately may be deemed unnecessary. It is only after information is assessed that its relevancy and necessity in a specific investigative activity can be established.

(5) From subsections (e)(2) and (3) because it is not feasible to comply with these provisions given the nature of this system. The majority of the records in this system come from other federal, state, local, joint, foreign, tribal, and international agencies; therefore, it is not feasible for the FBI to collect information directly from the individual or to provide notice. Additionally, the application of this provision could present a serious impediment to the FBI's responsibilities to detect, deter, and prosecute crimes and to protect the national security. Application of these provisions would put the subject of an investigation on notice of that fact and allow the subject an opportunity to engage in conduct intended to impede that activity or avoid apprehension.

(6) From subsection (e)(4)(I), to the extent that this subsection is interpreted to require more detail regarding the record sources in this system than has already been published in the Federal Register through the SORN documentation. Should the subsection be so interpreted, exemption from this provision is necessary to protect the sources of law enforcement and intelligence information and to protect the privacy and safety of witnesses and informants and others who provide information to the FBI.

(7) From subsection (e)(S) because in the collection of information for authorized law enforcement and intelligence purposes it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. With time, additional facts, or analysis, information may acquire new significance. The restrictions imposed by subsection (e)(S) would limit the ability of trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment in reporting on investigations and impede the development of criminal intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement. Although the FBI has claimed this exemption, it continuously works with its federal, state, local, tribal, and international partners to maintain the accuracy of records to the greatest extent practicable. The FBI does so with established policies and practices. The criminal justice and national security communities have a strong operational interest in using up-to-date and accurate records and will foster relationships with partners to further this interest.

(1) National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime (NCAVC) (JUSTICE/FBI-015).

These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a (j)(2) and (k)(2).

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because providing the accounting of disclosures to the subject could prematurely reveal investigative interest by the FBI and other law enforcement agencies, thereby providing the individual an opportunity to impede an active investigation, destroy or alter evidence, and possibly render harm to violent crime victims and/or witnesses.

(2) From subsections (d), (e)(4) (G) and (H), and (f) because disclosure to the subject could interfere with enforcement proceedings of a criminal justice agency, reveal the identity of a confidential source, result in an unwarranted invasion of another's privacy, reveal the details of a sensitive investigative technique, or endanger the life and safety of law enforcement personnel, potential violent crime victims, and witnesses. Disclosure also could prevent the future apprehension of a violent or exceptionally dangerous criminal fugitive should he or she modify his or her method of operation in order to evade law enforcement. Also, specifically from subsection (d)(2), which permits an individual to request amendment of a record, because the nature of the information in the system is such that an individual criminal offender would frequently demand amendment of derogatory information, forcing the FBI to continuously retrograde its criminal investigations in an attempt to resolve questions of accuracy, etc.

(3) From subsection (g) because the system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).

(4) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not always possible to establish relevance and necessity of the information at the time it is obtained or developed. Information, the relevance and necessity of which may not be readily apparent, frequently can prove to be of investigative value at a later date and time.

(5) From subsection (e)(5) because in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to light. The restrictions imposed by subsection (e)(5) would limit the ability of trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment in reporting on investigations and impede the development of criminal intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement. In addition, because many of these records come from other federal, state, local, joint, foreign, tribal, and international agencies, it is administratively impossible to ensure compliance with this provision.

(1) FBI Counterdrug Information Indices System (CIIS) (JUSTICE/FBI—016)

(2) [Reserved]

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures from records concerning him/her would reveal investigative interest by not only the FBI, but also by the recipient agency. This would permit the record subject to take appropriate measures to impede the investigation, e.g., destroy evidence, intimidate potential witnesses or flee the area to avoid the thrust of the investigation.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) to the extent it is not applicable because an exemption is being claimed from subsection (d).

(3)

(4)

(5) From subsection (e)(2) because the nature of criminal and other investigative activities is such that vital information about an individual often can only be obtained from other persons who are familiar with such individual and his/her activities. In such investigations it is not feasible to principally rely upon information furnished by the individual concerning his own activities.

(6) From subsection (e)(3) because disclosure would provide the subject with information which could impede or compromise the investigation. The individual could seriously interfere with undercover investigative activities and could take appropriate steps to evade the investigation or flee a specific area.

(7) From subsection (e)(5) because in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to light. The restrictions imposed by subsection (e)(5) would restrict the ability of trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment in reporting on investigations and impede the development of criminal intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement.

(8) From subsection (e)(8) because the notice requirements of this provision could seriously interfere with a law enforcement activity by alerting the subject of a criminal or other investigation of existing investigative interest.

(9) From subsection (f) to the extent that this system is exempt from the provisions of subsection (d).

(10) From subsection (g) to the extent that this system of records is exempt from the provisions of subsection (d).

(1) National DNA Index System (NDIS) (JUSTICE/FBI-017).

(2) [Reserved]

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because making available the accounting of disclosures of records to the subject of the record would prematurely place the subject on notice of the investigative interest of law enforcement agencies, provide the subject with significant information concerning the nature of the investigation, or permit the subject to take measures to impede the investigation (e.g., destroy or alter evidence, intimidate potential witnesses, or flee the area to avoid investigation and prosecution), and result in a serious impediment to law enforcement.

(2)

(3) From subsection (e)(1) because:

(4) From subsections (e)(2) and (3) because it is not feasible to comply with these provisions given the nature of this system. Most of the records in this system are necessarily furnished by State and local criminal justice agencies and not by individuals due to the very nature of the records and the system.

(5) From subsection (e)(5) because the vast majority of these records come from State and local criminal justice agencies and because it is administratively impossible for them and the FBI to insure that the records comply with this provision. Submitting agencies are urged and make every effort to insure records are accurate and complete; however, since it is not possible to predict when information in the indexes of the system (whether submitted by State and local criminal justice agencies or generated by the FBI) will be matched with other information, it is not possible to determine when most of them are relevant or timely.

(6) From subsection (e)(8) because the FBI has no logical manner to determine whenever process has been made public and compliance with this provision would provide an impediment to law enforcement by interfering with ongoing investigations.

(1) Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), from subsections (c) (3) and (4); (d); (e) (1), (2) and (3); (e)(4) (G) and (H); (e) (5) and (8); and (g); and

(2) Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k) (2) and (3), from subsections (c)(3), (d), (e)(1), and (e)(4) (G) and (H).

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because the release of the accounting of disclosures would place the subject on notice that the subject is or has been the subject of investigation and result in a serious impediment to law enforcement.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) to the extent that it is not applicable since an exemption is claimed from subsection (d).

(3)

(4) From subsection (e)(1) because it is impossible to state with any degree of certainty that all information in these records is relevant to accomplish a purpose of the FBI, even though acquisition of the records from state and local law enforcement agencies is based on a statutory requirement. In view of the number of records in the system, it is impossible to review them for relevancy.

(5) From subsections (e) (2) and (3) because the purpose of the system is to verify information about an individual. It would not be realistic to rely on information provided by the individual. In addition, much of the information contained in or checked by this system is from Federal, State, and local criminal history records.

(6) From subsection (e)(5) because it is impossible to predict when it will be necessary to use the information in the system, and, accordingly, it is not possible to determine in advance when the records will be timely. Since most of the records are from State and local or other Federal agency records, it would be impossible to review all of them to verify that they are accurate. In addition, an alternate procedure is being established in 28 CFR, part 25, subpart A, so the records can be amended if found to be incorrect.

(7) From subsection (e)(8) because the notice requirement could present a serious impediment to law enforcement by revealing investigative techniques and confidential investigations.

(8) From subsection (g) to the extent that, pursuant to subsections (j)(2), (k)(2), and (k)(3), the system is exempted from the other subsections listed in paragraph (p) of this section.

(1) Terrorist Screening Records System (TSRS) (JUSTICE/FBI-019).

(2) These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), (k)(1), and (k)(2). Where compliance would not appear to interfere with or adversely affect the counterterrorism purposes of this system, and the overall law enforcement process, the applicable exemption may be waived by the FBI in its sole discretion.

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures from records concerning him/her would specifically reveal any investigative interest in the individual. Revealing this information could reasonably be expected to compromise ongoing efforts to investigate a known or suspected terrorist by notifying the record subject that he/she is under investigation. This information could also permit the record subject to take measures to impede the investigation, e.g., destroy evidence, intimidate potential witnesses, or flee the area to avoid or impede the investigation. Similarly, disclosing this information to individuals who have been misidentified as known or suspected terrorists due to a close name similarity could reveal the Government's investigative interest in a terrorist suspect, because it could make known the name of the individual who actually is the subject of the Government's interest. Consequently, the Government has as great an interest in protecting the confidentiality of identifying information of misidentified persons as it does in protecting the confidentiality of the identities of known or suspected terrorists.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) because this system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).

(3) From subsections (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4) because these provisions concern individual access to and amendment of records contained in this system, which consists of counterterrorism, investigatory and intelligence records. Compliance with these provisions could alert the subject of a terrorism investigation of the fact and nature of the investigation, and/or the investigative interest of the FBI and/or other intelligence or law enforcement agencies; compromise sensitive information classified in the interest of national security; interfere with the overall law enforcement process by leading to the destruction of evidence, improper influencing of witnesses, fabrication of testimony, and/or flight of the subject; could identify a confidential source or disclose information which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of another's personal privacy; reveal a sensitive investigative or intelligence technique; or constitute a potential danger to the health or safety of law enforcement personnel, confidential informants, and witnesses. Amendment of these records would interfere with ongoing counterterrorism investigations and analysis activities and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations, analyses, and reports to be continuously reinvestigated and revised. Similarly, compliance with these provisions with respect to records on individuals who have been misidentified as known or suspected terrorists due to a close name similarity could reveal the Government's investigative interest in a terrorist suspect, because it could make known the name of the individual who actually is the subject of the Government's interest.

(4) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not always possible for TSC to know in advance what information is relevant and necessary for it to complete an identity comparison between the individual being screened and a known or suspected terrorist. Also, because TSC and the FBI may not always know what information about an encounter with a known or suspected terrorist will be relevant to law enforcement for the purpose of conducting an operational response.

(5) From subsection (e)(2) because application of this provision could present a serious impediment to counterterrorism efforts in that it would put the subject of an investigation, study or analysis on notice of that fact, thereby permitting the subject to engage in conduct designed to frustrate or impede that activity. The nature of counterterrorism investigations is such that vital information about an individual frequently can be obtained only from other persons who are familiar with such individual and his/her activities. In such investigations it is not feasible to rely upon information furnished by the individual concerning his own activities.

(6) From subsection (e)(3), to the extent that this subsection is interpreted to require TSC to provide notice to an individual if TSC receives information about that individual from a third party. Should the subsection be so interpreted, exemption from this provision is necessary to avoid impeding counterterrorism efforts by putting the subject of an investigation, study or analysis on notice of that fact, thereby permitting the subject to engage in conduct intended to frustrate or impede that activity.

(7) From subsection (e)(5) because many of the records in this system are derived from other domestic and foreign agency record systems and therefore it is not possible for the FBI and the TSC to vouch for their compliance with this provision; however, the TSC has implemented internal quality assurance procedures to ensure that TSC terrorist screening data is as thorough, accurate, and current as possible. In addition, TSC supports but does not conduct investigations; therefore, it must be able to collect information related to terrorist identities and encounters for distribution to law enforcement and intelligence agencies that do conduct terrorism investigations. In the collection of information for law enforcement, counterterrorism, and intelligence purposes, it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to light. The restrictions imposed by (e)(5) would limit the ability of those agencies' trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment in conducting investigations and impede the development of intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement and counterterrorism efforts. The TSC has, however, implemented internal quality assurance procedures to ensure that TSC terrorist screening data is as thorough, accurate, and current as possible. The FBI also is exempting the TSRS from the requirements of subsection (e)(5) in order to prevent the use of a challenge under subsection (e)(5) as a collateral means to obtain access to records in the TSRS. The FBI has exempted TSRS records from the access and amendment requirements of subsection (d) of the Privacy Act in order to protect the integrity of counterterrorism investigations. Exempting the TSRS from subsection (e)(5) serves to prevent the assertion of challenges to a record's accuracy, timeliness, completeness, and/or relevance under subsection (e)(5) to circumvent the exemption claimed from subsection (d).

(8) From subsection (e)(8) because to require individual notice of disclosure of information due to compulsory legal process would pose an impossible administrative burden on the FBI and the TSC and could alert the subjects of counterterrorism, law enforcement, or intelligence investigations to the fact of those investigations when not previously known.

(9) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.

(1) Law Enforcement National Data Exchange (N-DEx), (JUSTICE/FBI-020).

(2) These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). Where compliance would not appear to interfere with or adversely affect the law enforcement purposes of this system, or the overall law enforcement process, the applicable exemption may be waived by the FBI in its sole discretion.

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d). Also, because making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures from records concerning him/her would specifically reveal any investigative interest in the individual. Revealing this information may thus compromise ongoing law enforcement efforts. Revealing this information may also permit the record subject to take measures to impede the investigation, such as destroying evidence, intimidating potential witnesses or fleeing the area to avoid the investigation.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) because this system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).

(3) From subsections (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4), because these provisions concern individual access to and amendment of investigatory records, compliance with which could alert the subject of an investigation of the fact and nature of the investigation, and/or the investigative interest of the FBI and other law enforcement agencies; interfere with the overall law enforcement process by leading to the destruction of evidence, improper influencing of witnesses, fabrication of testimony, and/or flight of the subject; possibly identify a confidential source or disclose information which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of another's personal privacy; reveal a sensitive investigative or intelligence technique; or constitute a potential danger to the health or safety of law enforcement personnel, confidential informants, and witnesses. Amendment of these records would interfere with ongoing investigations and other law enforcement activities and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations, analyses, and reports to be continuously reinvestigated and revised.

(4) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not always possible to know in advance what information is relevant and necessary for law enforcement purposes and, in fact, a major tenet of the N-DEx information sharing system is that the relevance of certain information may not always be evident in the absence of the ability to correlate that information with other existing law enforcement data.

(5) From subsection (e)(2) because application of this provision could present a serious impediment to efforts to solve crimes and improve homeland security in that it would put the subject of an investigation on notice of that fact, thereby permitting the subject to engage in conduct intended to frustrate or impede that activity.

(6) From subsection (e)(3) because disclosure would put the subject of an investigation on notice of that fact and would permit the subject to engage in conduct intended to thwart that activity.

(7)

(8) From subsection (e)(8), because to require individual notice of disclosure of information due to compulsory legal process would pose an impossible administrative burden on the FBI and may alert the subjects of law enforcement investigations to the fact of those investigations, when not previously known.

(9) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.

(1) FBI Data Warehouse System, (JUSTICE/FBI-022).

(2) These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j) and (k). Where compliance with an exempted provision could not appear to interfere with or adversely affect interests of the United States or other system stakeholders, the Department of Justice (DOJ) in its sole discretion may waive an exemption in whole or in part; exercise of this discretionary waiver prerogative in a particular matter shall not create any entitlement to or expectation of waiver in that matter or any other matter. As a condition of discretionary waiver, the DOJ in its sole discretion may impose any restrictions deemed advisable by the DOJ (including, but not limited to, restrictions on the location, manner, or scope of notice, access, or amendment).

(1) From subsection (c)(3), the requirement that an accounting be made available to the named subject of a record, because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d). Also, because making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures from records concerning him/her would specifically reveal any law enforcement or national security investigative interest in the individual by the FBI or agencies that are recipients of the disclosures. Revealing this information could compromise ongoing, authorized law enforcement and intelligence efforts, particularly efforts to identify and defuse any potential acts of terrorism or other potential violations of criminal law. Revealing this information could also permit the record subject to obtain valuable insight concerning the information obtained during any investigation and to take measures to circumvent the investigation.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) notification requirements because this system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d) as well as the accounting of disclosures provision of subsection (c)(3).

(3) From subsections (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4) and (e)(4)(G) and (H) because these provisions concern individual access to and amendment of law enforcement, intelligence and counterintelligence, and counterterrorism records, and compliance could alert the subject of an authorized law enforcement or intelligence activity about that particular activity and the investigative interest of the FBI or other law enforcement or intelligence agencies. Providing access could compromise sensitive information classified to protect national security; disclose information that would constitute an unwarranted invasion of another's personal privacy; reveal a sensitive investigative or intelligence technique; could provide information that would allow a subject to avoid detection or apprehension; or constitute a potential danger to the health or safety of law enforcement personnel, confidential sources, and witnesses. The FBI takes seriously its obligation to maintain accurate records despite its assertion of this exemption, and to the extent it, in its sole discretion, agrees to permit amendment or correction of FBI records, it will share that information in appropriate cases with subjects of the information.

(4) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not always possible to know in advance what information is relevant and necessary for law enforcement and intelligence purposes. The relevance and utility of certain information that may have a nexus to terrorism or other crimes may not always be evident until and unless it is vetted and matched with other sources of information that are necessarily and lawfully maintained by the FBI.

(5) From subsections (e)(2) and (3) because application of these provisions could present a serious impediment to efforts to solve crimes and improve national security. Application of these provisions would put the subject of an investigation on notice of that fact and allow the subject an opportunity to engage in conduct intended to impede that activity or avoid apprehension.

(6) From subsection (e)(4)(I), to the extent that this subsection is interpreted to require more detail regarding the record sources in this system than has been published in the Federal Register. Should the subsection be so interpreted, exemption from this provision is necessary to protect the sources of law enforcement and intelligence information and to protect the privacy and safety of witnesses and informants and others who provide information to the FBI. Further, greater specificity of properly classified records could compromise national security.

(7) From subsection (e)(5) because in the collection of information for authorized law enforcement and intelligence purposes, it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely and complete. With time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance when new details are brought to light. Additionally, the information may aid in establishing patterns of activity and providing criminal or intelligence leads. It could impede investigative progress if it were necessary to assure relevance, accuracy, timeliness and completeness of all information obtained during the scope of an investigation. Further, some of the records in this system come from other agencies and it would be administratively impossible for the FBI to vouch for the compliance of these agencies with this provision.

(8) From subsection (e)(8) because to require individual notice of disclosure of information due to compulsory legal process would pose an impossible administrative burden on the FBI and may alert the subjects of law enforcement investigations, who might be otherwise unaware, to the fact of those investigations.

(9) From subsections (f) and (g) to the extent that the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.

(1) The FBI Online Collaboration Systems (JUSTICE/FBI-004).

(2) These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j) or (k). Where the FBI determines compliance with an exempted provision would not appear to interfere with or adversely affect interests of the United States or other system stakeholders, the FBI in its sole discretion may waive an exemption in whole or in part; exercise of this discretionary waiver prerogative in a particular matter shall not create any entitlement to or expectation of waiver in that matter or any other matter. As a condition of discretionary waiver, the FBI in its sole discretion may impose any restrictions deemed advisable by the FBI (including, but not limited to, restrictions on the location, manner, or scope of notice, access or amendment).

(1) From subsection (c)(3), the requirement that an accounting be made available to the named subject of a record, because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d). Also, because making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures from records concerning him/her would specifically reveal any law enforcement or national security investigative interest in the individual by the FBI or agencies that are recipients of the disclosures. Revealing this information could compromise ongoing, authorized law enforcement and intelligence efforts, particularly efforts to identify and defuse any potential acts of terrorism or other potential violations of criminal law. Revealing this information could also permit the record subject to obtain valuable insight concerning the information obtained during any investigation and to take measures to circumvent the investigation (e.g. destroy evidence or flee the area to avoid investigation).

(2) From subsection (c)(4) notification requirements because this system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d) as well as the accounting disclosures provision of subsection (c)(3). The FBI takes seriously its obligation to maintain accurate records despite its assertion of this exemption, and to the extent it, in its sole discretion, agrees to permit amendment or correction of FBI records, it will share that information in appropriate cases.

(3) From subsections (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4); (e)(4)(G) and (H); (e)(8); (f); and (g) because these provisions concern individual access to and amendment of law enforcement and intelligence records and compliance with such provisions could alert the subject of an authorized law enforcement or intelligence activity about that particular activity and the investigative interest of the FBI and/or other law enforcement or intelligence agencies. Providing access rights could compromise sensitive law enforcement information, disclose information that could constitute an unwarranted invasion of another's personal privacy; reveal a sensitive investigative or intelligence technique; provide information that would allow a subject to avoid detection or apprehension; or constitute a potential danger to the health or safety of law enforcement personnel, confidential sources, and witnesses. The FBI takes seriously its obligation to maintain accurate records despite its assertion of this exemption, and to the extent it, in its sole discretion, agrees to permit amendment or correction of FBI records, it will share that information in appropriate cases with subjects of the information.

(4) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not always possible to know in advance what information is relevant and necessary for law enforcement and intelligence purposes. Relevance and necessity are questions of judgment and timing. For example, what appears relevant and necessary when collected ultimately may be deemed unnecessary. It is only after information has been fully assessed that its relevancy and necessity in a specific investigative activity can be determined.

(5) From subsections (e)(2) and (3) because application of these provisions requiring collection directly from the subject individuals and informing individuals regarding information to be collected about them could present a serious impediment to efforts to solve crimes and improve national security. Application of these provisions could put the subject of an investigation on notice of the existence of the investigation and allow the subject an opportunity to engage in conduct intended to obstruct or otherwise impede that activity or take steps to avoid apprehension.

(6) From subsection (e)(4)(I), to the extent that this subsection is interpreted to require more detail regarding the record sources in this system than has already been published in the Federal Register through the SORN documentation. Should the subsection be so interpreted, exemption from this provision is necessary to protect the sources of law enforcement and intelligence information and to protect the privacy and safety of witnesses and informants and others who provide information to the FBI.

(7) From subsection (e)(5) because in the collection of information for authorized law enforcement and intelligence purposes it is often impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. With time, additional facts, or analysis, information may acquire new significance. The restrictions imposed by subsection (e)(5) would thus limit the ability of trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment in reporting on investigations and impede the development of criminal intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement. Although the FBI has claimed this exemption, it continuously works with its federal, state, local, tribal, and international partners to maintain the accuracy of records to the greatest extent practicable. The FBI does so with established policies and practices. The criminal justice and national security communities have a strong operational interest in using up-to-date and accurate records and will apply their own procedures and foster relationships with their partners to further this interest.

(1) Custodial and Security Record System (JUSTICE/BOP-001).

(2) Industrial Inmate Employment Record System (JUSTICE/BOP-003).

(3) Inmate Administrative Remedy Record System (JUSTICE/BOP-004).

(4) Inmate Commissary Accounts Record System (JUSTICE/BOP-006).

(5) Inmate Physical and Mental Health Record System (JUSTICE/BOP-007).

(6) Inmate Safety and Accident Compensation Record System (JUSTICE/BOP-008).

(7) Federal Tort Claims Act Record System (JUSTICE/BOP-009).

(8) Federal Tort Claims Act Record System (JUSTICE/BOP-009).

These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in these systems is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j).

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because inmates will not be permitted to gain access or to contest contents of these record systems under the provisions of subsection (d) of 5 U.S.C. 552a. Revealing disclosure accountings can compromise legitimate law enforcement activities and Bureau of Prisons responsibilities.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) because exemption from provisions of subsection (d) will make notification of formal disputes inapplicable.

(3) From subsection (d) because exemption from this subsection is essential to protect internal processes by which Bureau personnel are able to formulate decisions and policies with regard to federal prisoners, to prevent disclosure of information to federal inmates that would jeopardize legitimate correctional interests of security, custody, or rehabilitation, and to permit receipt of relevant information from other federal agencies, state and local law enforcement agencies, and federal and state probation and judicial offices.

(4) From subsection (e)(2) because primary collection of information directly from federal inmates about criminal sentences or criminal records is highly impractical and inappropriate.

(5) From subsection (e)(3) because in view of the Bureau of Prisons' responsibilities, application of this provision to its operations and collection of information is inappropriate.

(6) From subsection (e)(4)(H) because exemption from provisions of subsection (d) will make publication of agency procedures under this subsection inapplicable.

(7) From subsection (e)(8) because the nature of Bureau of Prisons law enforcement activities renders notice of compliance with compulsory legal process impractical.

(8) From subsection (f) because exemption from provisions of subsection (d) will render compliance with provisions of this subsection inapplicable.

(9) From subsection (g) because exemption from provisions of subsection (d) will render provisions of this subsection inapplicable.

(1) From subsection (c)(3) for similar reasons as those enumerated in paragraph (3).

(2) From subsection (c)(4) to the extent that exemption from subsection (d) will make notification of corrections or notations of disputes inapplicable.

(3) From the access provisions of subsection (d) to the extent that exemption from this subsection may appear to be necessary to prevent access by record subjects to information that may jeopardize the legitimate correctional interests of safety, security, and good order of Bureau of Prisons facilities; to protect the privacy of third parties; and to protect access to relevant information received from third parties, such as other Federal State, local and foreign law enforcement agencies, Federal and State probation and judicial offices, the disclosure of which may permit a record subject to evade apprehension, prosecution, etc.; and/or to otherwise protect investigatory or law enforcement information, whether received from other third parties, or whether developed internally by the BOP.

(4) From the amendment provisions of subsection (d) because amendment of the records would interfere with law enforcement operations and impose an impossible administrative burden. In addition to efforts to ensure accuracy so as to withstand possible judicial scrutiny, it would require that law enforcement and investigatory information be continuously reexamined, even where the information may have been collected from the record subject. Also, where records are provided by other Federal criminal justice agencies or other State, local and foreign jurisdictions, it may be administratively impossible to ensure compliance with this provision.

(5) From subsection (e)(1) to the extent that the BOP may collect information that may be relevant to the law enforcement operations of other agencies. In the interests of overall, effective law enforcement, such information should be retained and made available to those agencies with relevant responsibilities.

(6) From subsection (e)(2) because primary collection of information directly from the record subject is often highly impractical, inappropriate and could result in inaccurate information.

(7) From subsection (e)(3) because compliance with this subsection may impede the collection of information that may be valuable to law enforcement interests.

(8) From subsection (e)(5) because in the collection and maintenance of information for law enforcement purposes, it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely and complete. Data which may seem unrelated, irrelevant or incomplete when collected may take on added meaning or significance as an investigation progresses or with the passage of time, and could be relevant to future law enforcement decisions.

(9) From subsection (e)(8) because the nature of BOP law enforcement activities renders notice of compliance with compulsory legal process impractical and could seriously jeopardize institution security and personal safety and/or impede overall law enforcement efforts.

(10) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempted from subsection (d).

(1) From subsection (c)(3) to the extent that this system of records is exempt from subsection (d), and for such reasons as those cited for subsection (d) in paragraph (f)(3) below.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) to the extent that exemption from subsection (d) makes this exemption inapplicable.

(3) From the access provisions of subsection (d) because exemption from this subsection is essential to prevent access of information by record subjects that may invade third party privacy; frustrate the investigative process; jeopardize the legitimate correctional interests of safety, security, and good order to prison facilities; or otherwise compromise, impede, or interfere with BOP or other law enforcement agency activities.

(4) From the amendment provisions from subsection (d) because amendment of the records may interfere with law enforcement operations and would impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring that, in addition to efforts to ensure accuracy so as to withstand possible judicial scrutiny, it would require that law enforcement information be continuously reexamined, even where the information may have been collected from the record subject. Also, some of these records come from other Federal criminal justice agencies or State, local and foreign jurisdictions, or from Federal and State probation and judicial offices, and it is administratively impossible to ensure that the records comply with this provision.

(5) From subsection (e)(2) because the nature of criminal and other investigative activities is such that vital information about an individual can be obtained from other persons who are familiar with such individual and his/her activities. In such investigations it is not feasible to rely solely upon information furnished by the individual concerning his/her own activities since it may result in inaccurate information.

(6) From subsection (e)(3) because in view of BOP's operational responsibilities, application of this provision to the collection of information is inappropriate. Application of this provision could provide the subject with substantial information which may in fact impede the information gathering process or compromise an investigation.

(7) From subsection (e)(5) because in the collection and maintenance of information for law enforcement purposes, it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely and complete. Material which may seem unrelated, irrelevant or incomplete when collected may take on added meaning or significance at a later date or as an investigation progresses. Also, some of these records may come from other Federal, State, local and foreign law enforcement agencies, and from Federal and State probation and judicial offices and it is administratively impossible to ensure that the records comply with this provision. It would also require that law enforcement information be continuously reexamined even where the information may have been collected from the record subject.

(8) From subsection (e)(8) because the nature of BOP law enforcement activities renders impractical the notice of compliance with compulsory legal process. This requirement could present a serious impediment to law enforcement such as revealing investigative techniques or the existence of confidential investigations, jeopardize the security of third parties, or otherwise compromise law enforcement efforts.

(9)-(10) [Reserved]

(11) From subsections (f) and (g) to the extent that this system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because release of disclosure accounting could alert the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of the investigation and the fact that they are subjects of the investigation, and reveal investigative interest by not only the OIA but also by the recipient agency. Since release of such information to the subjects of an investigation would provide them with significant information concerning the nature of the investigation, release could result in activities that would impede or compromise law enforcement such as: the destruction of documentary evidence; improper influencing of witnesses; endangerment of the physical safety of confidential sources, witnesses, and law enforcement personnel; fabrication of testimony; and flight of the subject from the area. In addition, release of disclosure accounting could result in the release of properly classified information which could compromise the national defense or disrupt foreign policy.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d) pursuant to subsections (j) and (k) of the Privacy Act.

(3) From the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d) because access to the records contained in this system of records could provide the subject of an investigation with information concerning law enforcement activities such as that relating to an actual or potential criminal, civil or regulatory violation; the existence of an investigation; the nature and scope of the information and evidence obtained as to his activities; the identity of confidential sources, witnesses, and law enforcement personnel; and information that may enable the subject to avoid detection or apprehension. Such disclosure would present a serious impediment to effective law enforcement where they prevent the successful completion of the investigation; endanger the physical safety of confidential sources, witnesses, and law enforcement personnel; and/or lead to the improper influencing of witnesses, the destruction of evidence, or the fabrication of testimony. In addition, granting access to such information could disclose security-sensitive or confidential business information or information that would constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of third parties. Finally, access to the records could result in the release of properly classified information which could compromise the national defense or disrupt foreign policy. Amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.

(4) From subsection (e)(1) because the application of this provision could impair investigations and interfere with the law enforcement responsibilities of the OIA for the following reasons:

(5) From subsection (e)(2) because, in some instances, the application of this provision would present a serious impediment to law enforcement for the following reasons:

(6) From subsection (e)(3) because the application of this provision would provide the subject of an investigation with substantial information which could impede or compromise the investigation. Providing such notice to a subject of an investigation could interfere with an undercover investigation by revealing its existence, and could endanger the physical safety of confidential sources, witnesses, and investigators by revealing their identities.

(7) From subsection (e)(5) because the application of this provision would prevent the collection of any data not shown to be accurate, relevant, timely, and complete at the moment it is collected. In the collection of information for law enforcement purposes, it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. Material which may seem unrelated, irrelevant, or incomplete when collected may take on added meaning or significance as an investigation progresses. The restrictions of this provision could interfere with the preparation of a complete investigation report, and thereby impede effective law enforcement.

(8) From subsection (e)(8) because the application of this provision could prematurely reveal an ongoing criminal investigation to the subject of the investigation, and could reveal investigation techniques, procedures, and/or evidence.

(9) From subsection (g) to the extent that this system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d) pursuant to subsections (j)(2), (k)(1), and (k)(2) of the Privacy Act.

(1) From subsection (c)(3), the requirement that an accounting be made available to the named subject of a record, because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d). Also, because making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures from records concerning the subject individual would specifically reveal any investigative interest in the individual. Revealing this information may thus compromise ongoing law enforcement efforts, as well as efforts to identify and defuse any potential acts of terrorism. Revealing this information may also permit the subject individual to take measures to impede the investigation, such as destroying evidence, intimidating potential witnesses, or fleeing the area to avoid the investigation.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) notification requirements because this system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).

(3) From subsections (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4), because these provisions concern individual access to and amendment of records, compliance with which could jeopardize the legitimate correctional interests of safety, security, and good order of prison facilities; alert the subject of a suspicious activity report of the fact and nature of the report and any underlying investigation and/or the investigative interest of the BOP and other law enforcement agencies; interfere with the overall law enforcement process by leading to the destruction of evidence, improper influencing of witnesses, and/or flight of the subject; possibly identify a confidential source or disclose information which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of another's personal privacy; reveal a sensitive investigative or intelligence technique; or constitute a potential danger to the health or safety of law enforcement personnel, confidential informants, and witnesses. Although the BOP has rules in place emphasizing that records should be kept up to date, the requirement for amendment of these records would interfere with ongoing law enforcement activities and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations, analyses, and reports to be continuously reinvestigated and revised.

(4) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not always possible to know in advance what information is relevant and necessary for the proper safekeeping, care, and custody of incarcerated persons, and for the proper security and safety of federal prisons and the public. In addition, to the extent that the BOP may collect information that may also be relevant to the law enforcement operations of other agencies, in the interests of overall, effective law enforcement, such information should be retained and made available to those agencies with such relevant responsibilities.

(5) From subsections (e)(2) because the nature of criminal investigative and correctional activities is such that vital information about an individual can be obtained from other persons who are familiar with such individual and his/her activities. In such investigations and activities, it is not feasible to rely solely upon information furnished by the individual concerning his/her own activities since it may result in inaccurate information and compromise ongoing criminal investigations or correctional management decisions.

(6) From subsections (e)(3) because in view of BOP's operational responsibilities, the application of this provision would provide the subject of an investigation or correctional matter with significant information which may in fact impede the information gathering process or compromise ongoing criminal investigations or correctional management decisions.

(7) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H) because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d).

(8) From subsection (e)(4)(I) because publishing further details regarding categories of sources of records in the system may compromise ongoing investigations, reveal investigatory techniques and descriptions of confidential informants, or constitute a potential danger to the health or safety of law enforcement personnel.

(9) From subsection (e)(5) because in the collection and maintenance of information for law enforcement purposes, it is difficult to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. Data which may seem unrelated, irrelevant, or incomplete when collected may take on added meaning or significance during the course of an investigation or with the passage of time, and could be relevant to future law enforcement decisions. In addition, because many of these records come from courts and other state and local criminal justice agencies, it is administratively impossible for them and the BOP to ensure compliance with this provision. The restrictions of subsection (e)(5) would restrict and delay trained correctional managers from timely exercising their judgment in managing the inmate population and providing for the safety and security of the prisons and the public.

(10) From subsection (e)(8), because to require individual notice of disclosure of information due to a compulsory legal process would pose an impossible administrative burden on BOP and may alert subjects of investigations, who might otherwise be unaware, to the fact of those investigations.

(11) From subsection (f) to the extent that this system is exempt from the provisions of subsection (d).

(12) From subsection (g) to the extent that this system is exempted from other provisions of the Act.

(1) From subsection (e)(1) to the extent that the Bureau may collect information that may be relevant to the law enforcement operations of other agencies. In the interests of overall, effective law enforcement, such information should be retained and made available to those agencies with relevant responsibilities.

(2) From subsection (e)(5) because in the collection and maintenance of information for law enforcement purposes, it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely and complete. Data which may seem unrelated, irrelevant or incomplete when collected may take on added meaning or significance as an investigation progresses or with the passage of time, and could be relevant to future law enforcement decisions. In addition, amendment of the records may interfere with law enforcement operations and would impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring that law enforcement information be continuously reexamined, even where the information may have been collected from the record subject or other criminal justice agencies. The restrictions of subsection (e)(5) would restrict and delay trained correctional managers from timely exercising their judgment in managing the inmate population and providing for the safety and security of the prisons and the public.

(1) From subsection (e)(1) to the extent that the Bureau may collect information that may be relevant to the law enforcement operations of other agencies. In the interests of overall, effective law enforcement, such information should be retained and made available to those agencies with relevant responsibilities.

(2) From subsection (e)(5) because in the collection and maintenance of information for law enforcement purposes, it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely and complete. Data which may seem unrelated, irrelevant or incomplete when collected may take on added meaning or significance during the course of an investigation or with the passage of time, and could be relevant to future law enforcement decisions. In addition, because many of these records come from sources outside the Bureau of Prisons, it is administratively impossible for them and the Bureau to ensure compliance with this provision. The restrictions of subsection (e)(5) would restrict and delay trained correctional managers from timely exercising their judgment in managing the inmate population and providing for the health care of the inmates and the safety and security of the prisons and the public.

(1) From subsection (c)(3) to the extent that this system of records is exempt from subsection (d), and for such reasons as those cited for subsection (d) in paragraph (q)(3) below.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) to the extent that exemption from subsection (d) makes this exemption inapplicable.

(3) From the access provisions of subsection (d) because exemption from this subsection is essential to prevent access of information by record subjects that may invade third party privacy; frustrate the investigative process; jeopardize the legitimate correctional interests of safety, security and good order to prison facilities; or otherwise compromise, impede, or interfere with BOP or other law enforcement agency activities.

(4) From the amendment provisions of subsection (d) because amendment of the records may interfere with law enforcement operations and would impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring that, in addition to efforts to ensure accuracy so as to withstand possible judicial scrutiny, it would require that law enforcement information be continuously reexamined, even where the information may have been collected from the record subject. Also, some of these records come from other Federal criminal justice agencies or State, local and foreign jurisdictions, or from Federal and State probation and judicial offices, and it is administratively impossible to ensure that records comply with this provision.

(5) From subsection (e)(2) because the nature of criminal and other investigative activities is such that vital information about an individual can be obtained from other persons who are familiar with such individual and his/her activities. In such investigations it is not feasible to rely solely upon information furnished by the individual concerning his/her own activities since it may result in inaccurate information and compromise ongoing criminal investigations or correctional management decisions.

(6) From subsection (e)(3) because in view of BOP's operational responsibilities, application of this provision to the collection of information is inappropriate. Application of this provision could provide the subject with substantial information which may in fact impede the information gathering process or compromise ongoing criminal investigations or correctional management decisions.

(7) From subsection (e)(5) because in the collection and maintenance of information for law enforcement purposes, it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely and complete. Material which may seem unrelated, irrelevant or incomplete when collected may take on added meaning or significance at a later date or as an investigation progresses. Also, some of these records may come from other Federal, State, local and foreign law enforcement agencies, and from Federal and State probation and judicial offices and it is administratively impossible to ensure that the records comply with this provision. It would also require that law enforcement information be continuously reexamined even where the information may have been collected from the record subject.

(8) From subsection (g) to the extent that this system is exempted from other provisions of the Act.

(1) Automated Records and Consummated Orders System/Diversion Analysis and Detection System (ARCOS/DADS) (Justice/DEA-003)

(2) Controlled Substances Act Registration Records (Justice/DEA-005)

(3) Registration Status/Investigatory Records (Justice/DEA-012)

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because release of the disclosure accounting would enable the subject of an investigation to gain valuable information concerning the nature and scope of the investigation and seriously hamper the regulatory functions of the DEA.

(2) From subsection (d) because access to records contained in these systems may provide the subject of an investigation information that could enable him to avoid compliance with the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (Pub. L. 91-513).

(1) Air Intelligence Program (Justice/DEA-001).

(2) Clandestine Laboratory Seizure System (CLSS) (Justice/DEA-002).

(3) Planning and Inspection Division Records (Justice/DEA-010).

(4) Operation Files (Justice/DEA-011).

(5) Security Files (Justice/DEA-013).

(6) System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence (STRIDE/Ballistics) (Justice/DEA-014).

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because release of disclosure accounting would provide to the subjects of an investigation significant information concerning the nature of the investigation and thus would present the same impediments to law enforcement as those enumerated in paragraph (d)(3) regarding exemption from subsection (d).

(2) From subsection (c)(4) to the extent that it is not applicable because an exemption is being claimed from subsection (d).

(3) From the access provisions of subsection (d) because access to records in this system of records would present a serious impediment to law enforcement. Specifically, it could inform the record subject of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory investigation of the existence of that investigation; of the nature and scope of the information and evidence obtained as to his activities; of the identity of confidential sources, witnesses, and law enforcement personnel; and of information that may enable the subject to avoid detection or apprehension. Similarly, it may alert collateral suspects yet unprosecuted in closed cases. It could prevent the successful completion of the investigation; endanger the life, health, or physical safety of confidential sources, witnesses, and law enforcement personnel, and/or lead to the improper influencing of witnesses, the destruction of evidence, or the fabrication of testimony; or it may simply reveal a sensitive investigative technique. In addition, granting access to such information could result in the disclosure of confidential/security-sensitive or other information that would constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of third parties. Finally, access to the records could result in the release of properly classified information which would compromise the national defense or disrupt foreign policy. From the amendment provisions of subsection (d) because amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.

(4) From subsection (e)(1) because the application of this provision could impair investigations and interfere with the law enforcement responsibilities of the DEA for the following reasons:

(5) From subsection (e)(2) because, in some instances, the application of this provision would present a serious impediment to law enforcement for the following reasons:

(6) From subsection (e)(3) because the requirements thereof would constitute a serious impediment to law enforcement in that they could compromise the existence of an actual or potential confidential investigation and/or permit the record subject to speculate on the identity of a potential confidential source, and endanger the life, health or physical safety or either actual or potential confidential informants and witnesses, and of investigators/law enforcement personnel. In addition, the notification requirement of subsection (e)(3) could impede collection of that information from the record subject, making it necessary to collect the information solely from third party sources and thereby inhibiting law enforcement efforts.

(7) From subsection (e)(5) because in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to light and the accuracy of such information can only be determined in a court of law. The restrictions imposed by subsection (e)(5) would restrict the ability of trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment in reporting on investigations and impede the development of criminal intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement.

(8) From subsection (e)(8) because the application of this provision could prematurely reveal an ongoing criminal investigation to the subject of the investigation, and could reveal investigative techniques, procedures, or evidence.

(9) From subsection (g) to the extent that this system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d) pursuant to subsections (j)(2), (k)(1) and (k)(2) of the Privacy Act.

(1) Grants of Confidentiality Files (GCF) (Justice/DEA-017), and

(2) DEA Applicant Investigations (Justice/DEA-018).

(1) From subsection (d)(1) because many persons are contacted who, without an assurance of anonymity, refuse to provide information concerning an applicant for a grant of confidentiality with DEA. By permitting access to information which may reveal the identity of the source of that information—after a promise of confidentiality has been given—DEA would breach the promised confidentiality. Ultimately, such breaches would restrict the free flow of information which is vital to a determination of an applicant's qualifications for a grant.

(2) From subsection (e)(1) because in the collection of information for investigative and evaluation purposes, it is impossible to determine in advance what exact information may be of assistance in determining the qualifications and suitability of a candidate. Information which may appear irrelevant, when combined with other apparently irrelevant information, can on occasion provide a composite picture of an applicant which assists in determining whether a grant of confidentiality is warranted.

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures from records concerning him/her would potentially reveal any investigative interest in the individual. Revealing this information would permit the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to determine whether he is the subject of investigation, or to obtain valuable information concerning the nature of that investigation, and the information obtained, or the identity of witnesses and informants. Similarly, disclosing this information could reasonably be expected to compromise ongoing investigatory efforts by notifying the record subject that he/she is under investigation. This information could also permit the record subject to take measures to impede the investigation, e.g., destroy evidence, intimidate potential witnesses, or flee the area to avoid or impede the investigation.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) because this system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).

(3) From subsections (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4) because these provisions concern individual access to and amendment of records contained in this system, which consists of counter-drug and criminal investigatory records. Compliance with these provisions could alert the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation of the existence of that investigation, of the nature and scope of the information and evidence obtained as to his activities, of the identity of witnesses and informants, or would provide information that could enable the subject to avoid detection or apprehension. These factors would present a serious impediment to effective law enforcement because they could prevent the successful completion of the investigation; endanger the physical safety of witnesses or informants; or lead to the improper influencing of witnesses, the destruction of evidence, or the fabrication of testimony.

(4) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not always possible to know in advance what information is relevant and necessary to complete an identity comparison between the individual being screened and a known or suspected criminal or terrorist. Also, it may not always be known what information will be relevant to law enforcement for the purpose of conducting an operational response or on-going investigation.

(5) From subsection (e)(2) because application of this provision could present a serious impediment to law enforcement and counter-drug efforts in that it would put the subject of an investigation, study or analysis on notice of that fact, thereby permitting the subject to engage in conduct designed to frustrate or impede that activity. The nature of counter-drug investigations is such that vital information about an individual frequently can be obtained only from other persons who are familiar with such individual and his/her activities. In such investigations it is not feasible to rely upon information furnished by the individual concerning his own activities.

(6) From subsection (e)(3) because the requirements thereof would constitute a serious impediment to law enforcement in that they could compromise the existence of an actual or potential confidential investigation and/or permit the record subject to speculate on the identity of a potential confidential source, and endanger the life, health or physical safety of either actual or potential confidential informants and witnesses, and of investigators/law enforcement personnel. In addition, the notification requirement of subsection (e)(3) could impede collection of that information from the record subject, making it necessary to collect the information solely from third party sources and thereby inhibiting law enforcement efforts.

(7) From subsection (e)(5) because many of the records in this system are derived from other domestic record systems and therefore it is not possible for the DEA and EPIC to vouch for their compliance with this provision. In addition, EPIC supports but does not conduct investigations; therefore, it must be able to collect information related to illegal drug and other criminal activities and encounters for distribution to law enforcement and intelligence agencies that do conduct counter-drug investigations. In the collection of information for law enforcement and counter-drug purposes, it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to light. The restrictions imposed by (e)(5) would limit the ability of those agencies' trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment in conducting investigations and impede the development of intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement and counterterrorism efforts. EPIC has, however, implemented internal quality assurance procedures to ensure that ESS data is as thorough, accurate, and current as possible. ESS is also exempt from the requirements of subsection (e)(5) in order to prevent the use of a challenge under subsection (e)(5) as a collateral means to obtain access to records in the ESS. ESS records are exempt from the access and amendment requirements of subsection (d) of the Privacy Act in order to protect the integrity of investigations. Exempting ESS from subsection (e)(5) serves to prevent the assertion of challenges to a record's accuracy, timeliness, completeness, and/or relevance under subsection (e)(5) to circumvent the exemption claimed from subsection (d).

(8) From subsection (e)(8) because to require individual notice of disclosure of information due to compulsory legal process would pose an impossible administrative burden on the DEA and EPIC and could alert the subjects of counter-drug, counterterrorism, law enforcement, or intelligence investigations to the fact of those investigations when not previously known. Additionally, compliance could present a serious impediment to law enforcement as this could interfere with the ability to issue warrants or subpoenas and could reveal investigative techniques, procedures, or evidence.

(9) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because to provide a record subject with an accounting of disclosure of records in this system could impede or compromise an ongoing investigation, interfere with a law enforcement activity, lead to the disclosure of properly classified information which could compromise the national defense or disrupt foreign policy, invade the privacy of a person who provides information in connection with a particular investigation, or result in danger to an individual's safety, including the safety of a law enforcement officer.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) because this subsection is inapplicable to the extent that an exemption is being claimed for subsections (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4).

(3) From subsection (d)(1) because disclosure of records in the system could alert the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation of the existence of that investigation, of the nature and scope of the information and evidence obtained as to his activities, of the identity of confidential witnesses and informants, or of the investigative interest of the DEA; lead to the destruction of evidence, improper influencing of witnesses, fabrication of testimony, and/or flight of the subject; reveal the details of a sensitive investigative or intelligence technique, or the identity of a confidential source; or otherwise impede, compromise, or interfere with investigative efforts and other related law enforcement and/or intelligence activities. In addition, disclosure could invade the privacy of third parties and/or endanger the life, health, and physical safety of law enforcement personnel, confidential informants, witnesses, and potential crime victims. Access to records could also result in the release of information properly classified pursuant to Executive order, thereby compromising the national defense or foreign policy.

(4) From subsection (d)(2) because amendment of the records thought to be incorrect, irrelevant, or untimely would also interfere with ongoing investigations, criminal or civil law enforcement proceedings, and other law enforcement activities; would impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations, analyses, and reports to be continuously reinvestigated and revised; and may impact information properly classified pursuant to Executive order.

(5) From subsections (d)(3) and (4) because these subsections are inapplicable to the extent exemption is claimed from (d)(1) and (2).

(6) From subsection (e)(1) because, in the course of its acquisition, collation, and analysis of information under the statutory authority granted to it, an agency may occasionally obtain information, including information properly classified pursuant to Executive order, that concerns actual or potential violations of law that are not strictly within its statutory or other authority, or may compile information in the course of an investigation which may not be relevant to a specific prosecution. It is impossible to determine in advance what information collected during an investigation will be important or crucial to the investigation and the apprehension of fugitives. In the interests of effective law enforcement, it is necessary to retain such information in this system of records because it can aid in establishing patterns of criminal activity and can provide valuable leads for federal and other law enforcement agencies. This consideration applies equally to information acquired from, or collated or analyzed for, both law enforcement agencies and agencies of the U.S. foreign intelligence community and military community.

(7) From subsection (e)(2) because in a criminal investigation, prosecution, or proceeding, the requirement that information be collected to the greatest extent practicable from the subject individual would present a serious impediment to law enforcement because the subject of the investigation, prosecution, or proceeding would be placed on notice as to the existence and nature of the investigation, prosecution, and proceeding and would therefore be able to avoid detection or apprehension, to influence witnesses improperly, to destroy evidence, or to fabricate testimony. Moreover, thorough and effective investigation and prosecution may require seeking information from a number of different sources.

(8) From subsection (e)(3) because the requirement that individuals supplying information be provided a form stating the requirements of subsection (e)(3) would constitute a serious impediment to criminal law enforcement in that it could compromise the existence of a confidential investigation or reveal the identity of witnesses or confidential informants and endanger their lives, health, and physical safety. The individual could seriously interfere with undercover investigative techniques and could take appropriate steps to evade the investigation or flee a specific area.

(9) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H) because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d) pursuant to subsections (j) and (k) of the Privacy Act, and from subsection (e)(4)(I) to preclude any claims that the Department must provide more detail regarding the record sources for this system than the Department publishes in the system of records notice for this system. Exemption from providing any additional details about sources is necessary to preserve the security of sensitive law enforcement and intelligence information and to protect the privacy and safety of witnesses and informants and others who provide information to the DEA; and further, greater specificity of properly classified records could compromise national security.

(10) From subsection (e)(5) because the acquisition, collation, and analysis of information for criminal law enforcement purposes from various agencies does not permit a determination in advance or a prediction of what information will be matched with other information and thus whether it is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to light and the accuracy of such information can often only be determined in a court of law. The restrictions imposed by subsection (e)(5) would restrict the ability of trained investigators, intelligence analysts, and government attorneys to exercise their judgment in collating and analyzing information and would impede the development of criminal or other intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement.

(11) From subsection (e)(8) because the individual notice requirements of subsection (e)(8) could present a serious impediment to criminal law enforcement by revealing investigative techniques, procedures, evidence, or interest, and by interfering with the ability to issue warrants or subpoenas; could give persons sufficient warning to evade investigative efforts; and would pose an impossible administrative burden on the maintenance of these records and the conduct of the underlying investigations.

(12) From subsections (f) and (g) because these subsections are inapplicable to the extent that the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.

(13) From subsection (h) when application of this provision could impede or compromise an ongoing criminal investigation, interfere with a law enforcement activity, reveal an investigatory technique or confidential source, invade the privacy of a person who provides information for an investigation, or endanger law enforcement personnel.

(1) The Immigration and Naturalization Service Alien File (A-File) and Central Index System (CIS), JUSTICE/INS-001A.

(2) The Immigration and Naturalization Service Index System, JUSTICE/INS-001 which consists of the following subsystems:

(3) The Immigration and Naturalization Service “National Automated Immigration Lookout System (NAILS) JUSTICE/INS-032.” The exemptions apply only to the extent that records in the system are subject to exemptions pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) and (k)(2).

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because the release of the disclosure accounting for disclosure pursuant to the routine uses published for these subsystems would permit the subject of a criminal or civil investigation to obtain valuable information concerning the nature of that investigation and present a serious impediment to law enforcement.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) since an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d), this subsection will not be applicable.

(3) From subsection (d) because access to the records contained in these subsystems would inform the subject of a criminal or civil investigation of the existence of that investigation, provide the subject of the investigation with information that might enable him to avoid detection or apprehension, and present a serious impediment to law enforcement.

(4) From subsection (e)(1) because in the course of criminal or civil investigations, the Immigration and Naturalization Service often obtains information concerning the violation of laws other than those relating to violations over which INS has investigative jurisdiction. In the interests of effective law enforcement, it is necessary that INS retain this information since it can aid in establishing patterns of criminal activity and provide valuable leads for those law enforcement agencies that are charged with enforcing other segments of the criminal law.

(5) From subsection (e)(2) because in a criminal or civil investigation, the requirement that information be collected to the greatest extent possible from the subject individual would present a serious impediment to law enforcement in that the subject of the investigation would be placed on notice of the existence of the investigation and would therefore be able to avoid detection or apprehension.

(6) From subsection (e)(3) because the requirement that individuals supplying information be provided with a form stating the requirements of subsection (e)(3) would constitute a serious impediment to law enforcement in that it could compromise the existence of a confidential investigation, reveal the identity of confidential sources of information and endanger the life or physical safety of confidential informants.

(7) From subsections (e)(4) (G) and (H) because these subsystems of records are exempt from individual access pursuant to subsection (j) of the Privacy Act of 1974.

(8) From subsection (e)(5) because in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to light and the accuracy of such information can only be determined in a court of law. The restrictions of subsection (e)(5) would restrict the ability of trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment in reporting on investigations and impede the development of criminal intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement.

(9) From subsection (e)(8) because the individual notice requirements of subsection (e)(8) could present a serious impediment to law enforcement as this could interfere with the Immigration and Naturalization Service's ability to issue administrative subpoenas and could reveal investigative techniques and procedures.

(10) From subsection (g) because these subsystems of records are compiled for law enforcement purposes and have been exempted from the access provisions of subsections (d) and (f).

(11) In addition, these systems of records are exempt from subsections (c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4) (G) and (H) to the extent they are subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1). To permit access to records classified pursuant to Executive Order would violate the Executive Order protecting classified information.

(1) From subsection (d) because exemption is claimed only for those testing and examination materials used to determine an individual's qualifications for retention and promotion in the Immigration and Naturalization Service. This is necessary to protect the integrity of testing materials and to insure fair and uniform examinations.

(2) From subsection (f) because the subsystem of records has been exempted from the access provisions of subsection (d).

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because the release of the disclosure accounting for disclosure could permit the subject of an actual or potential criminal or civil investigation to obtain valuable information concerning the existence and nature of the investigation, the fact that individuals are subjects of the investigation, and present a serious impediment to law enforcement.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) to the extent that the exemption from subsection (d) is applicable. Subsection (c)(4) will not be applicable to the extent that records in the system are properly withholdable under subsection (d).

(3) From the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d) because access to the records contained in this system of records could inform the subject of a criminal or civil investigation of the existence of that investigation; of the nature and scope of the information and evidence obtained as to their activities; of the identity of confidential sources, witnesses and law enforcement personnel; and of information that may enable the subject to avoid detection or apprehension. Such disclosures would present a serious impediment to effective law enforcement where they prevent the successful completion of the investigation; endanger the physical safety of confidential sources, witnesses, and law enforcement personnel; and/or lead to the improper influencing of witnesses, the destruction of evidence, or the fabrication of testimony. In addition, granting access to these records could result in a disclosure that would constitute an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of third parties. Amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.

(4) From subsection (e)(1) because in the course of criminal or civil investigations, the Immigration and Naturalization Service often obtains information concerning the violation of laws other than those relating to violations over which INS has investigative jurisdiction, in the interests of effective law enforcement, it is necessary that INS retain this information since it can aid in establishing patterns of criminal activity and provide valuable leads for those law enforcement agencies that are charged with enforcing other segments of the criminal law.

(5) From subsection (e)(2) because in a criminal investigation, the requirement that information be collected to the greatest extent possible from the subject individual would present a serious impediment to law enforcement in that the subject of the investigation would be placed on notice of the existence of the investigation and would therefore be able to avoid detection or apprehension.

(6) From subsection (e)(3) because the requirement that individuals supplying information be provided with a form stating the requirements of subsection (e)(3) would constitute a serious impediment of criminal law enforcement in that it could compromise the existence of a confidential investigation, reveal the identify of confidential sources of information and endanger the life or physical safety of confidential informants.

(7) From subsection (e)(5) because in the collection of information for criminal law enforcement purposes it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to light and the accuracy of such information can only be determined in a court of law. The restrictions of subsection (e)(5) would restrict the ability of trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment in reporting on investigations and impede the development of criminal intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement.

(8) From subsection (e)(8) because the individual notice requirements of subsection (e)(8) could present a serious impediment to criminal law enforcement as this could interfere with the Immigration and Naturalization Service's ability to issue administrative subpoenas and could reveal investigative techniques and procedures.

(9) From subsection (g) for those portions of this system of records that were compiled for criminal law enforcement purposes and which are subject to exemption from the access provisions of subsections (d) pursuant to subsection (j)(2).

(1) From subsection (c)(3) for reasons stated in paragraph (h)(1) of this section.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) for reasons stated in paragraph (h)(2) of this section.

(3) From the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d) because access to the records contained in this system of records could inform the subject of a criminal or civil investigation of the existence of that investigation; of the nature and scope of the information and evidence obtained as to their activities; and of information that may enable the subject to avoid detection or apprehension. Such disclosures would present a serious impediment to effective law enforcement where they prevent the successful completion of the investigation or other law enforcement operation such as deportation or exclusion. In addition, granting access to these records could result in a disclosure that would constitute an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of third parties. Amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.

(4) From subsection (e)(1) for reasons stated in paragraph (h)(4) of this section.

(5) From subsection (e)(2) for reasons stated in paragraph (h)(5) of this section.

(6) From subsection (e)(3) because the requirement that individuals supplying information be provided with a form stating the requirements of subsection (e)(3) would constitute a serious impediment to criminal law enforcement in that it could compromise the existence of a confidential investigation.

(7) From subsection (e)(5) for reasons stated in paragraph (h)(7) of this section.

(8) From subsection (e)(8) for reasons stated in paragraph (h)(8) of this section.

(9) From subsection (g) to the extent that this system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).

(1) From subsection (c)(3) for reasons stated in paragraph (h)(1) of this section.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) for reasons stated in paragraph (h)(2) of this section.

(3) From the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d) for reasons stated in paragraph (h)(3) of this section.

(4) From subsection (e)(1) for reasons stated in paragraph (h)(4) of this section.

(5) From subsection (e)(2) for reasons stated in paragraph (h)(5) of this section.

(6) From subsection (e)(3) for reasons stated in paragraph (h)(6) of this section.

(7) From subsection (e)(5) for reasons stated in paragraph (h)(7) of this section.

(8) From subsection (e)(8) for reasons stated in paragraph (h)(8) of this section.

(9) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).

(1) From subsection (c)(3) for reasons started in paragraph (h)(1) of this section.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) for reasons stated in paragraph (h)(2) of this section.

(3) From the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d) for reasons stated in paragraph (h)(3) of this section.

(4) From subsection (e)(1) for reasons stated in paragraph (h)(4) of this section.

(5) From subsection (e)(2) for reasons stated in paragraph (h)(5) of this section.

(6) From subsection (e)(3) for reasons stated in paragraph (h)(6) of this section.

(7) From subsection (e)(5) for reasons stated in paragraph (h)(7) of this section.

(8) From subsection (e)(8) for reasons stated in paragraph (h)(8) of this section.

(9) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).

(1) The Civil Rights Investigative System (JUSTICE/OJP-008).

This exemption applies only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2).

(1) Warrant Information System (JUSTICE/USM-007).

These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2).

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because the release of disclosure accounting for disclosure made pursuant to subsection (b) of the Act, including those permitted under routine uses published for this system of records would permit a person to determine whether he is the subject of a criminal investigation, and to determine whether a warrant has been issued against him, and therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) since an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d) of the Act, this section is inapplicable.

(3) From subsection (d) because access to records would inform a person for whom a federal warrant has been issued of the nature and scope of information obtained as to his activities, of the identity of informants, and afford the person sufficient information to enable the subject to avoid apprehension. These factors would present a serious impediment to law enforcement in that they would thwart the warrant process and endanger lives of informants etc.

(4) From subsections (e)(1) and (e)(5) because the requirements of these subsections would present a serious impediment to law enforcement in that it is impossible to determine in advance what information collected during an investigation will be important or crucial to the apprehension of Federal fugitives. In the interest of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate in a thorough investigation to retain seemingly irrelevant, untimely, or inaccurate information which, with the passage of time, would aid in establishing patterns of activity and provide investigative leads toward fugitive apprehension and assist in law enforcement activities of other agencies.

(5) From subsection (e)(2) because the requirement that information be collected to the greatest extent practical from the subject individual would present a serious impediment to law enforcement because the subject of the investigation or prosecution would be placed on notice as to the existence of the warrant and would therefore be able to avoid detection or apprehension.

(6) From subsection (e)(3) because the requirement that individuals supplying information be provided with a form stating the requirements of subsection (e)(3) would constitute a serious impediment to law enforcement in that it could compromise the existence of a confidential investigation or reveal identity of confidential informants.

(7) From subsections (e)(4) (G) and (H) since an exemption is being claimed for subsections (f) and (d) of the Act, these subsections are inapplicable.

(8) From subsection (e)(8) because the individual notice requirement of this subsection would present a serious impediment to law enforcement in that it would give persons sufficient warning to avoid warrants, subpoena, etc.

(9) From subsection (f) because procedures for notice to an individual pursuant to subsection (f)(1) as to existence of records pertaining to him dealing with warrants must be exempted because such notice to individuals would be detrimental to the successful service of a warrant. Since an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d) of the Act the rules required pursuant to subsections (f) (2) through (5) are inapplicable to this system of records.

(10) From subsection (g) since an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d) and (f) this section is inapplicable and is exempted for the reasons set forth for these subsections.

(1) Witness Security System (JUSTICE/USM-008).

These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2).

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because the release of the disclosure accounting for disclosures made pursuant to subsection (b) of the Act including those permitted under routine uses published for this system of records would hamper the effective functioning of the Witness Security Program which by its very nature requires strict confidentiality vis-a-vis the records.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) for the reason stated in (b)(2) of this section.

(3) From subsection (d) because the U.S. Marshals Service Witness Security Program aids efforts of law enforcement officials to prevent, control or reduce crime. Access to records would present a serious impediment to effective law enforcement through revelation of confidential sources and through disclosure of operating procedures of the program, and through increased exposure of the program to the public.

(4) From subsection (e)(2) because in the Witness Security Program the requirement that information be collected to the greatest extent possible from the subject individual would constitute an impediment to the program, which is sometimes dependent on sources other than the subject witness for verification of information pertaining to the witness.

(5) From subsection (e)(3) for the reason stated in (b)(6) of this section.

(6) From subsection (e)(4) (G) and (H) for the reason stated in (b)(7) of this section.

(7) From subsection (e)(8) for the reason stated in (b)(8) of this section.

(8) From subsection (f)(2) since an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d) of the Act the rules required pursuant to subsection (f) (2) through (5) are inapplicable to this system of records.

(9) From subsection (g) for the reason stated in (b)(10) of this section.

(1) Internal Affairs System (JUSTICE/USM-002)—Limited access. These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), (k)(2) or (k)(5). Where compliance would not interfere with or adversely affect the law enforcement process, the USMS may waive the exemptions, either partially or totally.

(1) From subsections (c)(3) and (d) to the extent that release of the disclosure accounting may impede or interfere with civil or criminal law enforcement efforts, reveal a source who furnished information to the Government in confidence, and/or result in an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of collateral record subjects or other third party individuals.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) for the reason stated in (b)(2) of this section.

(3) From subsection (e)(1) to the extent that it is necessary to retain all information in order not to impede, compromise, or interfere with civil or criminal law enforcement efforts, e.g., where the significance of the information may not be readily determined and/or where such information may provide leads or assistance to Federal and other law agencies in discharging their law enforcement responsibilities.

(4) From subsection (e)(2) because the requirement that information be collected to the greatest extent practicable from the subject individual would present a serious impediment to law enforcement because the subject of the investigation or prosecution would be placed on notice as to the existence of the investigation and would therefore be able to compromise the investigation and avoid detection or apprehension.

(5) From subsection (e)(3) for the reason stated in (b)(6) of this section.

(6) From subsections (e)(4) (G) and (H) for the reason stated in (b)(7) of this section.

(7) From subsection (e)(5) because in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance and the accuracy of such information can only be determined in a court of law. The restrictions imposed by subsection (e)(5) would restrict the ability to collect information for law enforcement purposes and interfere with the preparation of a complete investigative report or otherwise impede effective law enforcement.

(8) From subsection (e)(8) because the individual notice requirement of this subsection would present a serious impediment to law enforcement in that the subject of the investigation would be alerted as to the existence of the investigation and therefore be able to compromise the investigation and avoid detection, subpoena, etc.

(9) From subsection (f) because procedures for notice to an individual pursuant to subsection (f)(1) as to the existence of records dealing with investigations of criminal or civil law violations would enable the individual to compromise the investigation and evade detection or apprehension. Since an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d) of the Act, the rules required pursuant to subsections (f)(2) through (f)(5) are not applicable to this system.

(10) From subsection (g) for the reason stated in (b)(10) of this section.

(1) U.S. Marshals Service Threat Analysis Information System (JUSTICE/USM-009).

These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2).

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because to release the disclosure accounting would permit a person to determine whether he or she has been identified as a specific threat to USMS protectees and to determine the need for countermeasures to USMS protective activities and thereby present a serious impediment to law enforcement.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) because it is inapplicable since an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d).

(3) From subsection (d) because to permit access to records would inform a person of the nature and scope of information obtained as to his or her threat-related activities and of the identity of confidential sources, and afford the person sufficient information to develop countermeasures to thwart protective arrangements and endanger lives of USMS protectees, informants, etc. To permit amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing criminal law enforcement and impose an impossible administrative burden requiring criminal investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.

(4) From subsections (e) (1) and (5) because the collection of investigatory information used to assess the existence, extent and likelihood of a threat situation necessarily includes material from which it is impossible to identify and segregate information which may not be important to the conduct of a thorough assessment. It is often impossible to determine in advance if all information collected is accurate, relevant, timely and complete but, in the interests of developing effective protective measures, it is necessary that the U.S. Marshals Service retain this information in order to establish patterns of activity to aid in accurately assessing threat situations. The restrictions of subsections (e) (1) and (5) would impede the protective responsibilities of the Service and could result in death or serious injury to Marshals Service protectees.

(5) From subsection (e)(2) because to collect information from the subject individual would serve notice that he or she is identified as a specific threat to USMS protectees and would enable the subject individual to develop countermeasures to protective activities and thereby present a serious impediment to law enforcement.

(6) From subsection (e)(3) because to inform individuals as required by this subsection would enable the subject individual to develop countermeasures to USMS protective arrangements or identify confidential sources and thereby present a serious impediment to law enforcement.

(7) From subsections (e)(4) (G) and (H) because they are inapplicable since an exemption is being claimed for subsections (d) and (f) of the Act.

(8) From subsection (e)(8) because to serve notice would give persons sufficient warning to develop countermeasures to protective arrangements and thereby present a serious impediment to law enforcement through compromise of protective procedures, etc.

(9) From subsection (f) because this system of records is exempt from the provisions of subsection (d).

(10) From subsection (g) because it is inapplicable since an exemption is being claimed for subsections (d) and (f).

(1) Judicial Facility Security Index System (JUSTICE/USM-010)

These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system is exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5).

(1) From subsection (c)(3) only to the extent that release of the disclosure accounting would reveal the identity of a confidential source.

(2) From subsection (d) only to the extent that access to information would reveal the identity of a confidential source.

(1) U.S. Marshals Service Freedom of Information/Privacy Act (FOIA/PA) Files (JUSTICE/USM-012).

These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a (j)(2), (k)(2) and (k)(5).

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because to release the disclosure accounting would permit the subject of an investigation to obtain valuable information concerning the existence and nature of the investigation and present a serious impediment to law enforcement.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) because that portion of this system which consists of investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes is being exempted from the provisions of subsection (d), rendering this provision not applicable.

(3) From subsection (d) because to permit access to investigatory records would reveal the identity of confidential sources and impede ongoing investigative or law enforcement activities by the premature disclosure of information related to those efforts. To permit amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing criminal law enforcement and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring criminal investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.

(4) From subsections (e) (1) and (5) because it is often impossible to determine in advance if investigatory records contained in this system are accurate, relevant, timely and complete but, in the interests of effective law enforcement, it is necessary to retain this information to aid in establishing patterns of activity and provide leads in criminal investigations.

(5) From subsection (e)(2) because to collect information from the subject individual would serve notice that he or she is the subject of criminal investigative or law enforcement activity and thereby present a serious impediment to law enforcement.

(6) From subsection (e)(3) because to inform individuals as required by this subsection would enable the subject individual to identify confidential sources, reveal the existence of an investigation, and compromise law enforcement efforts.

(7) From subsections (e)(4) (G) and (H) because they are inapplicable since an exemption is being claimed for subsections (d) and (f) for investigatory records contained in this system.

(8) From subsection (e)(8) because to serve notice would give persons sufficient warning to evade law enforcement efforts.

(9) From subsection (f) because investigatory records contained in this system are exempt from the provisions of subsection (d).

(10) From subsection (g) because it is inapplicable since an exemption is being claimed for subsections (d) and (f).

(1) U.S. Marshals Service Administrative Proceedings, Claims and Civil Litigation Files (JUSTICE/USM-013).

These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) or (k)(5).

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because to release the disclosure accounting for disclosures pursuant to the routine uses published for this system would permit the subject of a criminal or civil case or matter under investigation, or a case or matter in litigation, or under regulatory or administrative review or action, to obtain valuable information concerning the nature of that investigation, case or matter, and present a serious impediment to law enforcement or civil legal activities, or reveal a confidential source.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) because the exemption claimed for subsection (d) will make this section inapplicable.

(3) From subsection (d) because to permit access to records contained in this system would provide information concerning litigation strategy, or case development, and/or reveal the nature of the criminal or civil case or matter under investigation or administrative review, or in litigation, and present a serious impediment to law enforcement or civil legal activities, or reveal a confidential source.

(4) From subsection (e)(2) because effective legal representation, defense, or claim adjudication necessitates collecting information from all individuals having knowledge of the criminal or civil case or matter. To collect information primarily from the subject individual would present a serious impediment to law enforcement or civil legal activities.

(5) From subsection (e)(3) because to inform the individuals as required by this subsection would permit the subject of a criminal or civil matter under investigation or administrative review to compromise that investigation or administrative review and thereby impede law enforcement efforts or civil legal activities.

(6) From subsections (e)(4) (G) and (H) because these provisions are inapplicable since this system is exempt from subsections (d) and (f) of the Act.

(7) From subsection (e)(8) because to serve notice would give persons sufficient warning to compromise a criminal or civil investigation or administrative review and thereby impede law enforcement of civil legal activities.

(8) From subsection (f) because this system of records is exempt from the provisions of subsection (d).

(9) From subsection (g) because it is inapplicable since an exemption is claimed for subsections (d) and (f).

(1) U.S. Marshals Service Prisoner Transportation System (JUSTICE/USM-003).

(1) From subsection (c)(3) where the release of the disclosure accounting for disclosures made pursuant to subsection (b) of the Act would reveal a source who furnished information to the Government in confidence.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) to the extent that the system is exempt from subsection (d).

(3) From subsection (d) because access to records would reveal the names and other information pertaining to prisoners, including sensitive security information such as the identities and locations of confidential sources, e.g., informants and protected witnesses; and disclose access codes, data entry codes and message routing symbols used in law enforcement communications systems to schedule and effect prisoner movements. Thus, such a compromise of law enforcement communications systems would subject law enforcement personnel and other prisoners to harassment and possible danger, and present a serious threat to law enforcement activities. To permit amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing criminal law enforcement and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring that information affecting the prisoner's security classification be continuously reinvestigated when contested by the prisoner, or by anyone on his behalf.

(4) From subsections (e) (1) and (5) because the security classification of prisoners is based upon information collected during official criminal investigations; and, in the interest of ensuring safe and secure prisoner movements it may be necessary to retain information the relevance, necessity, accuracy, timeliness, and completeness of which cannot be readily established, but which may subsequently prove useful in establishing patterns of criminal activity or avoidance, and thus be essential to assigning an appropriate security classification to the prisoner. The restrictions of subsection (e) (1) and (5) would impede the information collection responsibilities of the USMS, and the lack of all available information could result in death or serious injury to USMS and other law enforcement personnel, prisoners in custody, and members of the public.

(5) From subsection (e)(2) because the requirement to collect information from the subject individual would impede the information collection responsibilities of the USMS in that the USMS is often dependent upon sources other than the subject individual for verification of information pertaining to security risks posed by the individual prisoner.

(6) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt from subsection (d).

(1) U.S. Marshals Service Prisoner Processing and Population Management System (JUSTICE/USM-005).

These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2).

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because to release the disclosure accounting would permit the subject of a criminal proceeding to determine the extent or nature of law enforcement authorities' knowledge regarding his/her alleged misconduct or criminal activities. The disclosure of such information could alert the subject to devise ways in which to conceal his/her activities and/or prevent law enforcement from learning additional information about his/her activities, or otherwise inhibit law enforcement efforts. In addition, where the individual is the subject of an ongoing or potential inquiry/investigation, such release could reveal the nature thereof prematurely, and may also enable the subject to determine the identity of witnesses and informants. Such disclosure could compromise the ongoing or potential inquiry/investigation, endanger the lives of witnesses and informants, or otherwise impede or thwart law enforcement efforts.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) to the extent that the system is exempt from subsection (d).

(3) From subsection (d) because to permit unlimited access would permit the subject of a criminal proceeding to determine the extent or nature of law enforcement authorities' knowledge regarding his/her alleged misconduct or criminal activities. The disclosure of such information could alert the subject to devise ways in which to conceal his/her activities and/or prevent law enforcement from learning additional information about his/her activities, or otherwise inhibit law enforcement efforts. Disclosure would also allow the subject to obtain sensitive information concerning the existence and nature of security measures and jeopardize the safe and secure transfer of the prisoner, the safety and security of other prisoners, informants and witnesses, law enforcement personnel, and the public. In addition, disclosure may enable the subject to learn prematurely of an ongoing or potential inquiry/investigation, and may also permit him/her to determine the identities of confidential sources, informants, or protected witnesses. Such disclosure could compromise the ongoing or potential inquiry/investigation, endanger the lives of witnesses and informants, or otherwise impede or thwart law enforcement efforts. Disclosure may also constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of third parties. Further, disclosure would reveal access codes, data entry codes and message routing symbols used in law enforcement communications systems. Access to such codes and symbols would permit the subject to impede the flow of law enforcement communications and compromise the integrity of law enforcement information, and thus present a serious threat to law enforcement activities. To permit amendment of the records would expose security matters, and would impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring that security precautions, and information pertaining thereto, be continuously reevaluated if contested by the prisoner, or by anyone on his or her behalf. Similarly, to permit amendment could interfere with ongoing or potential inquiries/investigations by requiring that such inquiries/investigations be continuously reinvestigated, or that information collected (the relevance and accuracy of which cannot readily be determined) be subjected to continuous change.

(4) From subsections (e)(1) and (5) because the system may contain investigatory information or information which is derived from information collected during official criminal investigations. In the interest of effective law enforcement and litigation, of securing the prisoner and of protecting the public, it may be necessary to retain information the relevance, necessity, accuracy, timeliness and completeness of which cannot be readily established. Such information may nevertheless provide investigative leads to other Federal or law enforcement agencies, or prove necessary to establish patterns of criminal activity or behavior, and/or prove essential to the safe and secure detention (and movement) of prisoners. Further, the provisions of (e)(1) and (e)(5) would restrict the ability of the USMS in exercising its judgment in reporting information during investigations or during the development of appropriate security measures, and thus present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts.

(5) From subsection (e)(2) because the requirement to collect information from the subject individual would impede the information collection responsibilities of the USMS which is often dependent upon sources other than the subject individual for verification of information pertaining to security risks posed by the individual prisoner, to alleged misconduct or criminal activity of the prisoner, or to any matter affecting the safekeeping and disposition of the individual prisoner.

(6) From subsection (e)(3) because to inform individuals as required by this subsection could impede the information gathering process, reveal the existence of an ongoing or potential inquiry/investigation or security procedure, and compromise law enforcement efforts.

(7) From subsection (e)(8) because to serve notice would give persons sufficient warning to compromise an ongoing or potential inquiry/investigation and thereby evade and impede law enforcement and security efforts.

(8) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt from subsection (d).

(1) From subsections (c)(3) and (d) to the extent that access to records in this system of records may impede or interfere with law enforcement efforts, result in the disclosure of information that would constitute and unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of collateral record subjects or other third parties, and/or jeopardize the health and/or safety of third parties.

(2) Where access to certain records may be appropriate, exemption from the amendment provisions of subsection (d)(2) in necessary to the extent that the necessary and appropriate justification, together with proof of record inaccuracy, is not provided, and/or to the extent that numerous, frivolous requests to amend could impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring agencies to continuously review booking and arrest data, much of which is collected from the arrestee during the arrest.

(3) From subsection (e)(1) to the extent that it is necessary to retain all information in order not to impede, compromise, or interfere with law enforcement efforts, e.g., where the significance of the information may not be readily determined and/or where such information may provide leads or assistance to Federal and other law enforcement agencies in discharging their law enforcement responsibilities.

(4) From subsection (e)(2) because, in some instances, the application of this provision would present a serious impediment to law enforcement since it may be necessary to obtain and verify information from a variety of sources other than the record subject to ensure safekeeping, security, and effective law enforcement. For example, it may be necessary that medical and psychiatric personnel provide information regarding the subject's behavior, physical health, or mental stability, etc. To ensure proper care while in custody, or it may be necessary to obtain information from a case agent or the court to ensure proper disposition of the subject individual.

(5) From subsection (e)(3) because the requirement that agencies inform each individual whom it asks to supply information of such information as is required by subsection (e)(3) may, in some cases, impede the information gathering process or otherwise interfere with or compromise law enforcement efforts, e.g., the subject may deliberately withhold information, or give erroneous information.

(6) From subsection (e)(5) because in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance and the accuracy of such information can only be determined in a court of law. The restrictions imposed by subsection (e)(5) would restrict the ability to collect information for law enforcement purposes and may prevent the eventual development of the necessary criminal intelligence or otherwise impede effective law enforcement.

(7) From subsection (e)(8) to the extent that such notice may impede, interfere with, or otherwise compromise law enforcement and security efforts.

(8) From subsection (g) to the extent that this system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).

(1) Automated Intelligence Record System (Pathfinder), JUSTICE/DEA-INS-111.

These exemptions apply to the extent that information in those systems is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a (j)(2), (k)(1) and (k)(2).

(1) (c)(3). The release of the disclosure accounting for disclosures made pursuant to subsection (b) of the Act, including those permitted under the routine uses published for these systems of records, would permit the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to determine whether he is the subject of investigation, or to obtain valuable information concerning the nature of that investigation, and the information obtained, or the identity of witnesses and informants and would therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement. In addition, disclosure of the accounting would amount to notice to the individual of the existence of a record; such notice requirement under subsection (f)(1) is specifically exempted for these systems of records.

(2) (c)(4). Since an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d) of the Act (Access to Records) this subsection is inapplicable to the extent that these systems of records are exempted from subsection (d).

(3) (d). Access to the records contained in these systems would inform the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation of the existence of that investigation, or the nature and scope of the information and evidence obtained as to his activities, of the identity of witnesses and informants, or would provide information that could enable the subject to avoid detection or apprehension. These factors would present a serious impediment to effective law enforcement because they could prevent the successful completion of the investigation, endanger the physical safety of witnesses or informants, and lead to the improper influencing of witnesses, the destruction of evidence, or the fabrication of testimony.

(4) (e)(1). The notices of these systems of records published in the Federal Register set forth the basic statutory or related authority for maintenance of this system. However, in the course of criminal or other law enforcement investigations, cases, and matters, the Immigration and Naturalization Service or the Drug Enforcement Administration will occasionally obtain information concerning actual or potential violations of law that are not strictly within its statutory or other authority or may compile information in the course of an investigation which may not be relevant to a specific prosecution. In the interests of effective law enforcement, it is necessary to retain such information in these systems of records since it can aid in establishing patterns of criminal activity and can provide valuable leads for federal and other law enforcement agencies.

(5) (e)(2). In a criminal investigation or prosecution, the requirement that information be collected to the greatest extent practicable from the subject individual would present a serious impediment to law enforcement because the subject of the investigation or prosecution would be placed on notice as to the existence of the investigation and would therefore be able to avoid detection or apprehension, to influence witnesses improperly, to destroy evidence, or to fabricate testimony.

(6) (e)(3). The requirement that individuals supplying information be provided with a form stating the requirements of subsection (e)(3) would constitute a serious impediment to law enforcement in that it could compromise the existence of a confidential investigation or reveal the identity of witnesses or confidential informants.

(7) (e)(4) (G) and (H). Since an exemption is being claimed for subsections (f) (Agency Rules) and (d) (Access to Records) of the Act these subsections are inapplicable to the extent that these systems of records are exempted from subsections (f) and (d).

(8) (e)(4)(I). The categories of sources of the records in these systems have been published in the Federal Register in broad generic terms in the belief that this is all that subsection (e)(4)(I) of the Act requires. In the event, however, that this subsection should be interpreted to require more detail as to the identity of sources of the records in these systems, exemption from this provision is necessary in order to protect the confidentiality of the sources of criminal and other law enforcement information. Such exemption is further necessary to protect the privacy and physical safety of witnesses and informants.

(9) (e)(5). In the collection of information for criminal law enforcement purposes it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to light and the accuracy of such information can often only be determined in a court of law. The restrictions of subsection (e)(5) would restrict the ability of trained investigators, intelligence analysts, and government attorneys in exercising their judgment in reporting on information and investigations and impede the development of criminal or other intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement.

(10) (e)(8). The individual notice requirements of subsection (e)(8) could present a serious impediment to law enforcement as this could interfere with the ability to issue warrants or subpoenas and could reveal investigative techniques, procedures, or evidence.

(11) (f). Procedures for notice to an individual pursuant to subsection (f)(1) as to the existence of records pertaining to him dealing with an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory investigation or prosecution must be exempted because such notice to an individual would be detrimental to the successful conduct and/or completion of an investigation or prosecution pending or future. In addition, mere notice of the fact of an investigation could inform the subject or others that their activities are under or may become the subject of an investigation and could enable the subjects to avoid detection or apprehension, to influence witnesses improperly, to destroy evidence, or to fabricate testimony.

Since an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d) of the Act (Access to Records) the rules required pursuant to subsections (f) (2) through (5) are inapplicable to these systems of records to the extent that these systems of records are exempted from subsection (d).

(12) (g). Since an exemption is being claimed for subsections (d) (Access to Records) and (f) (Agency Rules) this section is inapplicable, and is exempted for the reasons set forth for those subsections, to the extent that these systems of records are exempted from subsections (d) and (f).

(13) (h). Since an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d) (Access to Records) and (f) (Agency Rules) this section is inapplicable, and is exempted for the reasons set forth for those subsections, to the extent that these systems of records are exempted from subsections (d) and (f).

(14) In addition, exemption is claimed for these systems of records from compliance with the following provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a) pursuant to the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1): subsections (c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4) (G), (H), and (I), and (f) to the extent that the records contained in these systems are specifically authorized to be kept secret in the interests of national defense and foreign policy.

(1) The INTERPOL-United States National Central Bureau (INTERPOL-USNCB) (Department of Justice) INTERPOL-USNCB Records System (JUSTICE/INTERPOL-001).

This exemption applies only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a (j)(2), (k)(2), and (k)(5).

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because the release of accounting disclosures would place the subject of an investigation on notice that he is under investigation and provide him with significant information concerning the nature of the investigation, thus resulting in a serious impediment to law enforcement.

(2) From subsections (c)(4), (d), (e)(4) (G), and (H), (f) and (g) because these provisions concern individual access to records and such access might compromise ongoing investigations reveal investigatory techniques and confidential informants, and invade the privacy of private citizens who provide information in connection with a particular investigation.

(3) From subsection (e)(1) because information received in the course of an international criminal investigation may involve a violation of state or local law, and it is beneficial to maintain this information to provide investigative leads to state and local law enforcement agencies.

(4) From subsection (e)(2) because collecting information from the subject of criminal investigations would thwart the investigation by placing the subject on notice.

(5) From subsection (e)(3) because supplying an individual with a statement of the intended use of the requested information could compromise the existence of a confidential investigation, and may inhibit cooperation.

(6) From subsection (e)(5) because the vast majority of these records come from local criminal justice agencies and it is administratively impossible to ensure that the records comply with this provision. Submitting agencies are, however, urged on a continuing basis to ensure that their records are accurate and include all dispositions.

(7) From subsection (e)(8) because the notice requirements of this provision could present a serious impediment to law enforcement by revealing investigative techniques, procedures, and the existence of confidential investigations.

(1) Subsection (c)(3). To provide the subject of a criminal or civil matter or case under investigation with an accounting of disclosures of records concerning him or her would inform that individual of the existence, nature, or scope of that investigation and thereby seriously impede law enforcement efforts by permitting the record subject and other persons to whom he might disclose the records to avoid criminal penalties and civil remedies.

(2) Subsection (c)(4). This subsection is inapplicable to the extent that an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d).

(3) Subsection (d)(1). Disclosure of investigatory information could interfere with the investigation, reveal the identity of confidential sources, and result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of others.

(4) Subsection (d)(2). Amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing criminal law enforcement proceedings and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring criminal investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.

(5) Subsections (d)(3) and (4). These subsections are inapplicable to the extent exemption is claimed from (d)(1) and (2).

(6) Subsections (e)(1) and (5). It is often impossible to determine in advance if investigatory records contained in this system are accurate, relevant, timely and complete; but, in the interests of effective law enforcement, it is necessary to retain this information to aid in establishing patterns of activity and provide leads in criminal investigations.

(7) Subsection (e)(2). To collect information from the subject individual would serve notice that he or she is the subject of criminal investigative or law enforcement activity and thereby present a serious impediment to law enforcement.

(8) Subsection (e)(3). To inform individuals as required by this subsection would reveal the existence of an investigation and compromise law enforcement efforts.

(9) Subsection (e)(8). To serve notice would give persons sufficient warning to evade law enforcement efforts.

(10) Subsection (g). This subsection is inapplicable to the extent that the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures could reveal information that is classified in the interest of national security.

(2) From subsection (d)(1), (2), (3) and (4) because access to and amendment of certain portions of records within the system would tend to reveal or compromise information classified in the interest of national security.

(3) From subsection (e)(1) because it is often impossible to determine in advance if information obtained will be relevant for the purposes of conducting the risk analysis for flight training candidates.

(4) From subsection (e)(4)(I) to the extent that this subsection is interpreted to require more detail regarding the record sources in this system than have been published in the Federal Register. Should the subsection be so interpreted, exemption from this provision is necessary because greater specificity concerning the sources of these records could compromise national security.

(1) Criminal Investigation Report System (JUSTICE/ATF-003).

(2) These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). Where compliance would not appear to interfere with or adversely affect the overall law enforcement process, ATF may waive the applicable exemption.

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures from records concerning him/her would reveal investigative interest not only of ATF, but also of the recipient agency. This would permit the record subject to take measures to impede the investigation, e.g., destroy evidence, intimidate potential witnesses or flee the area to avoid the thrust of the investigation.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) because an exemption being claimed for subsection (d) makes this subsection inapplicable.

(3) From subsections (d)(1), (e)(4)(G) and (H), (f) and (g) because these provisions concern individual access to investigative records, compliance with which could compromise sensitive information, interfere with the overall law enforcement process by revealing a pending sensitive investigation, possibly identify a confidential source or disclose information, including actual or potential tax information, which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of another individual's personal privacy, reveal a sensitive investigative technique, or constitute a potential danger to the health or safety of law enforcement personnel.

(4) From subsection (d)(2) because, due to the nature of the information collected and the essential length of time it is maintained, to require ATF to amend information thought to be incorrect, irrelevant or untimely, would create an impossible administrative and investigative burden by forcing the agency to continuously retrograde its investigations attempting to resolve questions of accuracy, etc.

(5) From subsections (d)(3) and (4) because these subsections are inapplicable to the extent exemption is claimed from (d)(1) and (2).

(6) From subsection (e)(1) because:

(7) From subsection (e)(2) because the nature of criminal and other investigative activities is such that vital information about an individual can only be obtained from other persons who are familiar with such individual and his/her activities. In such investigations it is not feasible to rely upon information furnished by the individual concerning his own activities.

(8) From subsection (e)(3) because disclosure would provide the subject with substantial information that could impede or compromise the investigation. The individual could seriously interfere with undercover investigative activities and could take steps to evade the investigation or flee a specific area.

(9) From subsection (e)(4)(I) because the categories of sources of the records in these systems have been published in the Federal Register in broad generic terms in the belief that this is all that subsection (e)(4)(I) of the Act requires. In the event, however, that this subsection should be interpreted to require more detail as to the identity of sources of the records in these systems, exemption from this provision is necessary in order to protect the confidentiality of the sources of criminal and other law enforcement information. Such exemption is further necessary to protect the privacy and physical safety of witnesses and informants.

(10) From subsection (e)(5) because in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to light. The restrictions imposed by subsection (e)(5) would restrict the ability of trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment in reporting on investigations and impede the development of criminal intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement.

(11) From subsection (e)(8) because the notice requirements of this provision could seriously interfere with a law enforcement activity by alerting the subject of a criminal or other investigation of existing investigative interest.

(1) Internal Security Record System (JUSTICE/ATF-006).

(2) These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2) and (k)(5). Where compliance would not appear to interfere with or adversely affect the overall law enforcement process, ATF may waive the applicable exemption.

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because to provide the subject with an accounting of disclosures of records in this system could inform that individual of the existence, nature, or scope of an actual or potential law enforcement investigation, and thereby seriously impede law enforcement efforts by permitting the record subject and other persons to whom he might disclose the records to avoid criminal penalties, civil remedies, or other measures.

(2) From subsection (d)(1) because disclosure of records in the system could reveal the identity of confidential sources and result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of others. Disclosure may also reveal information relating to actual or potential criminal investigations. Such breaches would restrict the free flow of information which is vital to the law enforcement process and the determination of an applicant's qualifications.

(3) From subsection (d)(2) because, due to the nature of the information collected and the essential length of time it is maintained, to require ATF to amend information thought to be incorrect, irrelevant or untimely, would create an impossible administrative and investigative burden by forcing the agency to continuously retrograde its investigations attempting to resolve questions of accuracy, etc.

(4) From subsections (d)(3) and (4) because these subsections are inapplicable to the extent exemption is claimed from (d)(1) and (2).

(5) From subsection (e)(1) because it is often impossible to determine in advance if investigative records contained in this system are accurate, relevant, timely, complete, or of some assistance to either effective law enforcement investigations, or to the determination of the qualifications and suitability of an applicant. It also is necessary to retain this information to aid in establishing patterns of activity and provide investigative leads. Information that may appear irrelevant, when combined with other apparently irrelevant information, can on occasion provide a composite picture of a subject or an applicant which assists the law enforcement process and the determination of an applicant's suitability qualifications.

(6) From subsection (e)(4)(G) and (H), and (f) because these provisions concern individual access to investigative records, compliance with which could compromise sensitive information, interfere with the overall law enforcement or qualification process by revealing a pending sensitive investigation, possibly identify a confidential source or disclose information which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of another individual's personal privacy, reveal a sensitive investigative technique, or constitute a potential danger to the health or safety of law enforcement personnel. In addition, disclosure of information collected pursuant to an employment suitability or similar inquiry could reveal the identity of a source who provided information under an express promise of confidentiality, or could compromise the objectivity or fairness of a testing or examination process.

(7) From subsection (e)(4)(I) because the categories of sources of the records in these systems have been published in the Federal Register in broad generic terms in the belief that this is all that subsection (e)(4)(I) of the Act requires. In the event, however, that this subsection should be interpreted to require more detail as to the identity of sources of the records in these systems, exemption from this provision is necessary in order to protect the confidentiality of the sources of criminal and other law enforcement information. Such exemption is further necessary to protect the privacy and physical safety of witnesses and informants.

(1) Personnel Record System (JUSTICE/ATF-007).

(2) These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5). Where compliance would not appear to interfere with or adversely affect the overall law enforcement process, ATF may waive the applicable exemption.

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures from records concerning him/her would reveal the existence, nature, or scope of an actual or potential personnel action. This would permit the record subject to take measures to hamper or impede such actions.

(2) From subsections (d)(1), (e)(4)(G) and (H), and (f) because many persons are contacted who, without an assurance of anonymity, refuse to provide information concerning a candidate for a position with ATF. Access could reveal the identity of the source of the information and constitute a breach of the promise of confidentiality on the part of ATF. Such breaches ultimately would restrict the free flow of information vital to a determination of a candidate's qualifications and suitability.

(3) From subsection (d)(2) because, due to the nature of the information collected and the essential length of time it is maintained, to require ATF to amend information thought to be incorrect, irrelevant or untimely, would create an impossible administrative and investigative burden by forcing the agency to continuously retrograde its investigations attempting to resolve questions of accuracy, etc.

(4) From subsections (d)(3) and (4) because these subsections are inapplicable to the extent exemption is claimed from (d)(1) and (2).

(5) From subsection (e)(1) because: